Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule identifies user sign-ins originating from anonymous IP addresses, which may indicate the use of VPNs, Tor, or other anonymization services. Such activity can be a sign of an adversary attempting to mask their true location or identity during an access attempt.
This rule detects sign-in attempts originating from IP addresses that Microsoft Entra ID Protection has identified as malicious. These IP addresses are known to be associated with attackers or compromised systems at the time of the sign-in, indicating a high-risk authentication attempt.
This rule detects the use of the `wget` command-line utility to download files into potentially suspicious directories, specifically `/tmp/`. Adversaries often use `wget` for ingress tool transfer, downloading malicious payloads or additional tools to a compromised system. The rule looks for `wget` execution combined with the `-O` or `--output-document` flags, which specify an output file, and the presence of `/tmp/` in the command line, indicating a download to a common temporary directory often abused by attackers.
This rule identifies execution traces indicative of the XCSSET macOS malware. XCSSET is known to spread via Xcode projects and maliciously modify applications. The rule looks for specific command-line patterns involving 'curl' to suspicious URLs, 'osacompile' and 'plutil' interacting with user and group containers, and 'zip' archiving data from user and group containers. These activities suggest potential command and control communication, persistence mechanisms, and data staging/exfiltration by the malware.
This rule detects various keywords associated with data transfer and staging activities on Cisco devices. These activities could indicate an adversary attempting to move data onto the device for further exfiltration or to move data off the device. The keywords include common protocols and commands like 'tftp', 'rcp', 'puts', 'copy', 'configure replace', and 'archive tar', which are often used for file transfers and configuration management on network devices.
Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic
Detects the download of executable, script, archive, and document file types from hosts associated with dynamic DNS services. These services are often abused by adversaries for command and control or for hosting malicious content due to their ability to frequently change IP addresses, making them harder to track and block.
Detects network requests to '/pwndrop/' URI paths, which are indicative of communication with a PwnDrp web server. PwnDrp is a tool developed for red team testing and is also known to be used for malicious activities, typically for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named ':Zone.Identifier' within the WinGet temporary directory, specifically when the ZoneId is '3' (Internet) and the source URL contains suspicious IP address patterns (e.g., '://1', '://2', etc.). This indicates a file downloaded from the internet via WinGet that might originate from an untrusted or suspicious source, potentially used for defense evasion or persistence.
Detects the creation of an "Active Directory Schema Cache File" (.sch) by an uncommon process. This activity can be indicative of tools performing Active Directory-related operations, potentially for reconnaissance or command and control, such as LDAPFragger. The rule filters out common legitimate processes that create these files.
Detects the use of WebDAV by a client, specifically identifying the 'Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/' user agent during a GET request. This behavior is often associated with 'DownloadCradle' techniques used by adversaries to download malicious content or exfiltrate data.
Detects HTTP User-Agent strings that end with an equal sign, which can be an indicator of Base64 encoding. This technique is often used by malware to obfuscate C2 communications.
Detects the execution of the Windows LOLBIN (Living Off The Land Binary) PrintBrm.exe when it is used to create or extract ZIP files. This activity is generally not expected on a normal workstation and can indicate malicious use for data staging or exfiltration.
This rule detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with the Goofy Guineapig backdoor. It specifically looks for HTTP/S requests originating from a user agent string characteristic of the malware ('Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/54.0.2840.71 Safari/537.36') communicating with the domain 'static.tcplog.com'. This combination of user agent and destination domain is indicative of Goofy Guineapig C2 activity.
This rule detects indicators of exploitation related to PaperCut MF/NG vulnerabilities. Specifically, it looks for command-line patterns associated with downloading and executing a malicious MSI installer. The first pattern identifies PowerShell commands using 'Invoke-WebRequest' to download 'setup.msi' with hidden window and no profile. The second pattern identifies 'msiexec' being used to install 'setup.msi' with a specific 'IntegratorLogin' parameter, which is a known indicator of the PaperCut exploitation.
Detects the execution of 'curl.exe' on Windows systems. This activity can indicate an attempt to download files from a remote location, make web requests to external servers, or potentially be used for command and control communication. Adversaries often use tools like curl for ingress tool transfer or to retrieve additional malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of 'curl.exe' when a custom User-Agent string is specified using either the '-A' or '--user-agent' command-line options. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to mimic legitimate web traffic while using a non-standard User-Agent to evade detection or to identify themselves to a C2 server.
zeek_dns_nkn
Sigma
NKN is a networking service using blockchain technology to support a decentralized network of peers. While there are legitimate uses for it, it can also be used as a C2 channel. This rule looks for a DNS request to the ma>
Detects when a password-protected ZIP archive is opened on a Windows system, specifically looking for archives with suspicious filenames commonly used in phishing or social engineering attacks (e.g., 'invoice', 'order', 'payment'). This rule leverages Windows Security Event ID 5379, which indicates a sensitive privilege use, and filters for events related to the Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename provider, combined with a list of suspicious keywords in the TargetName field.
This rule detects the installation of a TAP (Tunnel Adapter) driver, specifically looking for 'tap0901' in the service's ImagePath. TAP drivers are commonly used by VPN software like OpenVPN to create virtual network interfaces, which can be leveraged for tunneling and data exfiltration. The detection aims to identify potential preparation for data exfiltration using tunneling techniques.
Detects DNS queries made by "AppInstaller.EXE" when attempting to load or install an AppX package from a referenced URL. This activity is indicative of the AppInstaller being used, which is the default handler for the "ms-appinstaller" URI scheme. This can be abused by adversaries for ingress tool transfer.
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