Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell processes spawned by common managed file transfer (MFT) or web service processes (such as Serv-U, GoAnywhere, MOVEit, Cleo, Tomcat, etc.) performing remote system discovery or ingress tool transfer activities.
Detects the Shai-Hulud tensorlake payload pattern of fetching a platform-specific HackBrowserData binary and then executing it on the same host to dump browser-stored credentials. Anchored on tool behavior (download then execution on one host) rather than a single sample hash or the rotating C2 domain.
Detects process execution where a shell (such as bash, zsh, cmd, or powershell) is spawned by a skill or openclaw process, and subsequently performs download activities (e.g., using curl, wget, invoke-webrequest) or establishes persistence (e.g., via cron, systemd, registry run keys, schtasks).
Detects a potential TeamPCP infostealer execution chain where a bash shell running setup.sh or entrypoint.sh spawns curl with POST or upload arguments.
Sweeps network connection, HTTP/proxy, file, and process telemetry for exact matches against known Cling botnet indicators: dedicated STUN C2/operator IPs, Cling MIPS loader staging URLs, and known Cling sample SHA256 hashes. Tightened to exclude broad domain-level matching on stun.l.google.com (legitimate, ubiquitous Google STUN infrastructure that Cling spoofs/abuses rather than owns) and to match payload-staging hosts only by full URL rather than bare IP, reducing false positives from shared/compromised hosting and unrelated legitimate STUN traffic.
This analytic detects PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) events that use common download methods to retrieve files directly from raw-content URLs on GitHub, GitLab, or Codeberg.
These code hosting services can be abused to stage payloads, but administrators and developers also download files from them.
A match identifies a download attempt; it does not establish that the file was successfully retrieved or executed. Review the full script block, destination path, process ancestry, and related endpoint activity.
These code hosting services can be abused to stage payloads, but administrators and developers also download files from them.
A match identifies a download attempt; it does not establish that the file was successfully retrieved or executed. Review the full script block, destination path, process ancestry, and related endpoint activity.
The following analytic detects a process located in a potentially suspicious location making DNS queries to known URL shortening services, specifically tinyurl.
URL shorteners are frequently used by threat actors to obfuscate malicious destinations, including phishing pages, malware distribution sites, or command-and-control (C2) endpoints.
While tinyurl.com is a legitimate service, its use in enterprise environments—particularly by non-browser processes or scripts—should be considered suspicious, especially if correlated with subsequent outbound connections, file downloads, process file path or credential prompts. Analysts should investigate the source process, execution context, and destination domain to determine intent and risk.
URL shorteners are frequently used by threat actors to obfuscate malicious destinations, including phishing pages, malware distribution sites, or command-and-control (C2) endpoints.
While tinyurl.com is a legitimate service, its use in enterprise environments—particularly by non-browser processes or scripts—should be considered suspicious, especially if correlated with subsequent outbound connections, file downloads, process file path or credential prompts. Analysts should investigate the source process, execution context, and destination domain to determine intent and risk.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
This rule monitors for potentially malicious use of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) binaries. It detects the execution of common command-line tools for reconnaissance, download, or lateral movement within the WSL environment, identifies the use of WSL to execute Windows 'living-off-the-land' binaries (Lolbins), and flags the installation of WSL components.
The following analytic detects the use of Windows Curl.exe to upload a file to a remote destination.
It identifies command-line arguments such as `-T`, `--upload-file`, `-d`, `--data`, and `-F` in process execution logs.
This activity is significant because adversaries may use Curl to exfiltrate data or upload malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches or further compromise of the system.
Analysts should review parallel processes and network logs to determine if the upload was successful and isolate the endpoint if necessary.
It identifies command-line arguments such as `-T`, `--upload-file`, `-d`, `--data`, and `-F` in process execution logs.
This activity is significant because adversaries may use Curl to exfiltrate data or upload malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches or further compromise of the system.
Analysts should review parallel processes and network logs to determine if the upload was successful and isolate the endpoint if necessary.
Detects the use of curl or wget commands targeting the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) at 169.254.169.254 for credential theft, or performing file uploads and data exfiltration patterns.
The following analytic detects suspicious file downloads by the Telegram application on a Windows system. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 15 to identify instances where Telegram.exe creates files with a Zone.Identifier, indicating a download. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary using Telegram to download malicious tools, such as network scanners, for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to network mapping, lateral movement, and potential compromise of additional systems within the network.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
Detects curl.exe writing an MSI package into the ProgramData
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
Detects usage of expand.exe to extract Microsoft Cabinet (CAB) archives, with
emphasis on extractions into `C:\\ProgramData` or similar staging locations. In
recent APT37 activity, a CAB payload (e.g., wonder.cab) was expanded into
ProgramData prior to persistence and execution. This behavior is a strong signal
for ingress tool transfer and staging of payloads.
emphasis on extractions into `C:\\ProgramData` or similar staging locations. In
recent APT37 activity, a CAB payload (e.g., wonder.cab) was expanded into
ProgramData prior to persistence and execution. This behavior is a strong signal
for ingress tool transfer and staging of payloads.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) domains, and specific download URLs associated with identified threats. It correlates these indicators across process execution, file activity, and network connection logs to identify potential compromises or malicious activity related to the aware-cr1 infrastructure.
Detects HTTP, TLS, DNS, and TCP communication with known AhsayCBS campaign infrastructure and Alibaba OSS storage buckets used for payload delivery.
A file was downloaded from an SAP system by a host matching a threat intelligence indicator
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