Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,598 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,151
134
65
63
53
Contributors
368
274
239
197
70
Categories
983
375
271
227
140
Platforms
871
506
164
160
149
Products / Services
949
298
133
113
108
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,587
8,397
6,227
1,598
CVEs
2
1
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
18
5
4
1
1
IDS Protocols
15
8
4
3
Detects a ClickFix attack chain involving an email client opening a browser to a suspicious domain, followed by a file download, and subsequent execution via cmd.exe from explorer within a short timeframe. This chain of events is indicative of a social engineering attack designed to trick users into executing malicious files.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
This rule detects inbound emails that appear to be Microsoft Teams invitations but contain suspicious keywords in the subject line related to financial transactions (invoice, billing, payment, renewal, charge). This could indicate a phishing attempt where adversaries leverage legitimate-looking Microsoft invitation emails to deliver financially themed lures.
This rule detects potential malicious email campaigns by identifying when multiple users submit email reports (e.g., phishing or spam) that share common entities such as sender IP, primary sender address/domain, secondary sender address/domain, or subject line. A configurable threshold determines the minimum number of distinct reports required to flag an entity as suspicious.
This Query is oriented to identify Malicious URL sent via Microsoft Teams and detect possible hits based on online Malware sites reported by the TI Feed URL Haus.
Detects anomalous Okta sign-on policy evaluations originating from Cloudflare, which could indicate an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attempt. The associated campaign uses Cloudflare to host its phishing infrastructure.
This KQL Query helps to understand all the URL Redirections from URLs received by Email using the UrlChainId identifier on KQL that groups together all URLs that belong to the same “click/redirect chain”. When an message contains a URL, that URL may redirect through several intermediate URLs (trackers, shorteners, phishing, etc.) before land on the final site. KQL builds a URL chain from the original URL in the email through each redirect hop. All URLs that are part of a single chain share the same UrlChainId and for each hop. On the other hand, UrlChainPosition register the position of every URL, the original one = value 0 and the other redirections tagged with next numbers(1, 2, etc. ) The following query includes different options to classify the insights into four categories:
Tracking Domains
Redirecting to Different Countries
Redirecting to Different Domains
Number of Redirections
Tracking Domains
Redirecting to Different Countries
Redirecting to Different Domains
Number of Redirections
This detection identifies emails linked to a recent widespread phishing campaign that abuses trusted Microsoft SharePoint links to bypass traditional security controls. Attackers use convincing business emails containing SharePoint URLs that lead to multi-step validation pages, mimicking legitimate Microsoft authentication flows. These techniques make the attacks highly deceptive and harder to detect, as the initial links appear legitimate.
This campaign has been active and prevalent over the past two weeks, targeting multiple organizations and leveraging user trust in Microsoft services to harvest credentials.
Use this query to find potential malicious SharePoint links in email messages and investigate them further by detonating the URLs in a sandbox environment to analyze their behavior.
This campaign has been active and prevalent over the past two weeks, targeting multiple organizations and leveraging user trust in Microsoft services to harvest credentials.
Use this query to find potential malicious SharePoint links in email messages and investigate them further by detonating the URLs in a sandbox environment to analyze their behavior.
Detects network traffic to domains associated with the TAG-160 cluster's phishing campaigns, which primarily target the logistics sector.
This rule detects network connections to or DNS requests for known malicious IP addresses and domains associated with phishing campaigns. The domains often mimic legitimate services like Zoom, Microsoft, and Google, indicating potential credential harvesting or malware distribution attempts.
This detection looks for browser network traffic to URLs containing common social engineering keywords and common web page file extensions, while excluding trusted domains. This activity is associated with the Matrix Push C2 framework, which uses malicious browser notifications to lure users to phishing pages.
This rule detects when a domain or URL observed in Teams Messages matches a known threat intelligence indicator from Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence. It specifically looks for hits against 'Domain' and 'URL' type indicators.
Detects network connections to domains known to be used as infrastructure for an ongoing, highly evasive Evilginx phishing campaign targeting SSO portals.
Detects network connections to dedicated IP addresses previously used to host Evilginx phishing proxies. While the threat actor has reportedly shifted to using Cloudflare, these IPs represent past infrastructure and should be monitored for potential reuse.
The .cfd Top-Level Domain (TLD) is often linked to malicious activities such as phishing, malware distribution, and command-and-control (C2) operations. This query detects new allowed network connections to .cfd domains that have appeared for the first time in your environment within the past 24 hours. Monitoring these connections can serve as an early warning sign of potential security breaches or users being targeted by phishing attacks. The query also provides valuable context for each newly observed domain, including its first-ever occurrence within a 30-day window, the total recent access count, and the users involved—enabling analysts to quickly evaluate the associated risk.
This rule detects potential Browser-in-the-Browser (BITB) phishing attacks, specifically targeting the 'Sneaky2FA' technique. It looks for HTTP responses containing an iframe, base64 encoded image data, and the string ';base64,', which are indicators of a malicious page attempting to mimic a legitimate login portal within an iframe to steal credentials.
Detects when an internal user successfully authenticates as a guest to an external Microsoft Teams tenant. This could be legitimate B2B collaboration, but it can also be abused by attackers to lure users into a malicious tenant where security controls (like Safe Links/Safe Attachments) are not enforced.
Detects when an internal user successfully authenticates as a guest to an external Microsoft Teams tenant. This could be legitimate B2B collaboration, but it can also be abused by attackers to lure users into a malicious tenant where security controls (like Safe Links/Safe Attachments) are not enforced.
Detects emails containing URLs with patterns characteristic of the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit. These URLs often contain a base64-encoded email address in the path, preceded by a special character.
Detects curl command downloading payloads to /var/tmp, indicating potential initial delivery stage of FlexibleFerret malware.
Detect when System Manager successfully executes commands against an instance.
Page 55 of 77