Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,116 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
6,549
6,199
1,473
1,002
661
Contributors
3,555
2,652
2,153
2,087
1,515
Categories
7,567
3,899
1,465
1,391
1,330
Platforms
13,722
1,392
1,318
824
738
Products / Services
3,828
3,129
2,448
912
908
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,636
12,583
8,393
6,223
CVEs
19
18
17
16
14
IDS Classtypes
305
51
24
23
22
IDS Protocols
308
136
13
10
10
Detects the creation of application-specific passwords followed by their initial use from unknown or new IP addresses using legacy authentication clients, which may indicate account compromise or persistence establishment.
Detects Azure AD service principal sign-ins utilizing suspicious scripting-related user agents such as curl, python-requests, Wget, or Postman, which may indicate automated scripting, custom tooling, or potential abuse of cloud service accounts.
Detects a potential app-only tenant-takeover sequence associated with Storm-3119 (YAM Store), where a single service principal performs an administrative password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window.
Detects when a Bandizip executable loads an unsigned dynamic-link library (DLL) from outside the standard installation directory, where the Bandizip process was launched by explorer.exe, potentially indicating DLL side-loading.
Detects non-interactive service principal sign-ins originating from an IP address and location never seen for that specific principal over a prior 30-day baseline period, approximating potential misuse of stolen cloud credentials exposed via environment variables.
Correlates a device code flow sign-in event with bulk file downloads from SharePoint or OneDrive by the same user account within a 1-hour window. This behavior can indicate potential account compromise or misuse where an adversary uses device code phishing to authenticate and subsequently exfiltrate sensitive files.
Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Detects potential bootkit activity or unauthorized modifications to the EFI system partition by correlating non-standard .efi file writes with subsequent execution of boot configuration utilities like bcdedit or mountvol within a 30-minute window.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
This rule detects suspicious driver loading from user-writable paths, kernel driver service creation, disabling of driver signing, loading of Linux kernel modules, and the usage of LD_PRELOAD for rootkit functionality.
Detects a single application or service principal performing a password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window. This sequence matches Storm-3119 admin-panel abuse of a compromised tenant client secret through an app-only flow in Microsoft 365 or Entra ID.
Detects administrative login to the FortiWeb console from an address without prior
history. Console access permits policy change and signature control, so compromise
of the WAF administrator is equivalent to removing the WAF for every application
behind it.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip
history. Console access permits policy change and signature control, so compromise
of the WAF administrator is equivalent to removing the WAF for every application
behind it.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip
Detects successful non-interactive sign-ins by Entra ID service principals from an IP address and location never seen in the prior 14 days, helping to identify potentially compromised application credentials used from unfamiliar locations.
Detects HTTP requests to the PeopleSoft PSEMHUB servlet using alternate
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
Detects PowerShell launched hidden and non-interactive with an insecure execution policy and Base64 decode-and-execute, or a script combining Base64 decode-and-execute with browser history collection and WMI shadow copy enumeration, as seen in the Midnight Blizzard (GTG-20006) stager.
Page 4 of 863