Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects web requests associated with PHP2Shell exploitation attempts: probing for randomized shell_<8 hex> files in common upload directories (.php, .phtml, .php5, .phar) and PoC marker strings in the query string. In the observed campaign these probes returned 404,but a 200 response on a matching path should be treated as a confirmed webshell.
Detects Sysinternals executables written to disk on Windows endpoints, identified by the Sysinternals company name in the PE metadata of newly written EXE files. These are legitimate admin utilities, but attackers also copy them to hosts for discovery, process inspection and credential access. The rule shows tool presence only, not misuse, so it suits inventory and hunting. To triage, review the file path, hash, writing process and whether the user is an administrator.
Correlates devices touched by known IoC IP scan waves with PHP software inventory, vulnerability management data for PHP CVEs, and active PHP process execution telemetry to identify vulnerable exposed web servers.
Detects process command lines containing C2 operator start flags or strings alongside reconnaissance tools or platforms like fofa or skynet.
Detects the execution of two or more distinct Active Directory discovery, credential extraction, or coercion tools (such as NetExec, Kerbrute, noPac, PetitPotam, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Impacket scripts) on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a client IP performs a brute-force attack against WordPress login or XML-RPC endpoints followed by enumeration of the wp-json REST API.
Detects the deployment of the ARTEX AI penetration testing framework via Docker/Docker-compose combined with the execution of offensive security and scanning tools (such as nmap, sqlmap, nuclei, httpx, apktool, frida) on the same host within a specified timeframe.
Detects high volume and diverse URI requests targeting login, search, or inquiry endpoints on IIS servers within a short time window, indicative of web brute force or active reconnaissance scanning.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects potential vulnerability scanning, enumeration, or bulk data extraction against Request Tracker (RT) web paths by monitoring high request volumes, distinct URI counts, or large response byte sizes within CommonSecurityLog data.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects high volume and diverse URI requests targeting login, search, or inquiry endpoints on IIS servers within a short time window, indicative of web brute force or active reconnaissance scanning.
Detects suspicious DNS queries to external service interaction domains often used for out-of-band interactions after successful RCE
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
Detects non-browser Python-based HTTP clients (such as python-requests, python-urllib, aiohttp, or httpx) targeting specific API endpoints (/user, /profile, /order, /upload) while exhibiting indicators of SQL injection or high-volume object ID enumeration.
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