Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the modification of Access Control List (ACL) permissions to files or folders on Windows systems, specifically when permissions are granted to 'Everyone' or 'SYSTEM' accounts. It monitors the execution of built-in Windows utilities like `cacls.exe`, `icacls.exe`, and `xcacls.exe` with command-line arguments indicative of granting broad access. Such activity is significant as it may suggest an adversary attempting to bypass security controls, evade detection, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive files, potentially leading to data breaches or further system compromise.
'This detection uses Sysmon telemetry to detect System Shutdown/Reboot (MITRE Technique: T1529)'
The analytic detects the use of `icacls.exe`, `cacls.exe`, or `xcacls.exe` with the `/grant` argument to modify file or directory permissions. This activity is often used by adversaries, including APTs and coinminer scripts, to establish persistence, evade detection, and maintain control over compromised systems. Granting additional access can lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects instances of Winlogon.exe, a critical Windows process, connecting to public IP addresses. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on network connections made by Winlogon.exe. Under normal circumstances, Winlogon.exe should not connect to public IPs, and such activity may indicate a compromise, such as the BlackLotus bootkit attack. This detection is significant as it highlights potential system integrity breaches. If confirmed malicious, attackers could maintain persistence, bypass security measures, and compromise the system at a fundamental level.
The following analytic identifies the modification of security permissions on files or directories using tools like icacls.exe, cacls.exe, or xcacls.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to hinder investigation, impede remediation efforts, and maintain persistent access to the compromised environment.
Detects the execution of SharpWSUS or WSUSpendu, utilities that allow for lateral movement through WSUS.
Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations.
Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations.
Detects execution of the "wusa.exe" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility by a parent process that is located in a suspicious location.
Attackers could instantiate an instance of "wusa.exe" in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC). They can duplicate the access token from "wusa.exe" to gain elevated privileges.
Attackers could instantiate an instance of "wusa.exe" in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC). They can duplicate the access token from "wusa.exe" to gain elevated privileges.
The following analytic detects instances where an adversary modifies security permissions of a file or directory using commands like "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", or "xcacls.exe" with deny options. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and impede access to critical files. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence and hinder incident response efforts.
'This hunting query looks for hosts that have attempted to interact with the Discord CDN. This activity is not normally invoked from the command line and could indicate C2, exfiltration, or malware delivery activity.'
Detects a Sysmon configuration change, which could be the result of a legitimate reconfiguration or someone trying manipulate the configuration
Triggers on any Sysmon "FileBlockExecutable" event, which indicates a violation of the configured block policy
Triggers on any Sysmon "FileExecutableDetected" event, which triggers every time a PE that is monitored by the config is created.
The following analytic detects the enabling of permission inheritance using ICACLS. This analytic identifies instances where ICACLS commands are used to enable permission inheritance on files or directories. The /inheritance:e flag, which restores inherited permissions from a parent directory, is monitored to detect changes that might reapply broader access control settings. Enabling inheritance can indicate legitimate administrative actions but may also signal attempts to override restrictive custom permissions, potentially exposing sensitive files to unauthorized access.
'This query looks for file hashes and AV signatures associated with Prestige ransomware payload.'
'Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident.
For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18)
Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095'
For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18)
Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095'
'Identifies instances of a base64 encoded PE file header seen in the process command line parameter.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
User accounts may be created to achieve persistence on a machine.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136.
Tags: #CreateAccount.
Query #1: Query for users being created using "net user" command.
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -.
E.g. in this example we look for use of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches (e.g. /ad instead of /add).
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136.
Tags: #CreateAccount.
Query #1: Query for users being created using "net user" command.
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -.
E.g. in this example we look for use of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches (e.g. /ad instead of /add).
Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of UseLogonCredential from HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest to enable clear-text credentials
'This query uses Sysmon Image Load (Event ID 7) and Process Create (Event ID 1) data to look for COM Event System being used to load a newly seen DLL.'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Trickbot: Pervasive & underestimated.
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command-and-control (C2) operations.
Trickbot is frequently spread through email. An attacker will send a target a message with an attachment containing a malicious macro. If the target enables the macro, it will write a JScript Encoded (JSE) file to disk (JScript is a Microsoft dialect of ECMAScript). The JSE file will then be launched using wscript.exe to perform a variety of malicious tasks, particularly reconnaissance.
The following query detects when Office applications have launched wscript.exe to run a JSE file.
See Detect rundll.exe being used for reconnaissance and command-and-control for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command-and-control (C2) operations.
Trickbot is frequently spread through email. An attacker will send a target a message with an attachment containing a malicious macro. If the target enables the macro, it will write a JScript Encoded (JSE) file to disk (JScript is a Microsoft dialect of ECMAScript). The JSE file will then be launched using wscript.exe to perform a variety of malicious tasks, particularly reconnaissance.
The following query detects when Office applications have launched wscript.exe to run a JSE file.
See Detect rundll.exe being used for reconnaissance and command-and-control for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
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