Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network communication to specific Gusercontent endpoints consistent with malicious browser extensions exfiltrating captured session tokens or cookies. The rule monitors for POST requests containing parameters like leadId, email, and data, often used to transmit stolen authentication material.
Detects the on-disk presence of a malicious Firefox browser extension, 'pdf-para-texto@extensao.local', used for credential or data harvesting. The rule monitors for the creation of its manifest file or XPI package in specific directories, indicating the staging or installation of the malicious extension.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
Detects an account takeover chain where a device loads a malicious JavaScript component ('load-addon.js') in a browser session, followed by repeated attempts to bypass bot detection mechanisms (targeting Google's 'errors/robot.png') as the payload attempts to force authentication challenges or password resets.
Detects a suspicious sequence where Microsoft Outlook launches Microsoft Edge to open a URL, and that browser process subsequently makes network connections to infrastructure associated with the ClickFix phishing campaign (e.g., rsvpopenh.one or specific malicious IP).
Detects a suspicious sequence where Microsoft Outlook launches Microsoft Edge to open a URL, and that browser process subsequently makes network connections to infrastructure associated with the ClickFix phishing campaign (e.g., rsvpopenh.one or specific malicious IP).
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects attempts to dump credentials from the LSASS process memory, either by executing known credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, using command-line arguments indicative of credential harvesting, or performing suspicious memory access/dumping operations on the lsass.exe process.
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
Detects network activity (TCP, DNS, TLS, HTTP) associated with the UNC6240 threat actor's infrastructure, specifically targeting communications with known malicious IP addresses and domains used in a campaign leveraging PeopleSoft-related lures.
Detects network activity (TCP, DNS, TLS, HTTP) associated with the UNC6240 threat actor's infrastructure, specifically targeting communications with known malicious IP addresses and domains used in a campaign leveraging PeopleSoft-related lures.
Detects network activity (TCP, DNS, TLS, HTTP) associated with the UNC6240 threat actor's infrastructure, specifically targeting communications with known malicious IP addresses and domains used in a campaign leveraging PeopleSoft-related lures.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window styles and encoded command arguments initiated directly from explorer.exe. This pattern is often indicative of malicious activity, such as fileless malware execution or obfuscated script delivery, where an attacker attempts to blend in with standard user interactions.
Detects established, bidirectional TCP connections between internal hosts and known infrastructure associated with the SIDEEYE backdoor on specific control and data ports (3333 and 3334).