Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Audit query that finds enabled OAuth apps in Microsoft Entra ID holding permissions an attacker would want: reading or sending mail, accessing files and sites, planting credentials on other apps, assigning roles, or changing Conditional Access. App-only permissions (the app signs in as itself, with no user and no MFA) are split from delegated ones. High-privilege delegated grants are flagged only for external apps with no verified publisher, the typical consent-phishing shape. Output is one row per app with a plain-language ReviewReason, publisher, origin, admin consent, activity (Inactive 90d+ is the easiest to disable) and “(in use)” markers on permissions the app actually exercises, so a review team can decide to keep, reduce or disable.
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
Detects high volume and diverse URI requests targeting login, search, or inquiry endpoints on IIS servers within a short time window, indicative of web brute force or active reconnaissance scanning.
Detects password spraying: a single source IP generating failed
logins against many distinct accounts in a short window. AI-assisted planning
can produce low-rate credential attacks designed to stay under per-account
lockout thresholds; the distinguishing signal is breadth across users rather
than volume per user.
logins against many distinct accounts in a short window. AI-assisted planning
can produce low-rate credential attacks designed to stay under per-account
lockout thresholds; the distinguishing signal is breadth across users rather
than volume per user.
Detects credential harvesting tooling and activity targeting PaperCut configuration and log files by identifying specific parser script executions, searches for PaperCut credential key patterns in process command lines, and the creation of related harvest artifacts.
Audit query that finds enabled OAuth apps in Microsoft Entra ID holding permissions an attacker would want: reading or sending mail, accessing files and sites, planting credentials on other apps, assigning roles, or changing Conditional Access. App-only permissions (the app signs in as itself, with no user and no MFA) are split from delegated ones. High-privilege delegated grants are flagged only for external apps with no verified publisher, the typical consent-phishing shape. Output is one row per app with a plain-language ReviewReason, publisher, origin, admin consent, activity (Inactive 90d+ is the easiest to disable) and “(in use)” markers on permissions the app actually exercises, so a review team can decide to keep, reduce or disable.
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
Detects potential password spraying behavior in Entra ID sign-in logs, characterized by a single source IP attempting authentication against numerous distinct user accounts with a low number of attempts per user.
Detects potential Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue or push bombing attacks against Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) accounts by identifying a high volume of MFA failures followed by suspicious or fraudulent report actions, or successful authentications shortly after repeated failures.
Detects the execution of ntdsutil.exe with arguments to create an Install from Media (IFM) database backup, preceded shortly by a Remote Interactive logon (RDP) from a remote IP source, which can indicate adversary activity attempting to dump Active Directory credentials.
Detects potential data exfiltration and credential hunting where an endpoint downloads a database backup using presigned URLs or cloud storage signatures within 6 hours of searching local files for API keys or private keys.
Detects Chromium-based browsers launched with remote debugging port 9222 or execution of chrome-decryptor tooling by Python processes, indicative of credential theft or Chrome CDP cookie extraction (such as Armorsteal).
Detects a suspicious behavioral sequence in AWS CloudTrail logs from external IPs using the Boto3 user agent. The sequence starts with caller-identity validation (GetCallerIdentity), followed by a high volume of secret reads (Secrets Manager) or cloud storage object reads (S3), indicating automated reconnaissance, credential theft, or data exfiltration.
Detects password spraying activity against Azure Active Directory / Microsoft 365 services where a single source IP attempts to authenticate against numerous distinct user accounts with low attempt counts per account and sustained over time, while excluding successful authentication IPs.
Detects NTDSUtil commands associated with Active Directory database export, installation media preparation, and snapshot creation, which may facilitate offline credential extraction.
Detects indicators of ToolShell web shell creation (spinstall0.aspx) and ASP.NET machine key harvesting activities (reading web.config or accessing validationkey/decryptionkey materials via w3wp child processes or file access audits) on SharePoint servers.
Detects Tailscale (tailscaled) reaching out to cloud instance metadata endpoints or Kubernetes internal service APIs, which may indicate unauthorized access or abuse of app connectors.
Detects a threat raised by the Cisco wireless LAN controller — rogue access points,
containment events and wireless intrusion signatures. Wireless is a physical-access
attack surface that endpoint and network monitoring never observes, and the
controller is the only thing that sees it.
A rogue access point broadcasting the corporate SSID collects credentials from
devices that connect automatically.
Onboarding: CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 201).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat, user
containment events and wireless intrusion signatures. Wireless is a physical-access
attack surface that endpoint and network monitoring never observes, and the
controller is the only thing that sees it.
A rogue access point broadcasting the corporate SSID collects credentials from
devices that connect automatically.
Onboarding: CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 201).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat, user
Detects unauthorized access to virtual hard disk (VMDK) files by non-standard processes followed by the creation or modification of sensitive offline credential artifacts such as ntds.dit or SYSTEM hives on the same host within a 2-hour window, indicating potential offline credential theft.
Detects execution of GoldenDMSA hacktool used for Directory Service Account manipulation.
Detects potential mimikatz-like tools accessing LSASS from non system account
Detects AI coding assistants and agents (such as Copilot, Cursor, Claude Code, etc.) spawning command-line interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, Node, Bun, Deno) with potential API keys, tokens, or credentials exposed in the process command line.
Detects the correlation between the loading of known stealer plugin DLLs outside of standard application paths and subsequent process activity accessing credential stores, sensitive files, or executing wireless key recovery commands.
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