Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,265 detections
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Detects indicators of compromise including Bash-based reverse shells communicating with a C2 domain on port 7070, outbound network connections from web server and shell processes to the same C2 infrastructure, and the dropping of known suspicious plugin archive files (akismetv4-plugin.zip, Hlx.zip, template.zip).
Detects when a shell process (such as sh, bash, dash, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe) is spawned by a metrics, logging, or authentication management service shortly after the service accepts an inbound network connection, potentially approximating exploitation of an internal management service.
Detects script-driven (curl, wget, python) outbound connections to
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
Detects the Tensorlake npm 0.5.144 compromise (Shai-Hulud worm via preinstall). Includes a baseline query to identify the affected package/version across Defender inventory, file, network, device and process events, plus preinstall download/obfuscated-exec behaviour. Results are summarized per device/account.
Detects the execution of PaperCut reverse SOCKS5 bridge kit operator-side scripts (such as admin_bridge.py, live_reverse_socks5.py, start_socks.sh) or the creation of related Java bridge class artifacts.
Detects malicious behaviors involving the Chisel tunneling tool, including reverse SOCKS proxy connections with TLS verification skipped, cron-based persistence referencing watchdog scripts in hidden /var/tmp directories, and associated tool staging activities.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, reconnaissance, and command execution originating from web server and PHP lineage processes, indicating potential webshell activity or compromised web applications.
Detects PHP out-of-memory fatal errors (Allowed memory size exhausted) on hosts where memory_limit=-1 has been configured as mitigation. On these hosts, memory is unlimited, so this error indicates potential configuration tampering or an attack.
Detects web server processes (apache2, httpd) spawning a Unix shell (sh, dash, bash) which subsequently executes curl, wget, or php to perform an external HTTP fetch or download. This behavior is commonly associated with PHP or web application post-exploitation callbacks (webshells).
Detects command execution patterns on NetScaler appliances involving the extraction of system details (id, uname, hostname, nsrelease) and writing or echoing them into HTML files within NetScaler web directories, indicative of web shell installation or staging.
Detects administrative access to the DLP console from an unfamiliar address. Console
access permits policy change, violation review and exception approval — everything
needed to make data loss invisible, in one place.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
access permits policy change, violation review and exception approval — everything
needed to make data loss invisible, in one place.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects outbound IPv4 and IPv6 connections from endpoints to public IP addresses on high-numbered ports (1023 and above), excluding private, reserved IP ranges and known noisy processes. Command-and-control tools, malware and tunneling activities may use uncommon ports to evade network monitoring.
Connections are aggregated by endpoint, process, remote IP and port to identify suspicious communication patterns.
Legitimate applications, custom services and administrative tools may also use these ports, so triage based on process context, destination reputation and connection frequency.
Connections are aggregated by endpoint, process, remote IP and port to identify suspicious communication patterns.
Legitimate applications, custom services and administrative tools may also use these ports, so triage based on process context, destination reputation and connection frequency.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects backup service processes writing server-side scripts into web-accessible directories, indicating potential web shell deployment after application compromise.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects credential harvesting tooling and activity targeting PaperCut configuration and log files by identifying specific parser script executions, searches for PaperCut credential key patterns in process command lines, and the creation of related harvest artifacts.
Detects GitLab backend processes (such as puma, sidekiq, rails, ruby, bundle) spawning shells, scripting interpreters, or network tools with suspicious command-line parameters, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity or vulnerability exploitation.
Detects behavioral indicators of shell-driven cryptocurrency miner staging where a hidden .trace file or binary is created, executed, or referenced via command-line arguments within go2rtc or shared memory directories (/config/, /opt/go2rtc/, /etc/go2rtc/, /.config/go2rtc/, /dev/shm/), alongside indicators of mining pools or software such as XMRig.
Detects the execution of the public Horizon3.ai PoC exploit for CVE-2026-106173 (FortiSIEM gRPC path traversal RCE) utilizing python interpreters with specific command-line arguments indicative of the exploit tool.
Detects a burst of newly created Python or Shell scripts on a host running the Zammad ticketing system, which can indicate post-exploitation activity or automated staging.
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