Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious activity where a user clicks on a URL from an email and subsequently accesses a '.workers.dev' domain that contains keywords commonly associated with credential harvesting or malicious activity (e.g., 'docusign', 'onedrive', 'password_reset'). This pattern often indicates a phishing attempt where an attacker uses a Cloudflare Workers domain to host a malicious landing page.
Detects the execution of the TruffleHog secret scanning tool. This tool is often used by attackers to find sensitive information like credentials in various data sources (filesystems, Git repositories, cloud storage, etc.). This rule identifies the process creation of TruffleHog and categorizes the type of scan being performed. It includes exclusions for legitimate CI/CD environments or security scanners.
This rule detects potential network reconnaissance activity by looking for keywords such as 'scan', 'sweep', 'probe', 'recon', 'nmap', and 'nessus' within the 'Message' field of CommonSecurityLog entries. This could indicate an adversary actively gathering information about the network infrastructure.
Detects the execution of the prt-scan supply chain campaign payload by identifying specific hardcoded exfiltration and reconnaissance log markers in command line arguments. These markers include 'PRT_EXFIL', 'PRT_RECON', 'PRT_HARVEST', 'PRT_DELAYED', 'PRT_GIT_AUTH', and 'PRT_LABEL_BYPASS'.
KQL Query from file: KQL Detection for MDI Password Protection Insight
This rule detects activity associated with TruffleHog, an open-source tool used for finding credentials and sensitive data, within cloud audit logs. It specifically looks for the 'trufflehog' string in the user_agent field, indicating that the tool was used to interact with cloud resources.
This rule detects sign-in attempts to Azure AD where the User-Agent string contains 'TruffleHog'. TruffleHog is an open-source tool used for finding sensitive data like credentials in various data sources, including code repositories. Its presence in sign-in logs could indicate an adversary or security researcher attempting to verify leaked credentials or discover exposed secrets related to Azure AD service principals.
This rule detects inbound emails from 'azure-noreply@microsoft.com' that are delivered to the inbox, are the first contact from this sender, and contain specific keywords in the subject line such as 'severity', 'activated', 'deactivated', 'alert', 'invoice', 'payment', 'order', or 'fund'. This could indicate phishing attempts or social engineering using a spoofed Microsoft sender to deliver urgent or financially-themed messages.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events indicative of the Albabat malware. It looks for instances where a device performs WMI-based reconnaissance (querying CPU, csproduct, OS, or NIC information) followed by or preceded by network communication with either a GitHub repository containing 'billdev' or a Supabase instance. The time window for these events is set to 30 minutes, suggesting a contextual link between the reconnaissance and subsequent network activity.
This rule detects potential social engineering attempts in external direct messages (DMs) by identifying messages that impersonate IT helpdesk or support personnel, or discuss 'working from home' scenarios. It specifically looks for keywords like 'helpdesk', 'help desk', 'IT support', and 'working from home' in the recipient details or sender display name of external messages within the last 5 days. The goal is to surface lures that aim to trick users into revealing sensitive information or performing actions under false pretenses.
Detects execution of ToastNotify.exe with the sendtoast subcommand, which dispatches a phishing notification with a title and body text using a specified AUMID for impersonation. Review CommandLine for Windows.Defender.SecurityCenter, MSTeams_8wekyb3d8bbwe, or MSEdge to identify the application being impersonated.
Detects User-Agent rotation behavior from a single Source IP (c-ip) associated with more than 3 distinct
User-Agent (c-useragent) values within a 5-minute window. This behavior is characteristic of the Nuclei
'-random-agent' flag, which allows the scanner to bypass WAF (Web Application Firewall) detections by
using a different, valid browser User-Agent string for each request.
User-Agent (c-useragent) values within a 5-minute window. This behavior is characteristic of the Nuclei
'-random-agent' flag, which allows the scanner to bypass WAF (Web Application Firewall) detections by
using a different, valid browser User-Agent string for each request.
Detects any execution of ToastNotify.exe, the .NET assembly used to dispatch phishing toast notifications impersonating legitimate applications. This catch-all rule fires when the binary runs with an unrecognized or absent subcommand. In environments that support rule ordering, evaluate subcommand-specific rules (getaumid, sendtoast, custom) before this rule. ToastNotify.exe has no known legitimate enterprise use.
Detects PowerShell constructing toast notification XML with an external HTTP image URL alongside WinRT toast API calls. When the notification is displayed the notification platform fetches the image, creating an outbound connection to an attacker-controlled server for delivery confirmation. Sourced from the toastnotify-bof repository incoming-call.xml and teams-security-alert.xml example payloads.
Detects Invoke-CredentialPhisher (legacy tool) or the sendtoast keyword in PowerShell script blocks. Both are direct indicators of an active toast notification-based credential phishing operation in progress.
Detects PowerShell constructing toast notification XML containing an activationType attribute combined with a protocol scheme. This pattern creates a clickable notification button that launches a URI handler, the primary mechanism for delivering phishing links via toast notifications. Covers both msteams:// protocol links and generic protocol handlers.
Storm-2561 Network IOC Detection
Cortex XDR
Detects outbound network connections from Windows endpoints to known Storm-2561 Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, including a specific C2 IP address and various domains used for credential exfiltration and initial access via spoofed VPN services.
AWS SES Email Enumeration Detection
Cortex XDR
Detects enumeration of AWS SES email identities and sending quotas. This activity can indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance before launching phishing or Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks. The rule identifies multiple distinct SES operations related to identity and quota checks performed by a single user within a two-hour window.
This rule identifies devices running vulnerable versions of Notepad++. It parses the software version to determine if it is older than 8.9.1, which was identified as vulnerable in a security incident. The rule specifically looks for Notepad++ installations and flags any instances where the major version is less than 8, or if the major version is 8 and the minor version is less than 9, or if the major version is 8, the minor version is 9, and the patch version is less than 1.
Detects possible MuddyWater related activity in Microsoft Defender XDR Advanced Hunting by correlating suspicious process, network, file, and logon telemetry into a unified timeline. The hunt focuses on behaviours reported in the Huntress MuddyWater attack chain, including Remote Desktop logons, reconnaissance commands, OpenSSH reverse tunnelling, suspicious network connections, and possible DLL side loading involving FMAPP.exe and FMAPP.dll.
This rule detects DNS queries for reverse lookups, specifically those ending with '.in-addr.arpa' or '.ip6.arpa'. While legitimate, frequent or unusual reverse DNS queries from a specific device or process could indicate reconnaissance activities or attempts to map internal network infrastructure by an attacker.
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