Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

12,583 detections

Detects a sequence where an UpdraftCentral management request is made to a WordPress site followed by plugin installation or user creation requests from the same source within a 30-minute window, potentially indicating unauthorized plugin installation or webshell deployment via compromised management endpoints.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
9 days ago
308
Detects indicators of ToolShell web shell creation (spinstall0.aspx) and ASP.NET machine key harvesting activities (reading web.config or accessing validationkey/decryptionkey materials via w3wp child processes or file access audits) on SharePoint servers.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
9 days ago
108
Detects a sequence where a SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) related to SharePoint, followed shortly (within 1 hour) by high-fidelity lateral movement tooling or remote execution techniques (such as PsExec, WMI, PowerShell remoting, or scheduled tasks) on the same host.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
9 days ago
108
Detects the creation or renaming of the 'ESX Admins' Active Directory security group combined with the addition of members to it, which is often used for privilege escalation or persistence in VMware ESXi environments managed via Active Directory.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
12 days ago
0017
Detects a successful AWS IAM CreateRole event whose trust policy allows sts:AssumeRole by a principal in another AWS account or by a wildcard
principal.
This configuration may provide persistent access if the principal can assume the role. The event alone does not establish that the role was assumed or that its creation was unauthorized.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
10 days ago
009
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that execute SysMon.py from the non-standard C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\ directory, or the corresponding scheduled task creation events.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
002
Detects script files (PHP, JSP, etc.) created or renamed within web root directories by the ProFTPD process, indicating potential exploitation of the mod_copy module (CVE-2015-3306) to upload web shells.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
002
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
7 hours ago
000
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
7 hours ago
000
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
7 hours ago
000
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
7 hours ago
000
Alerts whenever a default SAP administrative account (e.g., SAP*, DDIC, TMSADM) logs into the system. These accounts should be locked and used only for emergency 'break-glass' scenarios
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
14 days ago
4023
This hunting query identifies successful AWS IAM access key creation events where a named IAM user creates a key for a different named IAM user.
Such activity may indicate persistence or privilege escalation, particularly when the target user has elevated permissions. The query compares the caller and target usernames; it does not assess the target user's permissions.
Hunting queries are designed to be run manually during threat hunting activities.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
11 days ago
5011
Detects suspicious exploitation activity against NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances, including requests to CGI, VPN, or authentication endpoints with command execution, webshell, or encoded payload behavior associated with CVE-2026-88771.
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Sunil Chikkala@Sunil2652000
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Detection & Hunting Community
13 days ago
2018
Detects five or more Entra ID device registrations by a single account where device names match microsoft-* or WINDOWS-* patterns, occurring shortly after a device code flow sign-in by the same account. This behavior is indicative of device registration abuse or persistent access attempts.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
6 days ago
003
Detects execution of GoldenDMSA hacktool used for Directory Service Account manipulation.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
10 days ago
107
Browser sign-ins and MFA prompts with medium or high sign-in risk from devices that have no Entra device identity and are not managed or compliant. Hunting query, not an alert.
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Goksel Atakan@gokselatakan
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Detections.ai Community
14 days ago
9022
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
4 days ago
001
Detects potential persistence establishment where an AOMEI-related process writes a DLL file to disk, followed by the creation or modification of a Windows service pointing to that same DLL within a 15-minute window.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
11 days ago
208
Detects the creation of application-specific passwords followed by their initial use from unknown or new IP addresses using legacy authentication clients, which may indicate account compromise or persistence establishment.
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Shadows VMB@Vemorian_Mort
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Detections.ai Community
11 days ago
708
This detection flags a parent and child process pair on internet-facing Windows servers, where the parent is a web server process and the child is the process it launched. The web server processes covered are w3wp, httpd, nginx and Tomcat, including versioned Tomcat service executables such as tomcat9.exe and Tomcat running under java.exe, which is identified by the Catalina bootstrap class in its command line. A server is treated as internet-facing based on the most recent status recorded for it.

Instead of matching known web shell names, the query builds a baseline from the previous 30 days of process activity on each device and alerts when a pair appears in the latest window that has never been seen on that device before, so it can catch web shell activity it has never seen before. Because the baseline is held per device, a pair that is normal on one server does not hide the same pair appearing on another.

The rule runs every 24 hours, as this is the only Defender custom detection frequency with a 30-day lookback, and the alert window covers the last 25 hours so that a slightly delayed run does not leave a gap.

The baseline and alert windows are separated by ingestion time rather than event time, so events that arrive late are still evaluated.
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Christopher Scott@Scocha
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Detections.ai Community
16 days ago
10031
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