Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Azure AD service principal sign-ins utilizing suspicious scripting-related user agents such as curl, python-requests, Wget, or Postman, which may indicate automated scripting, custom tooling, or potential abuse of cloud service accounts.
Detects a potential app-only tenant-takeover sequence associated with Storm-3119 (YAM Store), where a single service principal performs an administrative password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window.
Detects non-interactive service principal sign-ins originating from an IP address and location never seen for that specific principal over a prior 30-day baseline period, approximating potential misuse of stolen cloud credentials exposed via environment variables.
Detects when a domain user account is renamed (Event ID 4781) where the old account name ends with a dollar sign (indicating a computer account) but the new name does not, or vice-versa, specifically checking if the new name matches a Domain Controller. This behavior can be indicative of account manipulation or exploitation attempts such as golden ticket or related attacks.
Correlates a device code flow sign-in event with bulk file downloads from SharePoint or OneDrive by the same user account within a 1-hour window. This behavior can indicate potential account compromise or misuse where an adversary uses device code phishing to authenticate and subsequently exfiltrate sensitive files.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task with the name or command containing 'WinRTCS' correlated with WMI permanent event subscription activities or execution of the 'own_lib.ps1' watchdog script within a 1-hour window on the same device, using Microsoft Defender XDR tables.
Detects when the same initiating process stops or deletes Windows services and subsequently deletes scheduled tasks or WMI event subscriptions within a 15-minute window on a single device, potentially indicating defense evasion or clean-up actions.
Detects new client secrets or certificates added to any service principal in Azure AD, specifically identifying activities linked to the ConnectWise supply-chain attack or suspicious user agents.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Detects potential bootkit activity or unauthorized modifications to the EFI system partition by correlating non-standard .efi file writes with subsequent execution of boot configuration utilities like bcdedit or mountvol within a 30-minute window.
Detects AppInit DLL registry modifications referencing DLLs located in user-writable directories (such as AppData, Temp, Users\Public, or Downloads), which may indicate adversary persistence or process injection configuration.
Detects a sequence where a FortiSIEM-related process writes or modifies a shell script in a cron or phoenix directory, followed closely within 2 minutes by a child process spawned by cron executing that same written script file.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Correlates a running ProFTPD FTP server process listening on TCP port 21 with commands checking or loading the mod_copy module on the same Linux device using Microsoft Defender XDR telemetry.
Detects a PHP file being written into a WordPress content directory
that has no legitimate reason to hold executable code. The wp2shell chain against
CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137 stages its payload through wp-content/uploads/
and wp-content/upgrade/ before it lands as a plugin under
wp-content/plugins/wp2shell_/, so both the staging directories and the
campaign's plugin directory shape are matched. uploads/ is the durable half:
WordPress serves user media from it and nothing there should ever be a .php file,
which makes a PHP write there a strong webshell indicator independent of this
campaign.
that has no legitimate reason to hold executable code. The wp2shell chain against
CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137 stages its payload through wp-content/uploads/
and wp-content/upgrade/ before it lands as a plugin under
wp-content/plugins/wp2shell_/, so both the staging directories and the
campaign's plugin directory shape are matched. uploads/ is the durable half:
WordPress serves user media from it and nothing there should ever be a .php file,
which makes a PHP write there a strong webshell indicator independent of this
campaign.
Detects VPN connection events where the client hostname contains the string 'kali', which may indicate the use of a penetration testing operating system or a suspicious device connecting to the corporate network via Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects persistence mechanisms established via Registry Run/RunOnce keys, Startup folder modifications, or scheduled task creation using specific tool names such as client32 or pcictlui.
Detects the removal of user accounts from a specific sensitive Microsoft Entra ID group, which may indicate unauthorized group membership changes or potential privilege escalation activities.
This rule detects suspicious driver loading from user-writable paths, kernel driver service creation, disabling of driver signing, loading of Linux kernel modules, and the usage of LD_PRELOAD for rootkit functionality.
Detects a user account that performs a device code sign-in flow followed by the registration of five or more devices with deceptive names (matching patterns like microsoft- or windows-) within a one day timeframe. This behavior can indicate an adversary establishing persistence or attempting tenant resource exhaustion using compromised accounts.
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