Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
15,636 detections
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Detects anomalous activities associated with potential PHP2Shell exploitation or webshell deployment where a web server worker (such as Apache, HTTPD, or PHP) spawns a Unix shell containing suspicious utility tokens, drops a PHP file outside excluded directories, or creates a PHP session-derived file.
Detects googleupdate.exe loading an unsigned DLL from a non-standard path, followed by network communication to a known Command and Control (C2) domain or IP address.
Detects suspicious use of Node.js package managers running malicious lifecycle hooks, installing rogue dependencies, or invoking script execution during package installation.
Detects the modification or setting of the execInstalledOnly parameter to false, 0, or disabled on VMware ESXi or Linux hosts via process execution command lines or syslog messages, often associated with running uninstalled or arbitrary scripts/binaries in virtualized environments.
Correlates an inbound connection to a Python/Xoscar/Xinference pool process with an outbound connection from a shell spawned by that same pool process shortly afterward, potentially indicating exploitation and reverse shell activity.
Detects command output staged in a temporary file (/tmp/nx_cmd.txt) by a Unix shell spawned from ExifTool or Perl, typically resulting from Gotenberg CVE-2026-42589 exploitation, or detects the specific staging filename behavior independently.
Box Shield Malicious Content Upload
Cortex XDR
Surfaces Box Shield malware detection alerts with file hash, upload path, source IP, and scan results for immediate correlation and threat response.
Correlates internet-origin executable creation with subsequent execution by Windows shell processes using matching device, file path and SHA1 hash within a five-minute timeframe.
Detects a sequence where a SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) related to SharePoint, followed shortly (within 1 hour) by high-fidelity lateral movement tooling or remote execution techniques (such as PsExec, WMI, PowerShell remoting, or scheduled tasks) on the same host.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell or PWSH executes a web download referencing an .mp4 file using download cmdlets, followed within 1 hour by the execution of NetSupport Manager components (client32.exe or pcictlui.exe) from a user-writable path.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that execute SysMon.py from the non-standard C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\ directory, or the corresponding scheduled task creation events.
Detects host-side telemetry indicating Cairn agent worker artifacts, including specific process command line terms, tsec skill files and environment variables, combined with network connections to OpenRouter from the same host.
Detects suspicious exploitation activity against NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances, including requests to CGI, VPN, or authentication endpoints with command execution, webshell, or encoded payload behavior associated with CVE-2026-88771.
This analytic detects outbound network connections from a Python process running from suspicious or non-standard directories to social media related domains.
It leverages Sysmon Event ID 3 to surface this anomalous behavior.
Legitimate Python applications rarely originate from paths such as "C:\Users\Public\", Windows font or debug folders, or the Recycle Bin, making direct outbound calls to social media infrastructure from these locations a strong indicator of compromise.
For example the Braodo Stealer, a Python-based credential-harvesting malware, abuses authenticated browser sessions to query the Meta Graph API and enumerate the victim's Facebook and Meta advertising infrastructure.
It leverages Sysmon Event ID 3 to surface this anomalous behavior.
Legitimate Python applications rarely originate from paths such as "C:\Users\Public\", Windows font or debug folders, or the Recycle Bin, making direct outbound calls to social media infrastructure from these locations a strong indicator of compromise.
For example the Braodo Stealer, a Python-based credential-harvesting malware, abuses authenticated browser sessions to query the Meta Graph API and enumerate the victim's Facebook and Meta advertising infrastructure.
Detects suspicious command execution activities using Azure RunCommand, Custom Script Extension, or Azure Connected Machine Agent combined with potentially malicious command arguments or tools such as PowerShell encoded commands, 'IEX', download strings, certutil, whoami, base64, curl, or wget.
Detects a web server process (apache2, httpd, php-fpm) spawning a Unix shell (dash/sh) that executes discovery commands such as id, whoami, hostname, or find. This is the durable post-exploitation signature of the wp2shell WordPress pre-auth RCE chain (CVE-2026-63030, CVE-2026-60137), where a malicious plugin or webshell executes commands through the web stack.
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
Detects an AhsayCBS / Tomcat / Java web service process spawning a
command or script interpreter. After exploiting AhsayCBS, attackers executed
shell commands through the dropped webshell to run reconnaissance and download
the XMRig payload. A backup web service should never directly spawn cmd.exe,
powershell.exe, or a Unix shell - this indicates webshell command execution.
command or script interpreter. After exploiting AhsayCBS, attackers executed
shell commands through the dropped webshell to run reconnaissance and download
the XMRig payload. A backup web service should never directly spawn cmd.exe,
powershell.exe, or a Unix shell - this indicates webshell command execution.
Detects AI coding assistants and agents (such as Copilot, Cursor, Claude Code, etc.) spawning command-line interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, Node, Bun, Deno) with potential API keys, tokens, or credentials exposed in the process command line.
Detects when a web browser (such as Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Brave, or Opera) spawns common command interpreters, scripting engines, or Living off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) like cmd, powershell, mshta, rundll32, or certutil. This behavior is often indicative of a drive-by compromise or browser exploitation attempt.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
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