Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings where a new partner is added or inbound trust settings (such as MFA or device compliance) are enabled for an external tenant. This activity may indicate an attempt to establish a persistent backdoor or facilitate initial access into the environment via a compromised or malicious external identity provider.
Detects the creation or modification of Granular Delegated Administrative Privileges (GDAP) relationships, or the assignment of highly privileged (Tier 0) roles, when performed by an application identified as a partner provider or via delegated administration. This rule monitors for potential abuse of trusted partner relationships to escalate privileges or establish persistence within a tenant.
Detects instances where an administrative user grants 'AllPrincipals' OAuth consent to a multi-tenant application that is unverified or lacks a trusted publisher. This behavior is indicative of an attacker tricking a global admin into granting broad permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All) to a malicious application, bypassing per-user consent restrictions.
This rule detects when new credentials (secrets or certificates) are added to an Azure Active Directory Service Principal. It flags this activity as suspicious if it occurs outside of typical business hours or if it exhibits signs of 'rapid re-keying', where multiple credentials are added to the same service principal within a 24-hour window. This behavior is a common indicator of persistence maintenance or credential rotation to support unauthorized access.
This rule detects scenarios where an external user is invited to an Azure AD tenant and subsequently granted a highly privileged role (such as Global Administrator or User Administrator) within a short window of time (1 hour). This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment or privilege escalation by an adversary using guest accounts.
Detects OAuth2 permission consent events where a user grants a third-party or newly registered application access to high-risk scopes (such as Mail, Files, or Directory). This technique is commonly used to establish persistence and bypass MFA by gaining access to user accounts via malicious or compromised OAuth applications.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft 365/Exchange inbox rules that suggest malicious staging or exfiltration activities. This includes rules configured for external email auto-forwarding, automatic deletion of messages, or movement of emails into hidden/system folders (e.g., RSS Subscriptions, Archive) which may be filtered based on sensitive keywords related to financial or credential theft (e.g., invoice, wire, payment).
This rule detects potentially malicious bulk mailbox exfiltration operations (such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ComplianceSearch, or Search-Mailbox) performed by an account within 24 hours of experiencing a high or medium-risk sign-in event, suggesting post-compromise data harvesting.
Detects successful user authentication to Microsoft Entra ID or Exchange Online using legacy authentication protocols (e.g., IMAP, POP3, SMTP AUTH, Exchange ActiveSync) that bypass modern MFA enforcement. The rule specifically alerts when these legacy sign-ins originate from a source IP address not previously associated with that specific user account, indicating potential credential abuse.
Detects anomalous, high-volume mailbox read (MailItemsAccessed) activity for a specific user compared to their historical daily baseline. The rule triggers when access volume significantly exceeds baseline averages, particularly when the activity originates from an IP address not previously observed for that specific user, which is a common indicator of automated email exfiltration via stolen session token replay.
Detects the creation or modification of mailbox inbox rules that configure forwarding or redirection to external addresses, or rules that automatically delete or move messages based on sensitive keyword filters (e.g., 'invoice', 'password'). It specifically looks for indicators of mailbox hiding (hidden rules) which are frequently used by attackers to maintain persistence and conceal activity, particularly following unauthorized access or token theft.
Detects the addition of a new client secret or certificate to an application or service principal by a user account. This activity is correlated with recent high-risk or suspicious sign-in events. Adversaries often perform this action following account takeover to establish durable, MFA-immune persistence in the cloud tenant.
Detects an account performing a mass download or synchronization of files from SharePoint or OneDrive within a 30-minute window, occurring within two hours of a medium or high-risk Azure AD sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover and subsequent data exfiltration by an adversary using harvested credentials.
Detects instances where a file is downloaded or exfiltrated, followed by the deletion or alteration of its version history within a 7-day window. This behavior is consistent with post-theft activities aimed at obfuscating access logs or sanitizing stolen data by removing original versioning markers, often observed in insider threat or compromised account scenarios.
Detects impossible travel authentication patterns where a user logs in from two geographically distant locations within a short time frame, while specifically filtering for sessions that reuse existing refresh or session tokens instead of performing fresh interactive authentication.
Detects potential account compromise by aggregating multiple high-fidelity indicators of adversary activity for a single user within a 72-hour window. The rule triggers when at least three distinct stages of an attack chain are identified, specifically: credential theft/infostealer activity, anomalous sign-in (token reuse/impossible travel), mailbox or OAuth configuration changes, and mass data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for the addition of new credentials (secrets) to service principals or applications in an Azure/Entra ID environment. It then correlates this event with subsequent mailbox activity (such as accessing mail items, sending mail, or message binding) performed by the application within 7 days of the credential creation. This detection pattern is indicative of potential OAuth application-based persistence and mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by correlating access to files labeled as sensitive (confidential, restricted, etc.) with a subsequent upload to a personal cloud storage provider or transmission via email to a personal domain within a two-hour window.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
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