Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of Python scripts associated with the ModeloRAT, such as modes.py, extentions.py, or udp.pyw. This activity is part of the CrashFix campaign, where attackers deploy a portable Python environment to ensure payload execution.
Detects PowerShell spawned by explorer.exe with extensive whitespace padding followed by comment characters and fake document paths. This technique is used in social engineering attacks where victims are instructed to paste commands into File Explorer, with malicious code hidden by whitespace and a visible fake path comment (e.g., "# C:\Documents\policy.docx") to appear benign.
This rule detects various activities associated with the ClawdBot campaign, which uses a fake VS Code extension to drop the ScreenConnect RAT. Detection logic includes suspicious network activity fetching malicious payloads (config.json, lightshot files, zoomupdate.msi) from known malicious domains or Dropbox, identification of known malicious file hashes, outbound connections to ScreenConnect C2 servers on port 8041, creation or start of ScreenConnect services, file dropping/staging in temporary directories, and execution of Code.exe or ScreenConnect binaries from temporary paths.
Detects the execution of the Diaoyu Loader, which performs a sandbox evasion check by verifying the existence of a 'pic1.png' file in its execution directory. This behavior is associated with the TGR-STA-1030 threat group.
This query utilizes the IOCs provided by Rapid7 and focuses on columns in the DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents tables. This is a high FP query, however each event will require an investigation to its legitimacy. The query accounts for all devices that have installed notepad++ in the past 400d and only looking for IOCs within time of known compromise in order to save on resources. Some IOCs are commented out due to high FP rate.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools or related lures from suspicious user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp folders. Adversaries trick users into downloading RMM tools into these locations to bypass typical software installation monitoring.
This rule detects outbound network connections to command and control (C2) domains and identifies files by name or hash associated with malicious PDF editor campaigns (e.g., ConvertMate, PDFClick, PDFSkills). These campaigns use malicious PDF editors for C2 communication, to download additional payloads, and for initial execution.
Detects the execution of processes named 'openclaw-agent.exe' or 'openclaw-agent'. These binaries are being distributed as malicious 'prerequisites' in weaponized OpenClaw AI agent skills to install infostealers and other malware.
Detects the legitimate Notepad++ updater (GUP.exe) spawning suspicious child processes. This behavior was observed during the Notepad++ supply chain attack where the updater was abused to download and execute malicious installers and command interpreters.
Detects the Notepad++ updater process (gup.exe) spawning unusual child processes. Attackers have been observed hijacking the update process to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the creation or modification of a `.vscode/tasks.json` file that is configured to automatically run a task when a folder is opened.
Adversaries can abuse this feature in VS Code and GitHub Codespaces to achieve remote code execution by tricking a user into opening a malicious repository or pull request.
Adversaries can abuse this feature in VS Code and GitHub Codespaces to achieve remote code execution by tricking a user into opening a malicious repository or pull request.
Detects the creation of a zero-byte 'pic1.png' file alongside an executable in the same directory, a TTP associated with the Diaoyu Loader's anti-sandbox integrity check. This behavior indicates an attempt to evade detection by verifying the execution environment.
Detects the execution of a command shell by the Java Runtime to run a batch file from a typical malware staging directory. This behavior is a core TTP of the Stan Ghouls group, used to execute their malicious Java-based loaders which in turn drop and run the NetSupport RAT.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'ClawdBot' campaign, which involves dropping the ScreenConnect Remote Access Trojan (RAT) via a fake VS Code extension. It identifies suspicious network connections to known malicious domains or Dropbox (when initiated by Code.exe), known malicious file hashes, outbound connections to ScreenConnect C2 ports, creation or start of ScreenConnect services, file drops in temporary directories related to ScreenConnect or Lightshot, and execution of Code.exe or ScreenConnect binaries from temporary folders. It also looks for initial payload downloads from attacker command and control infrastructure.
Detects the execution of suspicious binaries (update.exe, AutoUpdater.exe) from a temporary directory, where the parent process is the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe). Notepad++ does not use these filenames for legitimate updates, and this behavior is indicative of a hijacked update process.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) spawning suspicious child processes like command shells or script interpreters. This behavior can be indicative of malicious macro execution or exploitation of vulnerabilities, where an embedded OLE object leads to code execution.
Detects the execution of a process named 'code.exe' or 'lightshot.exe' from a temporary directory.
This behavior was observed in a campaign involving a malicious VS Code extension, "ClawdBot Agent", which impersonates a legitimate AI coding assistant.
The extension drops and executes a weaponized ScreenConnect payload, masquerading it as a legitimate VS Code or Lightshot process to evade detection.
The execution is often spawned by the legitimate VS Code process.
This behavior was observed in a campaign involving a malicious VS Code extension, "ClawdBot Agent", which impersonates a legitimate AI coding assistant.
The extension drops and executes a weaponized ScreenConnect payload, masquerading it as a legitimate VS Code or Lightshot process to evade detection.
The execution is often spawned by the legitimate VS Code process.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) spawning suspicious child processes like command shells or script interpreters. This behavior can be indicative of malicious macro execution or exploitation of vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2026-21509, where an embedded OLE object leads to code execution.
Detects when a suspicious process (such as a script interpreter or LOLBIN) is executed from a directory configured as a Microsoft Office Trusted Location. Attackers may place malicious executables or scripts in these locations to bypass security controls and execute them, often as a result of a user opening a malicious document.
Detects when a potentially malicious file (such as a macro-enabled document, executable, or script) is created within a directory configured as a Microsoft Office Trusted Location. Attackers may place malicious files in these locations to ensure they are opened by the user without security warnings (like Protected View or macro-blocking), facilitating code execution. This rule correlates file creation events with trusted paths dynamically enumerated from the device's registry.
Detects when a Microsoft Office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) spawns a suspicious child process (like cmd.exe or powershell.exe) from a document located in a configured Office Trusted Location. While trusted locations are meant to bypass macro security warnings, the subsequent spawning of shell processes is a strong indicator of malicious macro execution for post-exploitation activities.
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