Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Example usage of WHOIS data, detecting an executable file download from a domain that's recently expired
Alert on known Hash contacting known IP with VT Relationships
Detects outbound network connections initiated by `dialer.exe`, an outdated Microsoft utility. This process is known to be targeted by info-stealers for process injection and used to establish command and control (C2) connections, with Rhadamanthys being a common example. The rule filters out connections to common local and private IP ranges to reduce false positives.
Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
This analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates by comparing the SHA1 fingerprint from Cisco Secure Firewall logs against a blacklist. This is crucial for identifying malware distribution, C2 infrastructure, or phishing campaigns that reuse or self-sign certificates. Detection of such activity may indicate beaconing, malware download, or data exfiltration over TLS/SSL.
This analytic detects network connections flagged by Cisco Secure Firewall's Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) with a high threat confidence score (80% or greater). This indicates that the encrypted traffic is highly likely to be malicious, potentially associated with malware command and control (C2), remote access tools, or suspicious tunneling behavior. Such activity could signify covert communication from compromised hosts.
The analytic identifies potential malware activities within a network that are blocked by Zscaler. It leverages web proxy logs to filter for blocked actions associated with malware, aggregating occurrences by user, URL, and threat category. This detection is significant for SOC as it highlights attempts to access malicious content, indicating potential compromise or targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could signify an ongoing attempt to infiltrate the network, necessitating immediate investigation to prevent further threats and ensure network integrity.
The analytic identifies potential exploit attempts involving command and script interpreters that are blocked by Zscaler. It uses web proxy logs to detect incidents where actions are blocked due to exploit references. The detection compiles statistics by user, threat name, URL, hostname, file class, and filename. This activity is significant as it helps identify and mitigate exploit attempts, which are critical for maintaining security. If confirmed malicious, such activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-31324, a critical unauthenticated file upload vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer. This flaw allows remote attackers to send specially crafted POST requests to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint, enabling arbitrary file uploads—commonly webshells—resulting in full system compromise. The detection looks for HTTP HEAD or POST requests with a 200 OK status to sensitive Visual Composer endpoints, which may indicate reconnaissance or active exploitation. Successful exploitation can lead to attackers gaining privileged access, deploying malware, and impacting business-critical SAP resources. Immediate patching and investigation of suspicious activity are strongly recommended, as this vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild.
This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing "discord" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.
This analytic detects access attempts to the PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) console on Windows IIS servers. It monitors web traffic for requests to PSWA-related URIs, which could indicate legitimate administrative activity or potential unauthorized access attempts. By tracking source IP, HTTP status, URI path, and HTTP method, it helps identify suspicious patterns or brute-force attacks targeting PSWA. This detection is crucial for maintaining the security of remote PowerShell management interfaces and preventing potential exploitation of this powerful administrative tool.
This YARA rule detects the BackConnect backdoor by identifying specific byte patterns related to its network communication, system information gathering, DNS server enumeration, and network interface enumeration functionalities. The rule looks for distinct code sequences that are characteristic of how this malware operates.
This rule detects the wmRAT backdoor by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include connecting to a command and control (C2) server, finding and exfiltrating files, receiving data and writing it to files, and gathering system information. The rule looks for a combination of these distinct byte patterns to minimize false positives.
Detects HTTP requests to low reputation Top-Level Domains (TLDs) or for files with suspicious extensions, which may indicate an attempt to download malicious content or establish command and control.
GraphRunner contains a function that forges UA strings. The UA strings below are found in that function. Can be used for other UA strings if desired
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2024-1212, an unauthenticated command injection vulnerability in Progress Kemp LoadMaster. The rule specifically looks for GET requests to the '/access/set' API with the parameters 'param=enableapi' and 'value=1', combined with an "Authorization" header containing a base64 encoded value with uncommon characters, indicative of an attempted exploit.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events: a process launching with a low prevalence executable (meaning it's rarely seen in the environment) followed by that same process initiating an HTTP connection to a low prevalence domain (a domain rarely accessed in the environment) within a 10-minute window. This combination can indicate the execution of novel or custom malware attempting to establish command and control or exfiltrate data to an unusual destination.
Detects suspicious user agent strings commonly used by exploit and penetration testing frameworks such as Metasploit, Cobalt Strike, Empire, and Havoc. These user agents often mimic legitimate browsers or applications but contain specific patterns that indicate their use by these tools. The rule is designed to identify command and control (C2) communication or initial access attempts originating from these frameworks by analyzing proxy logs.
Detects when a low prevalence hash is seen during a process launch event, and a low prevalence domain is accessed within 10m.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication activity associated with the Peach Sandstorm APT group. The rule specifically looks for HTTP GET requests to '/api/Core/Command/Init' or '/api/Core/Command/Restart' endpoints, which are indicators of this group's C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects the Voldemort backdoor by identifying specific byte patterns related to its configuration decryption, general decryption algorithm, access token request mechanism, network communication routines, and data download functions from its command and control (C2) server. The rule looks for a combination of these distinct code segments within a Windows executable (MZ header).
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