Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a precursor pattern identified as JADEPUFFER, where a failed 'ListKeys' operation (indicating an attempt to discover or access keys for a non-existent storage account) is immediately followed by a burst of destructive delete operations on critical cloud resources (e.g., storage, databases, key vaults) by the same actor.
Detects a suspicious pattern often associated with Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) activity: prolonged, high-volume Azure resource enumeration by one service principal, followed shortly by a second service principal performing rapid, multi-subscription enumeration from the same source IP address.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where an identity performs enumeration of Kubernetes secrets or configmaps and subsequently performs a search action within Slack from the same IP address within a one-hour window. This behavioral pattern is indicative of post-breakout reconnaissance, where a compromised identity or token is used to exfiltrate sensitive cloud configuration data and then perform internal reconnaissance in SaaS collaboration tools to identify further targets or credentials.
Detects the multi-stage Microsoft cloud identity compromise chain reported by Microsoft Security Research (September 2026): a victim completes a successful Entra ID device-code sign-in (often induced by passkey-themed device-code phishing), the same identity's authentication/security info is registered or changed (MFA/passkey persistence) within 60 minutes (deduplicated to the earliest such event per sign-in), followed within 120 minutes by a burst of at least 25 successful, delegated-context Microsoft Graph API calls (Scopes claim populated, i.e. user-delegated permissions rather than pure application/client-credential access) spanning at least 3 distinct resource paths, exhibiting reconnaissance (>=5 requests against /users, /groups, /directoryRoles, /roleManagement, /applications, /servicePrincipals, /organization) and/or collection (>=10 requests against /messages, /mailFolders, /attachments, /drive, /drives, /sites, /lists, /search) patterns. Restricting to delegated (Scopes-bearing) Graph calls and requiring resource-path breadth removes the two largest false-positive sources: service-principal/application-only automation jobs (Roles-only tokens) and single-endpoint polling tools. Pure behavioral correlation across SigninLogs, AuditLogs, and MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs - no static IOCs. Flags whether Graph activity originated from an IP different from the original device-code sign-in IP as a strong pivot/session-reuse indicator.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects the enumeration of Wi-Fi profiles followed by the extraction of clear-text credentials for those profiles using the Windows 'netsh wlan' command. This pattern is commonly observed during post-exploitation activities to retrieve stored Wi-Fi passwords.
Detects a specific multi-stage exfiltration pattern characterized by initial reconnaissance/fingerprinting probes against sensitive service endpoints (/health, /docs, /openapi.json) followed by unauthorized access to artifact storage endpoints (/files or /file?name=) from the same device against the same host within a short timeframe.
Detects a suspicious sequence of reconnaissance activities associated with ShinyHunters campaigns targeting PeopleSoft environments. The pattern involves reading '/etc/hosts' using standard utilities ('cat', 'grep', 'awk') followed by rapid network discovery or probing attempts using 'curl', 'wget', 'nmap', or 'nc' from the same host within a 10-minute window.
Detects processes attempting to enumerate Active Directory objects (users, groups, trusts) while simultaneously establishing a network connection to Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) on port 9389. This behavior is characteristic of tools like SharpADWS, which performs AD enumeration via the ADWS protocol rather than traditional LDAP, potentially bypassing legacy detection mechanisms.
Detects the manual enablement of network discovery services (fdrespub, fdPHost, SSDPSRV, upnphost) and the associated Windows Firewall rules. This activity is a known tactic used by Gentlemen ransomware to facilitate lateral movement and network share enumeration by making the compromised host visible to others and allowing it to discover peers.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
Detects anomalous, rapid enumeration of system, network, process, and software configuration settings by AI coding assistant processes (e.g., Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT). This behavior often signifies an AI agent being coerced or configured to perform environment discovery or credential gathering, indicating potential compromise or abuse of the LLM-integrated development environment.
Detects anomalous, rapid enumeration of system, network, process, and software configuration settings by AI coding assistant processes (e.g., Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT). This behavior often signifies an AI agent being coerced or configured to perform environment discovery or credential gathering, indicating potential compromise or abuse of the LLM-integrated development environment.
Detects anomalous, rapid enumeration of system, network, process, and software configuration settings by AI coding assistant processes (e.g., Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT). This behavior often signifies an AI agent being coerced or configured to perform environment discovery or credential gathering, indicating potential compromise or abuse of the LLM-integrated development environment.
Detects anomalous discovery behavior originating from known AI agent and development tools (e.g., Claude, Cursor, Aider). The rule monitors for a rapid sequence of commands spanning multiple categories of enumeration (Network, File/Directory, Software, and System) within a short timeframe, which indicates an attempt to map the runtime environment, permissions, or system capabilities.
Detects the execution of reconnaissance commands designed to enumerate Active Directory domain trust relationships. Attackers, including those associated with ransomware operations like INC Ransom, use these tools to map organizational structures and identify pathways for lateral movement and cross-domain propagation.
Detects multiple reconnaissance commands executed by PowerShell processes running as the SYSTEM account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to enumerate domain trusts, group memberships, or user sessions on a host to facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities such as findstr, cmd, powershell, or file copy utilities with recursive flags to search for files containing keywords related to internal infrastructure documentation, such as network diagrams, server inventories, firewall configs, or AD topologies. This activity is indicative of information gathering and reconnaissance by an adversary.
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