Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

9,758 detections

Detects suspicious activity in which the MSExchangeMailboxReplication process writes .asp and .apsx files to disk, which could be a sign of ProxyShell exploitation
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects the creation of files that indicator an interactive use of PowerShell in the SYSTEM user context
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects the creation of binaries in the WinSxS folder by non-system processes
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects the creation of files with certain extensions on a static web site. This can be indicative of potential uploads of a web shell.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects a remote DLL load event via "rundll32.exe".
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects a network connection initiated by IMEWDBLD.EXE. This might indicate potential abuse of the utility as a LOLBIN in order to download arbitrary files or additional payloads.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects programs that connect to known malware callback ports based on statistical analysis from two different sandbox system databases
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects the execution of PowerShell via the creation of a named pipe starting with PSHost
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could indicate that the tool is being used in an attack
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects LSASS process access for potential credential dumping by a Python-like tool such as LaZagne or Pypykatz.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects suspicious access to LSASS handle via a call trace to "seclogon.dll" with a suspicious access right.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects usage of the copy builtin cmd command to copy files with the ".dmp"/".dump" extension from a remote share
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects the execution of the "net use" command to mount a WebDAV server and then immediately execute some content in it. As seen being used in malicious LNK files
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects the execution of "ConfigSecurityPolicy.EXE", a binary part of Windows Defender used to manage settings in Windows Defender.
Users can configure different pilot collections for each of the co-management workloads.
It can be abused by attackers in order to upload or download files.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects the execution of "csvde.exe" in order to export organizational Active Directory structure.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects the execution of FSharp Interpreters "FsiAnyCpu.exe" and "FSi.exe"
Both can be used for AWL bypass and to execute F# code via scripts or inline.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
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