Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects Sysinternals executables written to disk on Windows endpoints, identified by the Sysinternals company name in the PE metadata of newly written EXE files. These are legitimate admin utilities, but attackers also copy them to hosts for discovery, process inspection and credential access. The rule shows tool presence only, not misuse, so it suits inventory and hunting. To triage, review the file path, hash, writing process and whether the user is an administrator.
Detects execution of virtualization and container software on Windows endpoints by image name, covering Hyper-V, VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU, Xen, Parallels, WSL, Docker and containerd. Attackers can run payloads inside a virtual machine or WSL instance to hide activity from host-based security tools. Developers and administrators use these tools routinely, so the rule suits inventory and hunting. To triage, check the user, parent process, command line and hash, and whether the host is expected to run virtual machines.
Detects processes rapidly invoking multiple system and network reconnaissance APIs (such as NetGetJoinInformation, NetSessionEnum, GetAdaptersAddresses, etc.) within a short window, which is indicative of automated discovery or reconnaissance activity.
Detects reconnaissance commands (whoami, systeminfo) and PowerShell execution spawned as children of remote-access tools (such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer/QuickAssist variants, etc.), followed shortly by an outbound network connection to a .top domain from the same device.
Detects when typical discovery commands (whoami, id, uname, ipconfig) are executed under a web server or PHP process parent, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity following a web application compromise. The rule aggregates distinct commands within a 15-minute window to reduce false positives.
Detects the execution of two or more distinct Active Directory discovery, credential extraction, or coercion tools (such as NetExec, Kerbrute, noPac, PetitPotam, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Impacket scripts) on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects the execution of OpenConnect VPN clients on non-sanctioned devices followed within a 4-hour window by high-volume internal network connections across multiple ports indicative of network service discovery or pivoting activity.
Detects a PaperCut server Java process spawning a local account creation or local administrators group addition, followed closely by Active Directory domain or computer enumeration from the same host within a 30-minute window.
Detects web server processes (such as apache2, httpd, nginx, php-fpm) spawning a shell or curl process that performs LDAP queries using curl against URLs. This activity is indicative of Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities being exploited against web applications to perform internal reconnaissance or LDAP enumeration.
Detects instances where the Apache web server spawns a shell process (sh, dash, bash) which subsequently executes common discovery or callback utilities (such as id, curl, wget, php, hostname, or uname), typically indicative of web application exploitation or remote code execution.
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
Detects post-exploitation behavior where a PaperCut server Java process spawns local account creation or administrator reset followed closely by Active Directory enumeration on the same host, indicating potential post-RCE meterpreter activity.
Detects the correlation of two or more distinct discovery tools or artifacts (such as SharpShares, NetScan, NetExec, ShareFinder, and specific nltest.exe domain trust commands) executed on the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects a single external source IP reading secrets and configmaps across multiple Kubernetes namespaces in bulk within a 1-hour window, which may indicate reconnaissance or credential theft.
Detects potential data exfiltration and credential hunting where an endpoint downloads a database backup using presigned URLs or cloud storage signatures within 6 hours of searching local files for API keys or private keys.
Detects web server processes (such as Apache, httpd, or PHP) spawning a Unix shell (sh, bash, dash) and executing discovery commands (such as id, hostname, uname) with output redirection to proof files or embedded in callback URLs via command substitution.
Detects a Python process spawning msiexec.exe followed by a high volume of LDAP connections (burst) from the same device within a 30-minute window, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity such as domain enumeration.
Detects a suspicious behavioral sequence in AWS CloudTrail logs from external IPs using the Boto3 user agent. The sequence starts with caller-identity validation (GetCallerIdentity), followed by a high volume of secret reads (Secrets Manager) or cloud storage object reads (S3), indicating automated reconnaissance, credential theft, or data exfiltration.
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