Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connections to known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the TraderTraitor campaign, including trojanized Terraform providers (FLATROOF/ROOFDECK malware families) using specific domains and URL paths.
Sweeps proxy, firewall and endpoint network telemetry for requests to the three published BraZetsu Pastebin dead-drop raw URLs used to retrieve the XOR-encrypted C2 config.
Detects the Shai-Hulud tensorlake payload pattern of fetching a platform-specific HackBrowserData binary and then executing it on the same host to dump browser-stored credentials. Anchored on tool behavior (download then execution on one host) rather than a single sample hash or the rotating C2 domain.
Detects the creation of persistence artifacts associated with the 'gh-token-monitor' service utilized by the Shai-Hulud worm across Linux systemd user services, macOS LaunchAgents, and Windows scheduled tasks or local application directories. This service acts as a dead-man's switch designed to wipe the user's home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked.
Detects creation or modification of cron entries on the BeyondTrust
Remote Support / Privileged Remote Access appliance. After exploiting the pre-auth
vulnerability, attackers establish recurring execution for persistence and C2
beaconing via cron (T1053.003) on the Linux-based appliance.
Follows CISA's urgent patch advisory for BeyondTrust appliances.
Remote Support / Privileged Remote Access appliance. After exploiting the pre-auth
vulnerability, attackers establish recurring execution for persistence and C2
beaconing via cron (T1053.003) on the Linux-based appliance.
Follows CISA's urgent patch advisory for BeyondTrust appliances.
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
Detects potential exploitation of the libcurl CURLOPT_REQUEST_TARGET CRLF injection vulnerability via web/proxy request logs where curl user-agents are observed with carriage return/line feed characters or injected request lines within the URI path.
Detects process execution where a shell (such as bash, zsh, cmd, or powershell) is spawned by a skill or openclaw process, and subsequently performs download activities (e.g., using curl, wget, invoke-webrequest) or establishes persistence (e.g., via cron, systemd, registry run keys, schtasks).
Detects a potential TeamPCP infostealer execution chain where a bash shell running setup.sh or entrypoint.sh spawns curl with POST or upload arguments.
Sweeps network connection, HTTP/proxy, file, and process telemetry for exact matches against known Cling botnet indicators: dedicated STUN C2/operator IPs, Cling MIPS loader staging URLs, and known Cling sample SHA256 hashes. Tightened to exclude broad domain-level matching on stun.l.google.com (legitimate, ubiquitous Google STUN infrastructure that Cling spoofs/abuses rather than owns) and to match payload-staging hosts only by full URL rather than bare IP, reducing false positives from shared/compromised hosting and unrelated legitimate STUN traffic.
Detects modification of a monitored file on a Centrify-managed Linux host. File
integrity events on Unix servers catch tampering with configuration, authorised keys
and service definitions — the common Linux persistence routes, which leave no
registry trace and no Windows-style artefact.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='FILE_MODIFIED'
| groupby user, targetuser, domain
integrity events on Unix servers catch tampering with configuration, authorised keys
and service definitions — the common Linux persistence routes, which leave no
registry trace and no Windows-style artefact.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='FILE_MODIFIED'
| groupby user, targetuser, domain
Detects a privilege change recorded by Centrify on a Linux server. Centrify brokers
privileged access to Unix estates, so it sees elevation decisions that native auditd
may record only partially — and in many estates it is the only consistent record
across heterogeneous Linux and AIX systems.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
privileged access to Unix estates, so it sees elevation decisions that native auditd
may record only partially — and in many estates it is the only consistent record
across heterogeneous Linux and AIX systems.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects process execution reported by a Smokescreen decoy. A decoy runs no business
workload, so any process beyond the platform's own agent indicates an intruder has
reached the asset and is executing code on it.
Capture the command line in full: on a decoy it is uncontaminated by legitimate
activity and gives a clean view of attacker tooling and intent.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and process != ''
| groupby process, commandline, user, srcip
workload, so any process beyond the platform's own agent indicates an intruder has
reached the asset and is executing code on it.
Capture the command line in full: on a decoy it is uncontaminated by legitimate
activity and gives a clean view of attacker tooling and intent.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and process != ''
| groupby process, commandline, user, srcip
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
Detects when an SAP audit message ID appears in security audit logs but is absent from the defined monitoring configuration table, which could indicate attempts to bypass or disable monitoring controls.
Detects potential SSH agent hijacking where process command line activities reference SSH authentication sockets or environment variables, followed closely by a successful SSH connection to a remote host from the same device.
The following analytic detects SSH connections presenting client banners that do not match known, common SSH client software by leveraging Zeek ssh logs.
Unusual or unknown SSH client banners may indicate custom tooling, offensive frameworks, tunneling utilities, or malware using SSH for command-and-control or lateral movement.
Unusual or unknown SSH client banners may indicate custom tooling, offensive frameworks, tunneling utilities, or malware using SSH for command-and-control or lateral movement.
Detects a Unix-based (Linux or macOS) browser process spawning a Unix shell that establishes an outbound connection to an external destination.
This browser-to-shell execution chain may indicate malicious browser content, drive-by execution, a compromised website, or abuse of a browser extension on Linux or macOS systems.
The behavior may also occur during legitimate development, installation, automation, or enterprise software workflows.
This browser-to-shell execution chain may indicate malicious browser content, drive-by execution, a compromised website, or abuse of a browser extension on Linux or macOS systems.
The behavior may also occur during legitimate development, installation, automation, or enterprise software workflows.
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