Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
9,759 detections
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Domain Prevalence
YARA-L
Detects DNS events querying domains that have a low rolling max prevalence.
DNS query to a recently created domain
Detects creation and movement of .lnk files to specific folders
Detects when a low prevalence hash is seen during a process launch event, and a low prevalence domain is accessed within 10m.
Connection to ADFS via named pipes that are not using specific Windows ADFS processes may be indicative of user attempting to access ADFS for suspicious purposes
Provides example usage of WHOIS data, detecting a DNS query for a domain that contains a specific string and is not registered with the defined domain registrar.
Detects the creation of a file named "wermgr.exe" in an uncommon directory, which could indicate exploitation of CVE-2023-36874. The rule specifically looks for 'wermgr.exe' being created outside of standard Windows system directories, aiming to catch malicious instances masquerading as the legitimate Windows Error Reporting Manager.
Detects process access requests to the LSASS process with specific call trace calls and access masks. This behavior is expressed by many credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump and even the Taskmgr dumping feature.
Detects potentially suspicious file downloads directly from IP addresses and stored in suspicious locations using Wget.exe
Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8.
Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors.
Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate
This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections.
Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors.
Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate
This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections.
Detects the execution of a system command via the ScreenConnect RMM service.
Detects potentially suspicious changes to the SentinelOne context menu scan command by a process other than SentinelOne.
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
Detects an exploitation attempt of CVE-2019-1388, a privilege escalation vulnerability. This involves the UAC consent dialogue (consent.exe) invoking an Internet Explorer process (iexplore.exe) with system-level privileges, indicated by 'System' or 'S-1-16-16384' integrity level and a command line containing ' http'.
Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2023-38331 (WinRAR before v6.23), where an attacker can leverage WinRAR to execute arbitrary commands and binaries. The rule specifically looks for child processes spawned by WinRAR.exe, where the command line contains a temporary path indicative of the vulnerability (e.g., '\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar$') and a double extension (e.g., '.ext .exe'), combined with the execution of common binaries like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or scripting hosts.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe that leads to an external network connection, specifically looking for known processes used by the Pikabot malware family for command and control (C2) communication. This rule identifies suspicious network activity originating from rundll32.exe when its parent process is one of the specified Windows binaries, which Pikabot has been observed to hijack for C2.
Detects the execution of a binary that has been renamed from its original name, often used by attackers or malware for defense evasion. This rule leverages the Sysmon 'OriginalFileName' datapoint to identify instances where common Windows utilities or attacker tools are executed under a different filename.
Detects process creation activity related to the Peach Sandstorm APT, specifically looking for a unique string 'QP's\*(58vaP!tF4' in the command line. This string is likely a unique identifier or a specific parameter used by the APT's tools.
Detects remote thread creation in the 'mstsc.exe' process by a process originating from a suspicious temporary or public user directory. This technique is often used by attackers to inject code into 'mstsc.exe' to hook APIs and steal credentials during RDP authentications.
This rule detects the execution of the PingCastle utility, a legitimate Active Directory security assessment tool, when its executable name has been changed. Adversaries often rename legitimate tools to evade detection. The detection logic relies on identifying specific original file names within the PE metadata (OriginalFileName) and/or recognizing characteristic command-line arguments used by PingCastle, such as those related to scanner functions or health checks. The rule specifically filters out executions where the image path matches the original PingCastle executable names, focusing on instances where the binary has been renamed.
Detects system discovery activity carried out by Pikabot, such as network, user information, and domain groups. The malware Pikabot has been observed using this technique as part of its C2-botnet registration with a short collection time frame (less than 1 minute). The rule specifically looks for `ipconfig.exe /all`, `netstat.exe -aon`, and `whoami.exe /all` commands executed by processes whose grandparent image ends with `rundll32.exe` or parent image ends with `SearchFilterHost.exe` or `SearchProtocolHost.exe`.
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