Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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CyberSecurityNews has reported a raising case about a new wave of phishing emails masquerading as breach notifications from LastPass.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
Detects a sequence of events where a user visits a Cloudflare Pages URL (*.pages.dev) and shortly after, a suspicious command (mshta, powershell, or curl) is executed. This pattern is consistent with the UNC5142 threat actor's TTP of using social engineering lures hosted on Cloudflare Pages to trick users into running malicious commands.
KQL Query
These rules detect encrypted ZIP files that contain only a single entry. The rules further specialize to detect if that single entry is a VBScript (.vbs) or Microsoft Management Console (.msc) file. This pattern is often used by adversaries to deliver malicious payloads, bypassing email security solutions that might not scan encrypted archives or might not recognize the malicious intent of single-entry archives containing specific script or configuration file types.
This rule detects a suspicious activity chain where an SVG file is created by Outlook, immediately followed by a browser downloading a potentially malicious payload (archive, executable, or script file) on the same device within a short timeframe. This pattern could indicate a social engineering attack where a user is tricked into opening a malicious SVG attachment, which then leads to the download of a secondary malicious file.
This rule detects Portable Executable (PE) files that masquerade as PDF documents by embedding specific PDF-themed icons. The rule checks for the standard PE file magic bytes and then hashes the first resource (typically the icon) of the PE file. If the hash matches any of the known hashes for PDF red icons, it triggers an alert. This technique is commonly used by attackers to trick users into executing malicious files that appear to be benign PDF documents.
Detects Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) or masquerading binaries executing JavaScript (.js) files from user-writable paths such as C:\Users\ or C:\ProgramData\. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing payloads, malware droppers, or persistence mechanisms that execute user-space scripts. The rule covers both legitimate wscript.exe and renamed or spoofed variants.
This rule detects process injection activities originating from Microsoft Word (winword.exe) that are characteristic of a LittleCorporal generated malicious document. Specifically, it looks for winword.exe as the source image performing process access, combined with a call trace that includes a .NET Framework 64-bit v2.x path and an 'UNKNOWN' module, which is indicative of injected code.
Detects the creation of an MSI (Microsoft Installer) file on a device where the file's origin referrer URL indicates it was downloaded from a ZIP archive that was originally an email attachment. This could indicate a user opening a malicious ZIP file from an email, leading to the execution of an installer.
Detects PowerShell execution with a command line indicative of a download cradle, initiated from the user's shell (explorer.exe). This behavior is characteristic of the "ClickFix" social engineering technique where a user is tricked into copying and running a malicious command from a webpage.
Detects mshta.exe or masquerading binaries executing HTA files (.hta) from user-writable paths such as C:\Users\.
Threat actors leverage mshta for proxy execution or to launch malicious HTA payloads stored under user profiles.
Threat actors leverage mshta for proxy execution or to launch malicious HTA payloads stored under user profiles.
Detects high-fidelity execution of executables spawned from Office applications or browsers after engaging with recruitment-themed lures (e.g., LinkedIn, careers). Focuses on EXE files created and executed within 24 hours in user directories (Downloads, Temp, AppData), reflecting Subtle Snail’s social engineering and document-based initial access methods.
Detects the creation of files with executable or script extensions by Microsoft Office applications. This behavior can indicate an attempt to drop and execute malicious code, often associated with initial access or execution phases of an attack. The rule specifically looks for common Office applications creating files with extensions like .exe, .dll, .ps1, .vbs, etc., while filtering out known legitimate activities.
This rule detects potential SVG-based phishing attempts originating from Microsoft Outlook. It correlates network access, file downloads, and URL click telemetry to identify instances where Outlook initiates connections to or downloads files ending with '.svg'. This is particularly relevant for detecting phishing campaigns that leverage malicious SVG files to embed JavaScript, redirectors, or Base64-encoded HTML payloads for credential harvesting or other malicious activities.
RedCanary recommends to create a Policy wich opens js files in Notepad (https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/notepad-javascript/) to prevent the execution of malicious payloads.
This Query detects instances where 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' are initiated by 'openwith.exe' or 'explorer.exe' and execute a JavaScript file (.js) located within a user's profile directory. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often delivered via user interaction (e.g., opening a malicious file).
This Query detects instances where 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' are initiated by 'openwith.exe' or 'explorer.exe' and execute a JavaScript file (.js) located within a user's profile directory. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often delivered via user interaction (e.g., opening a malicious file).
This analytic identifies Office applications spawning child processes that attempt to download content via HTTP/HTTPS. It focuses on process creation events where Office applications (e.g., Word, Excel) initiate network connections, specifically excluding common web browsers. This activity is significant because it often indicates the use of malicious documents to execute living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) for payload delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
This analytic detects the creation of URL shortcut files (.url) outside of common, legitimate directories. Such activity is often associated with malware, including ransomware like CHAOS. Malicious .url files can be used to trick users into visiting harmful websites or, if placed in specific locations (e.g., Windows Startup folder), can achieve persistence and execute malicious code upon system reboot, leading to system compromise and data loss.
The following analytic detects the creation or dropping of executable or script files in the root directory of a removable drive. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on specific file types and their creation paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to spread malware, such as ransomware, via removable media. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, lateral movement, or persistence within the network, potentially compromising sensitive data and systems.
The analytic identifies a suspicious process executed from within common container/archive file types such as ZIP, ISO, IMG, and others. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by adversaries to execute scripts or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed Russian military Intelligence actor Seashell Blizzard conduct a phishing campaign using Excel attachments embedded with the custom CheapShot malware. CheapShot allows the actor to maintain persistence on targeted devices, likely to support intelligence collection. The actor primarily targeted critical infrastructure and key resources in Ukraine and Europe.
Search for events in your network and locate potential CheapShot malware- related indicators.
The file hashes are associated with CheapShot activity.
Search for events in your network and locate potential CheapShot malware- related indicators.
The file hashes are associated with CheapShot activity.
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