Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies devices that have been observed as being directly exposed to the public internet. This is based on Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's device discovery capabilities. Such devices may be at higher risk of attack and should be reviewed to ensure the exposure is intentional and properly secured.
The following analytic detects the usage of specific Exchange PowerShell modules, such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ManagementRoleAssignment, New-MailboxSearch, and Get-Recipient. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify these commands. This activity is significant because these modules can be exploited by adversaries who have gained access via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could export mailbox contents, assign management roles, conduct mailbox searches, or view recipient objects, potentially leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
Detects HTTP GET requests originating from the 'Hello-World/1.0' user agent to common web ports.
The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell activity via EventCode 4104, where WMI performs event queries to gather information on running processes or services. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific WMI queries targeting system information classes like Win32_Bios and Win32_OperatingSystem. This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an adversary to profile the compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain detailed system information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
📌 Description
Threat actors frequently register lookalike domains to support malicious activities such as phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, and command-and-control (C2) operations. This KQL hunting query is designed to help identify potential phishing and typosquatting domains that may be targeting your organization or its third-party vendors.
🔍 Threat Intelligence Feed
The hunting query utilizes data from the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) API, which provides access to newly registered domains.
API Endpoint:
https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/today?json
Use Cases:
Threat intelligence enrichment
Detection of suspicious or malicious domains
Security log correlation
Returned Data Fields:
Domain name
Registration date
IP address
Type
Additional metadata (if available)
Query by Date (Optional):
Example: https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/2025-07-08?json
🎯 ATT&CK Framework Mapping
Technique: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
ID: T1583.001
Reference: MITRE ATT&CK
Threat actors frequently register lookalike domains to support malicious activities such as phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, and command-and-control (C2) operations. This KQL hunting query is designed to help identify potential phishing and typosquatting domains that may be targeting your organization or its third-party vendors.
🔍 Threat Intelligence Feed
The hunting query utilizes data from the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) API, which provides access to newly registered domains.
API Endpoint:
https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/today?json
Use Cases:
Threat intelligence enrichment
Detection of suspicious or malicious domains
Security log correlation
Returned Data Fields:
Domain name
Registration date
IP address
Type
Additional metadata (if available)
Query by Date (Optional):
Example: https://isc.sans.edu/api/recentdomains/2025-07-08?json
🎯 ATT&CK Framework Mapping
Technique: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
ID: T1583.001
Reference: MITRE ATT&CK
This detection identifies when a one-on-one Microsoft Teams chat is initiated with an external domain that has not been observed in previous Teams chats (past 90 days) or recent email communications (past 15 days). This may indicate a new, potentially unsolicited or suspicious contact attempting to engage with an internal user, which could represent a social engineering attempt or early-stage reconnaissance.
Hunting WMI execution from remote system
Detect suspicious graph user activity with behavioral analytics (UEBA)
A user inadvertently granted consent to an external, unverified OAuth application. Exploiting the high-level permissions obtained, a threat actor initiated an attack targeting the tenant’s environment via Microsoft Graph.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell script execution that attempts to identify installed anti-virus products using WMI or PowerShell commands. It specifically looks for PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) entries containing keywords like "SELECT," "WMIC," "AntiVirusProduct," or "AntiSpywareProduct." This activity is often performed by malware and APT actors to map security applications for evasion purposes, potentially leading to the disabling or bypassing of security measures.
The analytic detects the `wermgr.exe` process attempting to connect to known IP check web services. This activity is significant because `wermgr.exe` is typically used for Windows error reporting, and its connection to these services may indicate malicious code injection, often associated with malware like Trickbot. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to recon the infected machine's IP address, aiding in further exploitation and evasion tactics.
This rule detects attempts at Local File Inclusion (LFI) or Remote File Inclusion (RFI) vulnerabilities by analyzing web server logs for specific patterns in the request URI. It looks for directory traversal sequences ('../'), attempts to access common sensitive files like '/etc/passwd', or patterns indicating file inclusion via HTTP or file:// protocols.
This rule detects potential spearphishing attempts where the sender's email address is from Gmail, there are no attachments or URLs, and the subject line of the email matches the recipient's first name. This pattern is often used in highly targeted social engineering attacks to appear legitimate and bypass traditional email security controls.
This analytic detects repeated blocked connection attempts from the same initiator to the same responder within a short time window. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and identifies connections where the action is set to Block, and the number of occurrences reaches or exceeds a threshold of ten within a one-minute span. This pattern may indicate a misconfigured application, unauthorized access attempts, or early stages of a brute-force or scanning operation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior may represent an attacker probing the network, attempting lateral movement, or testing firewall rules for weaknesses.
This rule detects activity from a list of specified malicious IP addresses across network connection events and sign-in attempts. It correlates `DeviceNetworkEvents` (network connections from devices) and `SigninLogs` (user authentication attempts) to identify instances where these IPs are involved. The rule is designed for hunting, looking back 30 days for any activity originating from the defined IP addresses.
The following analytic detects a blocked connection event by identifying a "Block" value in the action field. It leverages logs from Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense devices. This activity is significant as it can identify attempts from users or applications initiating network connection to explicitly or implicitly blocked range or zones. If confirmed malicious, attackers could be attempting to perform a forbidden action on the network such as data exfiltration, lateral movement, or network disruption.
KQL Query from file: Hunting Exposed JDWP
KQL Query from file: Direct Send Abuse Detection
KQL Query from file: GraphRunner Recon Detection & Response
KQL Query
KQL Query from file: Sentinel KQL Detection for ShadowHound
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