Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects inbound HTTP POST requests directed at the /SDK/webLanguage path, which is known to be vulnerable to command injection via CVE-2021-36260 in Hikvision IP cameras.
This rule detects potential brute-force or credential stuffing attempts against web application authentication endpoints by monitoring patterns of success and failure. It aggregates requests over 5-minute intervals, calculating a risk score based on high volumes of authentication failures relative to successful requests from individual source IPs targeting sensitive API paths (e.g., auth, session, login, token).
This rule detects potential brute-force or credential stuffing attempts against web application authentication endpoints by monitoring patterns of success and failure. It aggregates requests over 5-minute intervals, calculating a risk score based on high volumes of authentication failures relative to successful requests from individual source IPs targeting sensitive API paths (e.g., auth, session, login, token).
Detects network activity over port 1313 containing Socket.IO payloads with keywords 'control' and 'escape', indicative of a command and control or remote access channel often associated with interactive shells or administrative backdoors.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to dynv6 dynamic DNS providers containing specific multipart form data patterns, including filenames like 'Info.txt', indicative of data exfiltration by the Kimsuky threat group using custom C2 staging scripts.
This rule detects HTTP/1.1 requests containing an Upgrade header (specifically targeting WebSocket upgrades) accompanied by a non-zero Content-Length header. This pattern is characteristic of a request smuggling primitive targeting the nghttpx reverse proxy, where the provided body may be misinterpreted by the backend as a separate, smuggled request due to improper request queue handling.
Detects network communication behavior indicative of Yuta or Glove Stealer malware, where suspicious processes (specifically 'winupdate.exe' in common staging directories or Python-based requests) exfiltrate data via HTTP POST requests to known attacker-controlled infrastructure platforms like Discord or Telegram.
This rule identifies potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity by detecting recurring, consistent HTTP(S) requests from internal hosts to unknown or newly seen external destinations, characterized by stable time intervals and low variance in response sizes. The detection logic filters out common User-Agents, indicating non-browser or automated traffic often associated with malware communication.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting the BeyondTrust Privileged Remote Access API by identifying unauthenticated POST requests directed at specific sensitive API endpoints (e.g., /api/, /remote-support/). It flags high-frequency or multi-path request patterns indicative of automated vulnerability scanning or exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-1731, where the absence of authorization headers is a key indicator of unauthorized access.
This rule detects network connections to or from known suspicious IP addresses and requests to known suspicious domains. These indicators are often associated with command and control (C2) activity, malware distribution, or other malicious infrastructure.
Detects anomalous lateral movement or network pivoting activity originating from an internet-facing Nginx server. The detection identifies an incoming HTTP POST request from an external IP address followed immediately by an outbound network connection from that same Nginx server to an internal RFC1918 host on the FastCGI port (9000). This behavior is consistent with the 'Velvet Ant' operation's technique of abusing proxy_pass configurations to relay traffic into isolated internal network segments via FastCGI request-chaining.
Detects potential exploitation attempts against management interfaces of SOHO network devices (Cisco, Ubiquiti, Draytek) by monitoring for suspicious web request activity, specifically targeting paths like /admin, /cgi-bin, or /setup.cgi. The rule identifies high-volume or systematic scan patterns from external sources, which may indicate automated exploitation attempts (e.g., related to CVE-2026-35616).
This rule detects potential beaconing or re-registration activity associated with the JDY/KV-botnet by monitoring network connections to known Tor control/relay ports (9001 and 9050). The detection identifies endpoints making high-volume, multi-destination connections to external IPs over these specific ports, a pattern indicative of botnet nodes attempting to re-establish C2 communication after infrastructure disruption or actively recruiting new nodes.
Detects network connection attempts directed toward RFC 1918 private IP address spaces (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) and localhost (127.0.0.0/8) that do not involve common Windows file sharing ports (TCP/445 and TCP/139). This behavior may indicate lateral movement, internal reconnaissance, or the use of non-standard protocols for internal communication.
Detects outbound proxy traffic originating from identified AI and automation agent user-agents (e.g., ChatGPT, Perplexity, Claude, etc.) attempting to access sensitive URI paths, such as credential files, SSH keys, configuration files, or cloud-hosted secrets. This may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data to or through AI platforms.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
Detects outbound ICMP Type 8 (Echo Request) packets that contain an abnormally large payload (greater than 64 bytes). This behavior is characteristic of ICMP tunneling, where attackers encapsulate data within the payload of ICMP packets to bypass network security controls or establish covert command and control communication.
This rule detects large HTTP POST requests (greater than 10MB) originating from the internal network to external destinations, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of Emotet malware command and control (C2) beaconing, specifically looking for POST requests with random alphanumeric URIs (4-16 characters) and a specific Accept-Encoding header (gzip, deflate).
This rule monitors SIEM-ingested HTTP or API gateway traffic for JSON Web Tokens (JWT) where the base64url-encoded payload claims contain sensitive identifiers such as 'password' or 'role'. Detection of these fields in unencrypted JWT claims indicates poor development practices leading to excessive data exposure or potential credential leakage within web session management.
Detects network connections to known Telegram or Steam community profile pages used by the Vidar information stealer as dead-drop resolvers to retrieve secondary C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically filters for non-browser processes to reduce noise from legitimate user traffic.
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