Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects non-root SSH execution performing remote port forwarding (-R) targeting a Unix socket bind on hosts running the tailscaled daemon, excluding known automation tools.
Detects a threat identified by Cisco Meraki. Meraki is the security stack for branch
offices, retail sites and small locations that have no local IT presence — the parts
of an estate least likely to be monitored and most likely to be the way in.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat, user
offices, retail sites and small locations that have no local IT presence — the parts
of an estate least likely to be monitored and most likely to be the way in.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat, user
Detects outbound network connections to domains associated with the AdFection / Discover-Tech / Controlium threat infrastructure using a Sentinel watchlist, filtering out known browser activity or allowing custom domain lists.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects connections held open far longer than normal. Interactive command and
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a device first exhibits usage of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, followed by the execution of known data transfer or exfiltration utilities such as WinSCP or Rclone.
Detects algorithmically generated domain names at the resolver. Malware families
using a DGA cycle through many candidate domains to find their live controller, so
the resolver sees a burst of long, random-looking names, most of which fail to
resolve.
Resolver-level visibility covers every device that uses the resolver, including
those with no endpoint agent — appliances, IoT and unmanaged hosts.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and len(query) > 30
| groupby srcip, query, recordtype, responsecode
using a DGA cycle through many candidate domains to find their live controller, so
the resolver sees a burst of long, random-looking names, most of which fail to
resolve.
Resolver-level visibility covers every device that uses the resolver, including
those with no endpoint agent — appliances, IoT and unmanaged hosts.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and len(query) > 30
| groupby srcip, query, recordtype, responsecode
Detects a host generating an unusual rate of failed DNS resolutions. A high NXDOMAIN
rate is the signature of a client searching for something that mostly does not exist
— DGA malware hunting for its live controller, or tooling enumerating subdomains.
This complements the DGA detection: entropy catches the shape of the names, NXDOMAIN
rate catches the behaviour regardless of how the names look.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(responsecode) like '%nxdomain%'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
rate is the signature of a client searching for something that mostly does not exist
— DGA malware hunting for its live controller, or tooling enumerating subdomains.
This complements the DGA detection: entropy catches the shape of the names, NXDOMAIN
rate catches the behaviour regardless of how the names look.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(responsecode) like '%nxdomain%'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
The following analytic detects outbound connections to commonly abused file sharing and pastebin-style hosting domains.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects persistent blocked web requests from one internal source. A person stops
after a block; software does not. Sustained retries after blocking indicate
automation attempting to reach a destination it has been configured to use.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user, category
| select srcip, user, category, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
after a block; software does not. Sustained retries after blocking indicate
automation attempting to reach a destination it has been configured to use.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user, category
| select srcip, user, category, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
Detects web access through Meraki content filtering. Branch users frequently work
without the endpoint controls applied at headquarters, so the network appliance is
often the only layer observing where they go.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='URL_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, useragent, user
without the endpoint controls applied at headquarters, so the network appliance is
often the only layer observing where they go.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='URL_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, domain, url, useragent, user
Detects one internal source repeatedly blocked from reaching URLs. Persistent
attempts after a block indicate automated software rather than a person — a person
gives up, malware retries on a timer.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user
| select srcip, user, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
attempts after a block indicate automated software rather than a person — a person
gives up, malware retries on a timer.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='URL_BLOCKED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user
| select srcip, user, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
Detects a threat raised by Versa Networks on a zero trust session. Versa sits at the
branch edge, so it observes traffic from sites that frequently have no local
security stack at all — in many estates it is the only sensor between a remote
office and the internet.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, srcip, dstip, threat, process
branch edge, so it observes traffic from sites that frequently have no local
security stack at all — in many estates it is the only sensor between a remote
office and the internet.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, srcip, dstip, threat, process
Detects a decoy asset initiating an outbound connection. A decoy should only ever
receive traffic. Outbound activity means the asset has been compromised and is being
used as a launch point, or that attacker tooling on it is calling home.
The destination is live command-and-control infrastructure and should be blocked
estate-wide immediately rather than only on the decoy.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and dstip != ''
| groupby dstip, url, process, srcip
receive traffic. Outbound activity means the asset has been compromised and is being
used as a launch point, or that attacker tooling on it is calling home.
The destination is live command-and-control infrastructure and should be blocked
estate-wide immediately rather than only on the decoy.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and dstip != ''
| groupby dstip, url, process, srcip
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