Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious sign-in attempts to Microsoft services (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, outlook.office365.com) that occur within 30 minutes of a user clicking on a URL associated with these services. The sign-in is considered suspicious if it originates from a user agent commonly used by automated tools (e.g., axios, curl, python-requests, httpclient, Go-http-client) and is flagged with a 'atRisk' or 'high' risk level by Azure AD. This combination suggests a potential credential compromise following a phishing attempt, where an attacker might be using automated tools to leverage stolen credentials.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
This rule detects instances where a user clicks on a URL identified as potentially malicious (phishing-related) and subsequently has a risky sign-in event in Azure AD. The rule correlates URL click events from email with Azure AD sign-in logs, specifically looking for sign-ins marked as risky or originating from suspicious user agents (e.g., specific axios versions). The phishing URLs are identified by keywords such as 'azureapplicationregistration.pages.dev', 'chrnobinson.com', 'workers.dev', '.pages.dev', '.web.core.windows.net', '/oauth2/v2.0/authorize', 'client_id=', and 'scope=openid'.
KQL Query
This query detects URLs shared in Microsoft Teams messages, chats, or meetings that may represent potential security risks. It filters out internal domains, SharePoint URLs, placeholder links, and known system domains to focus specifically on unique external URLs being exchanged within the organization.
The detection is useful for identifying phishing attempts, malware distribution, unauthorized data sharing, or other unsafe activities originating from collaboration tools.
The detection is useful for identifying phishing attempts, malware distribution, unauthorized data sharing, or other unsafe activities originating from collaboration tools.
KQL Query from file: Detects when a user uploads, shares, or sends executable files (e.g., .exe, .dll, .scr) through Office 365 services (OneDrive / SharePoint / Exchange). This Query is used to find the SHA values of file.
This rule detects the use of the vssadmin.exe command-line tool to delete volume shadow copies. This is a common and high-confidence technique used by ransomware and other malicious actors to prevent system recovery and increase their leverage.
This KQL provide a detailed audit listing of your tenant consented OAuth apps and their granted permissions and number of users consented.
This rule detects phishing attempts by identifying emails containing URLs and endpoint network connections to domains known to be associated with phishing campaigns. It leverages an external Indicator of Compromise (IOC) list of phishing domains. The rule scans email events for inbound messages with URLs matching these domains and also monitors endpoint network events for successful connections or HTTP inspections to these malicious domains. The results from both email and endpoint sources are then combined to provide a correlated view of potential phishing activity.
Detects potential abuse of Microsoft Actor tokens for cross-tenant impersonation attacks targeting Entra ID tenants. This rule identifies suspicious audit log entries that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-55241, a critical vulnerability in Azure AD Graph API that allowed attackers to impersonate any user across Entra ID tenants using malicious Actor tokens.
This rule detects potential malware infections and command and control activity by correlating email, endpoint file, and network events with indicators of compromise (IOCs) sourced from an external OSINT feed. It specifically looks for SHA256 hashes in email attachments, domains and URLs in email links, MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes of created files on endpoints, and IP addresses and domains in network connections (both direct and HTTP inspected connections). The rule aims to identify initial access, execution, and command and control phases of an attack, potentially involving Cloudflare Tunnels as suggested by the rule's title and the OSINT source.
This rule detects and correlates Microsoft Defender's Zero-hour Auto Purge (ZAP) actions on emails. It joins original email delivery events with subsequent ZAP actions (Malware ZAP or Phish ZAP) to calculate the dwell time between an email's delivery and its removal. This helps in understanding how long a malicious or phishing email was present in a user's inbox before being remediated, which is crucial for incident response and assessing potential user interaction with the threat.
This rule detects emails containing URLs that match domains identified as phishing domains by cert.pl. It joins email URL information with a regularly updated list of known malicious domains from cert.pl and then correlates these with email events to identify potential phishing attempts.
This rule identifies unusual activity from locations not previously observed for a user within a defined lookback period. It leverages Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) Behavior Analytics and SigninLogs to baseline legitimate user locations and filter out trusted devices/IPs. The rule flags unusual activity where the source IP location is new for the user and exceeds a configurable threshold of 'unusual' behavior indicators, while also excluding specified trusted countries.
KQL Query
Microsoft has announced new restrictions on email sending for organizations that use the default onmicrosoft domains.
A throttling system will be enforced, limiting external email delivery to a maximum of 100 recipients per organization every 24 hours. To summarize:
1. Microsoft limits onmicrosoft.com domains to 100 external emails daily.
2. Targets cybercriminals exploiting new tenants, protecting shared domain reputation.
3. Organizations must purchase custom domains, rollout phases through June 2026.
The following KQL Query shows the number of distinct external domains where your onmicosoft.com domain, has been sending emails during a day. Could be that you don't detect 100 domains x day but in any case, I would recommend to start to purchase / configure your own domains instead of use the mentioned one.
A throttling system will be enforced, limiting external email delivery to a maximum of 100 recipients per organization every 24 hours. To summarize:
1. Microsoft limits onmicrosoft.com domains to 100 external emails daily.
2. Targets cybercriminals exploiting new tenants, protecting shared domain reputation.
3. Organizations must purchase custom domains, rollout phases through June 2026.
The following KQL Query shows the number of distinct external domains where your onmicosoft.com domain, has been sending emails during a day. Could be that you don't detect 100 domains x day but in any case, I would recommend to start to purchase / configure your own domains instead of use the mentioned one.
Detects incoming emails that contain suspicious attachment types (e.g., RAR, ZIP) or links to file-sharing services, combined with subject lines commonly used in phishing campaigns. This pattern is indicative of initial access attempts via spear-phishing.
This rule detects suspicious bulk file downloads from SharePoint by correlating successful sign-in events with subsequent file download activities. It specifically looks for sign-ins that are not from registered devices, followed by multiple file downloads (at least 3) within a short time window (up to 10 minutes) from the same IP address. The rule flags scenarios where a user downloads a significant number of unique files (at least 2) or has a high download count (5 or more), or a combination of moderate downloads (3 or more) within a very short duration (1 minute). This pattern can indicate data exfiltration attempts.
This detection identifies suspicious use of wreply or redirect_uri parameters in ADFS or Microsoft login URLs. Attackers can abuse these parameters to redirect users to non-Microsoft domains after authentication, a technique commonly referred to as ADFSjacking.
In May 2025, a campaign started using the Microsoft Exchange Direct Send feature to send phishing mails to organizations. This feature is designed for use by printers, scanners, cloud services and other devices that need to send messages on behalf of the company. This detection rule tries to detect the malicious mails being send via Direct Send using a couple of indicators:
- Sender email is the same as Recipient email
- SPF and DMARC both failed
- Mail is not comming in via an Exchange connector
- The sender IP address country is not a country that the user is known to login from
FYI, if you remove the country check (last line of the query), you can use the query to identify if there are legitimate mails as well. If not, you can disable the Direct Send feature in Exchange Online.
- Sender email is the same as Recipient email
- SPF and DMARC both failed
- Mail is not comming in via an Exchange connector
- The sender IP address country is not a country that the user is known to login from
FYI, if you remove the country check (last line of the query), you can use the query to identify if there are legitimate mails as well. If not, you can disable the Direct Send feature in Exchange Online.
This rule identifies users who have clicked on specific URLs that are known to be associated with phishing attempts. It correlates email URL information with URL click events to pinpoint users who interacted with malicious links shared via email. This is particularly useful for identifying victims of targeted phishing campaigns.
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