Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious modifications to agent configurations by monitoring for multiple significant changes within a short time frame (2 days) compared to a 14-day baseline. Monitored indicators include: changes to instructions, addition of new Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, addition of new owners, and expansion of access permissions to include the entire organization. An alert is triggered when an agent exhibits at least two of these signals simultaneously.
The query builds a 14-day baseline snapshot and a 2-day current snapshot per agent from AgentsInfo, computes the four signals independently, then correlates them by AgentId and surfaces only agents with 2 or more signals firing in the same window. Output is a prioritized triage list instead of four separate alert streams.
The query builds a 14-day baseline snapshot and a 2-day current snapshot per agent from AgentsInfo, computes the four signals independently, then correlates them by AgentId and surfaces only agents with 2 or more signals firing in the same window. Output is a prioritized triage list instead of four separate alert streams.
This rule monitors Azure Active Directory (Microsoft Entra ID) audit logs for the addition or modification of application registrations that contain specific, potentially malicious redirect URI patterns ('brk-' or 'brk-multihub'). These patterns are associated with OAuth consent phishing or malicious application authorization where an adversary registers an app to intercept authorization codes.
This query is trying to identify cases where a newly created machine account may correspond to a device that quickly begins exposing domain-controller-like services, especially LDAP and SMB.
This rule monitors Okta system logs for lifecycle events related to inbound Identity Providers (IdP), specifically creation, modification, activation, deactivation, or deletion. It flags these changes when initiated by clients identified as proxies or associated with known abused ASNs. This activity is indicative of potential cross-tenant impersonation where an attacker with administrative access adds a malicious IdP to federate and impersonate organizational users.
Detects the use of the 'net.exe' command to reset the password of a local administrator account. This behavior is specifically associated with the NoEscape ransomware, which utilizes this command as part of its impact-oriented activity to prevent authorized access to the compromised system.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects instances where a WordPress customization changeset is published by a session user that differs from the user associated with the changeset, specifically when the changeset owner holds an administrator role. This behavior may indicate account hijacking or unauthorized privilege escalation within the WordPress administration interface.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
detects manual additions to local Administrators, Remote Desktop Users, and Remote Management Users groups, resolving member SIDs to display names via AD sync, host inventory, and well-known SID mapping, with machine account and FQDN deduplication built in.
Detects when the administrative user is enabled for an Azure Container Registry (ACR). Enabling this account provides a static username and password, which may bypass more secure authentication methods like Azure Active Directory-based access and increase the risk of credential exposure.
Detects when the administrative user account for an Azure Container Registry (ACR) is enabled. Enabling the admin user creates a static username and password for registry access, which may bypass modern identity-based access controls like Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and increase the risk of credential-based attacks.
Detects email notifications regarding the addition of a new Personal Access Token (PAT) to a GitHub account. This activity is often a precursor to unauthorized API access if an adversary has compromised a user's account.
Detects the creation of Azure Container Registry (ACR) scoped access tokens or scope maps. Adversaries may use these features to establish persistent, least-privileged access to registry resources, often bypassing standard authentication monitoring.
Detects the creation or modification of tokens for an Azure Container Registry (ACR). This activity may indicate an administrator managing registry access, or an adversary creating long-lived credentials for persistence within the container environment.
Detects the use of WMIC to rename a local administrator account to 'NO ESCAPE'. This behavior is associated with the NoEscape ransomware, which renames the built-in administrator account to 'NO ESCAPE' as part of its post-compromise activity.
Detects modifications to enable the admin account for an Azure Container Registry (ACR), or queries to check the status of this setting. Enabling the admin account provides a static username/password combination that can be used for authentication, which may represent an security risk or account manipulation if not authorized.
Detects attempts to exploit an authorization bypass vulnerability in MyBB (specifically observed in version 1.8.40) where a non-administrative ACP account can assign users to the administrator group (gid=4) by manipulating POST requests to the user-add or user-edit endpoints.
Detects exploitation attempts of the MyBB limited Admin CP-to-Admin privilege escalation vulnerability. The detection looks for unauthorized HTTP POST requests to the user management module that assign the Administrator group (gid=4) to a new user, or access to sensitive super-admin-only modules by accounts that should not have such permissions. It also flags requests containing known PoC artifact identifiers.
Detects the execution of 'net.exe' from a 'powershell.exe' parent process to either reset the local administrator password or reactivate a built-in domain administrator account. This behavior is associated with the Akira ransomware group's pre-encryption stage to ensure access to compromised endpoints.
Detects high frequency administrative modifications, such as user creation/deletion, password resets, or group membership changes, performed by service accounts associated with Azure AD Connect or Microsoft Entra Connect. This behavior may indicate account compromise where a service principal is being abused to perform bulk identity management operations.
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