Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or writing of the specific log file '/logs/send_sms_apix.log' associated with the AnonyMousKIT Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This file is typically used by the kit to record SMS billing or gateway activity during a phishing operation.
This rule detects network connections (TLS SNI and HTTP requests) to domains associated with the AnonyMousKIT PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) platform. It flags connections to known phishing backend domains and monitors for access to suspicious management dashboard paths commonly utilized by this threat actor for managing phishing orders and communications.
Detects incoming emails that use 'Apple' or 'Find My' related strings in the sender display name while originating from common consumer email relay domains like Gmail or iCloud, which is indicative of a social engineering or phishing attempt attempting to impersonate Apple support.
Detects high or medium severity security alerts related to Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery, as identified by Microsoft Defender for Identity. This rule filters for specific alert names indicative of forged TGTs minted from the krbtgt account, excluding generic or informational ticket anomalies.
Detects DNS queries for domains containing specific brand-related strings (such as government agencies or courier services) coupled with high-risk top-level domains (TLDs). This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to register infrastructure for phishing and social engineering campaigns by mimicking legitimate organizational presence.
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects successful OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant sign-ins using the 'Microsoft Authentication Broker' client. This pattern is commonly used in device-code phishing (GhostCode) to trick users into authorizing a malicious application, often bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements.
Detects the execution of shell interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, Bash, Zsh) with suspicious command-line arguments typically associated with malicious activity, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or network download requests, when initiated by common user-facing applications like web browsers or Windows Explorer.
Detects HTML smuggling files identified as 'FlipBook' lures, commonly used in device-code phishing campaigns. These lures utilize client-side JavaScript for AES-GCM decryption, extensive comment-based obfuscation, and specific junk-padding techniques to bypass security controls and trick users into providing credentials.
This rule detects network activity associated with the GhostCode phishing kit. It monitors for sequential calls to the harvester backend (geoip, get_code, and poll) from specific suspicious hostnames, indicating a likely interaction between a victim and a credential harvesting landing page.
Detects a suspicious multi-stage PowerShell execution pattern where an initial process, such as explorer.exe or common loaders, invokes PowerShell with obfuscated or download-related flags (e.g., -enc, IEX, DownloadString), followed immediately by a child PowerShell process performing further download or network operations within a short time window.
This rule monitors for processes that are digitally signed by 'Discord Inc.' or 'Lenovo' but executing from file paths that are not associated with legitimate installations of their software. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using stolen or compromised code-signing certificates to bypass security controls like SmartScreen or endpoint antivirus solutions.