Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
6,225 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,421
1,435
704
406
354
Contributors
1,092
1,080
584
397
348
Categories
2,147
1,820
1,777
1,302
888
Platforms
4,250
1,450
902
582
182
Products / Services
1,571
855
774
655
512
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,638
12,585
8,395
6,225
CVEs
9
9
9
9
7
IDS Classtypes
412
174
39
29
25
IDS Protocols
342
113
110
103
15
Detects high-frequency DNS NXDOMAIN responses for domains exhibiting patterns indicative of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA), specifically fixed-length, high-entropy character strings. This behavior is commonly associated with botnets attempting to locate command and control infrastructure.
Detects suspicious network connectivity where a newly executed process (that is not a browser or Slack) immediately establishes an outbound HTTPS connection to the Slack API. This behavior is indicative of potential malware implants or malicious scripts attempting to perform system reconnaissance and check-in to an attacker-controlled Slack workspace.
Detects scripting interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, python.exe) that perform an outbound network connection to known public Generative AI API endpoints and subsequently modify their own script file on disk. This behavior is indicative of sophisticated malware attempting to rewrite its own source code at runtime to evade signature-based detection.
Detects established, bidirectional TCP connections between internal hosts and known infrastructure associated with the SIDEEYE backdoor on specific control and data ports (3333 and 3334).
Detects the initiation of a SOCKS5 proxy handshake from an internal host to an external destination. The rule monitors for the characteristic SOCKS5 greeting (0x05) while specifically excluding HTTP traffic to identify potential unauthorized proxy tunneling used for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects NeedyMantis' initial C2 beacon: an HTTP GET to /library/zip/ on port 443, anchored to the URI root, carrying a client-originated 'Set-Cookie:' header (clients normally send 'Cookie:', never 'Set-Cookie:' -- this direction reversal is the core anomaly and is near-impossible for legitimate traffic) alongside an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header. Matching the literal header text (not just header-name presence) and anchoring the URI removes generic WebSocket apps and any unrelated path containing '/library/zip/' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' initial C2 beacon: an HTTP GET to /library/zip/ on port 443, anchored to the URI root, carrying a client-originated 'Set-Cookie:' header (clients normally send 'Cookie:', never 'Set-Cookie:' -- this direction reversal is the core anomaly and is near-impossible for legitimate traffic) alongside an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header. Matching the literal header text (not just header-name presence) and anchoring the URI removes generic WebSocket apps and any unrelated path containing '/library/zip/' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' initial C2 beacon: an HTTP GET to /library/zip/ on port 443, anchored to the URI root, carrying a client-originated 'Set-Cookie:' header (clients normally send 'Cookie:', never 'Set-Cookie:' -- this direction reversal is the core anomaly and is near-impossible for legitimate traffic) alongside an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header. Matching the literal header text (not just header-name presence) and anchoring the URI removes generic WebSocket apps and any unrelated path containing '/library/zip/' as a substring.
Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects the NeedyMantis main-component handshake: an HTTP GET to port 443 with a User-Agent that is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end) and an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' header, marking the HTTPS-to-WebSocket protocol switch used before the RC4 key exchange. Restricting to port 443 and requiring an exact (not substring) UA match removes generic WebSocket apps and any traffic where 'firefox/21.0' merely appears inside a real, longer browser UA string.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects egress to the NeedyMantis C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com across three vantage points: TLS SNI (port 443), DNS resolution, and HTTP Host header. Each content match is anchored to the start of its buffer ('startswith') so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') cannot match — only this exact domain or a genuine subdomain of it triggers.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
Detects NeedyMantis' WebSockets comms-module handshake: an outbound HTTP GET to port 443 whose User-Agent is EXACTLY the hard-coded literal 'firefox/21.0' (anchored start+end, not a substring of a real browser UA) AND whose headers contain an explicit 'Upgrade: websocket' value. Anchoring the UA to an exact match and requiring the literal upgrade header (rather than just the presence of an 'Upgrade' header name) removes legitimate WebSocket apps and any app whose real UA merely contains 'firefox/21.0' as a substring.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the User-Agent header indicates a PowerShell execution occurring from a system configured with the zh-CN locale. This pattern is often associated with automated scripts or potential malicious activity masquerading as legitimate PowerShell traffic.
Detects a sequence of network events where a host downloads a portable Python embeddable package from python.org, followed by a subsequent attempt to establish a WebSocket connection. This pattern is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity using a Python-based tunnel.
Page 16 of 297