Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects PHP command-line interpreters executing code supplied directly on the command line with the CLI -r / --run options, or code supplied to PHPDBG through standard input.
It covers common CLI executable names on Linux and Windows, including php.exe, php-win.exe, the legacy php-cli.exe name, versioned Linux php binaries, phpdbg, and FrankenPHP's php-cli subcommand.
PHP-CGI and PHP-FPM are excluded because they do not support the PHP CLI inline -r option.
This behavior can be used legitimately for administration and automation, but unexpected or obfuscated inline PHP execution may indicate an attacker using an installed interpreter to run commands without dropping a script file.
It covers common CLI executable names on Linux and Windows, including php.exe, php-win.exe, the legacy php-cli.exe name, versioned Linux php binaries, phpdbg, and FrankenPHP's php-cli subcommand.
PHP-CGI and PHP-FPM are excluded because they do not support the PHP CLI inline -r option.
This behavior can be used legitimately for administration and automation, but unexpected or obfuscated inline PHP execution may indicate an attacker using an installed interpreter to run commands without dropping a script file.
The following analytic detects instances where Java, or Tomcat processes spawn a Linux shell, which may indicate exploitation attempts, such as those related to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).
This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent-child process relationships.
This activity is significant as it can signify a compromised Java application, potentially leading to unauthorized shell access.
If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent-child process relationships.
This activity is significant as it can signify a compromised Java application, potentially leading to unauthorized shell access.
If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes typically associated with WebShell activity on web servers.
It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`.
This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a WebShell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.
It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`.
This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a WebShell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.
Detects cmd.exe launching curl.exe with TLS verification disabled, redirect following, an output file, and forced hostname-to-IP resolution, or the PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest with a certificate-check bypass switch, often associated with malicious trojan droppers.
Detects when typical discovery commands (whoami, id, uname, ipconfig) are executed under a web server or PHP process parent, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity following a web application compromise. The rule aggregates distinct commands within a 15-minute window to reduce false positives.
Detects WinRAR or 7-Zip extracting an archive with a hard-coded password supplied via command line from a cmd.exe batch parent, using switch patterns associated with the RareWolf AnyDesk dropper.
The following analytic detects the writing of files from known remote access software to disk within the environment.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on file path, file name, and user information.
This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, further compromise, or complete control over affected systems.
It is best to update both the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup and the remote_access_software lookup with any known or approved remote access software to reduce false positives and increase coverage.
In order to enhance performance, the detection filters for specific file names extensions / names that are used in the remote_access_software lookup.
If add additional entries, consider updating the search filters to include those file names / extensions as well, if not alread covered.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on file path, file name, and user information.
This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, further compromise, or complete control over affected systems.
It is best to update both the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup and the remote_access_software lookup with any known or approved remote access software to reduce false positives and increase coverage.
In order to enhance performance, the detection filters for specific file names extensions / names that are used in the remote_access_software lookup.
If add additional entries, consider updating the search filters to include those file names / extensions as well, if not alread covered.
Detects Trays.exe started with the -tray argument from a Trays subfolder or a batch script, as observed in the RareWolf BAT dropper ahead of a silent AnyDesk installation.
The following analytic detects the use of the taskkill command in a process command line to terminate several known browser processes, a technique commonly employed by the Braodo stealer malware to steal credentials. By forcefully closing browsers like Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, the malware can unlock files that store sensitive information, such as passwords and login data. This detection focuses on identifying taskkill commands targeting these browsers, signaling malicious intent. Early detection allows security teams to investigate and prevent further credential theft and system compromise.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem dataset to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \windows\fonts\, \users\public\). This activity can be significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in temporary file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data set to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in temporary directories (e.g., \windows\Temp\, \AppData\Local\Temp\).
This activity can be significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
This activity can be significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
Detects indicators of ToolShell web shell creation (spinstall0.aspx) and ASP.NET machine key harvesting activities (reading web.config or accessing validationkey/decryptionkey materials via w3wp child processes or file access audits) on SharePoint servers.
Detects a sequence where a SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) related to SharePoint, followed shortly (within 1 hour) by high-fidelity lateral movement tooling or remote execution techniques (such as PsExec, WMI, PowerShell remoting, or scheduled tasks) on the same host.
Detects execution of GoldenDMSA hacktool used for Directory Service Account manipulation.
This analytic detects outbound network connections from a Python process running from suspicious or non-standard directories to social media related domains.
It leverages Sysmon Event ID 3 to surface this anomalous behavior.
Legitimate Python applications rarely originate from paths such as "C:\Users\Public\", Windows font or debug folders, or the Recycle Bin, making direct outbound calls to social media infrastructure from these locations a strong indicator of compromise.
For example the Braodo Stealer, a Python-based credential-harvesting malware, abuses authenticated browser sessions to query the Meta Graph API and enumerate the victim's Facebook and Meta advertising infrastructure.
It leverages Sysmon Event ID 3 to surface this anomalous behavior.
Legitimate Python applications rarely originate from paths such as "C:\Users\Public\", Windows font or debug folders, or the Recycle Bin, making direct outbound calls to social media infrastructure from these locations a strong indicator of compromise.
For example the Braodo Stealer, a Python-based credential-harvesting malware, abuses authenticated browser sessions to query the Meta Graph API and enumerate the victim's Facebook and Meta advertising infrastructure.
The following analytic identifies the execution of commonly used NirSoft utilities on Windows systems.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution details such as process name, parent process, and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant for a SOC because NirSoft utilities, while legitimate, can be used by adversaries for malicious purposes like credential theft or system reconnaissance.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Note that this search does not use a where clause to filter out known benign paths, as NirSoft utilities can be executed from various locations. This might hinder performance in environments with high data volumes.
Apply additional filtering as necessary to enhance this.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution details such as process name, parent process, and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant for a SOC because NirSoft utilities, while legitimate, can be used by adversaries for malicious purposes like credential theft or system reconnaissance.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Note that this search does not use a where clause to filter out known benign paths, as NirSoft utilities can be executed from various locations. This might hinder performance in environments with high data volumes.
Apply additional filtering as necessary to enhance this.
Detects Python interpreter activity accessing multiple credential store categories (such as password managers, Discord, SSH keys, or Steam) in a short window on a single device, or specific stealer scripts associated with known file paths.
Detects DNS queries to definitionupdates.microsoft.com or the go.microsoft.com fwlink redirect used for WD update downloads, when the querying process is not a Windows system component. BlueHammer utilizes these definition updates as part of its exploit chain.
Detects PowerShell launched hidden and non-interactive with an insecure execution policy and Base64 decode-and-execute, or a script combining Base64 decode-and-execute with browser history collection and WMI shadow copy enumeration, as seen in the Midnight Blizzard (GTG-20006) stager.
Detects PowerShell execution involving Base64 decoding or certutil decoding combined with writing files to the AppData directory using .NET I/O methods or PowerShell cmdlets.
Detects when common office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, etc.) or archive utilities/PDF readers spawn command-line interpreters or scripting engines (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, etc.), which is a common indicator of phishing document execution or malicious archive extraction.
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