Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,259 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,550
1,190
352
288
225
Contributors
792
520
494
354
298
Categories
1,717
1,495
401
382
376
Platforms
3,058
530
334
314
258
Products / Services
778
656
633
283
238
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,587
8,397
6,227
4,259
CVEs
6
6
6
5
5
IDS Classtypes
75
63
37
23
9
IDS Protocols
127
66
6
4
4
Detects Microsoft Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) where specific GUIDs associated with sensitive Active Directory rights (specifically, those related to DCSync or sensitive extended rights) are accessed. The rule filters out events originating from Domain Controllers to identify potentially anomalous access patterns from non-DC endpoints.
Detects potential exfiltration of sensitive DevOps credentials or configuration files (such as AWS credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, or cryptocurrency wallets) by monitoring for file access events followed by outbound network connections to known exfiltration channels like Slack or specific C2 infrastructure within a 30-minute window.
Detects instances where a process that is not a recognized web browser accesses or enumerates the file storage path of the MetaMask browser extension. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized reconnaissance or credential theft attempt targeting cryptocurrency wallet data stored locally, often performed by malware following successful system compromise.
Detects the execution of multiple distinct host reconnaissance commands (e.g., systeminfo, whoami, ipconfig, AV/EDR checks, and domain enumeration) within a short window (10 minutes) originating from the same parent process. This pattern is characteristic of automated reconnaissance collection, often performed during the initial phases of an attack or as part of a C2 workflow. The rule includes exclusions for common administrative, monitoring, and RMM tools to reduce false positives.
Detects high-frequency TCP SYN scanning activity originating from external networks targeting port 37777, commonly associated with the Dahua DVR P2P discovery service. This behavior is indicative of automated reconnaissance and scanning campaigns searching for vulnerable IoT devices.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
Detects high-volume, rapid enumeration of core Microsoft Graph directory endpoints (users, groups, applications, and servicePrincipals) by a single identity or session. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance tools such as AADInternals, ROADtools, or TokenTactic being used to map out a cloud environment's directory structure.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the Exvicy malware family. This includes heartbeat polling, victim fingerprinting registration, and CAPTCHA handling over HTTP GET and POST requests to the '/api.php' endpoint.
Detects a trojanized Electron application performing anti-sandbox environment checks by querying GPU hardware information via WMI or PowerShell CIM cmdlets. This activity is characterized by the presence of the PYTHONUTF8 environment variable and is identified as a precursor step to attempting Microsoft Defender exclusions and launching a malicious payload.
Detects high-volume account enumeration activity associated with the TeamFiltration tool, characterized by the use of legacy Microsoft Teams desktop client User-Agent strings (specific versions of Teams, Electron, and Chrome) within a short time window.
Detects high-volume account enumeration activity associated with the TeamFiltration tool, characterized by the use of legacy Microsoft Teams desktop client User-Agent strings (specific versions of Teams, Electron, and Chrome) within a short time window.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects the Graphalgo Go-based remote access trojan (RAT) sending an initial system report containing device and user information to the Slack API. This activity occurs during the initial check-in phase before establishing a primary command and control channel.
Detects malicious processes or scripts that perform multi-stage environment fingerprinting to identify virtualization or sandbox environments. The rule identifies chains of suspicious activities, including querying registry keys related to virtualization (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU), WMI queries for BIOS/Computer system details, API calls common to sandbox evasion (GetCursorPos, GetTickCount), and artificial execution delays (sleep/timeout), typically used by malware like LummaC2 to perform conditional exits if an analysis environment is detected.
Detects processes querying registry keys or accessing file paths associated with common virtualization and sandbox environments (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V, Sandboxie). This behavior is often indicative of malware attempting to identify if it is running in an analysis or sandbox environment to evade detection.
Detects network activity associated with ORAX Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS), specifically identifying fake Cloudflare security-verification pages and emoji-based CAPTCHA gates used as anti-analysis techniques to frustrate automated sandboxing.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the ARToken phishing campaign, specifically identifying access to lure pages hosted on 'workers.dev' domains with 'docviewer' in the hostname and 'turnstile' challenge responses in the HTTP body, which is used for anti-analysis/evasion.
Detects HTTP traffic where a common automated scanner or sandbox user agent triggers an immediate redirect to 'about:blank', a common technique used by phishing kits to hide content from automated security analysis tools.
Page 13 of 203