Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This correlation analytic identifies likely PHP2Shell exploitation attempts by correlating a PHP memory disclosure indicator
with either of two independent PHP web exploitation indicators from Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Intrusion Events.
Seeing these behaviors from the same source against the same destination within a short period can indicate an attempt to
improve the reliability of subsequent exploitation. Investigate the complete network and web server activity.
with either of two independent PHP web exploitation indicators from Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Intrusion Events.
Seeing these behaviors from the same source against the same destination within a short period can indicate an attempt to
improve the reliability of subsequent exploitation. Investigate the complete network and web server activity.
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2024-4577, a PHP-CGI argument injection vulnerability, by identifying soft-hyphen encoding (%AD) injected alongside PHP configuration options such as allow_url_include and auto_prepend_file=php://input in request URLs.
Detects web requests originating from the RedTail botnet user-agent 'libredtail-http' attempting to exploit two or more distinct vulnerability families (such as Apache path traversal, PHP-CGI argument injection, PHPUnit eval-stdin, and ThinkPHP pearcmd) from a single source IP.
Detects HTTP POST requests with multipart form data containing PHP session identifiers and PHP session upload progress parameters, indicative of an exploit attempt against a PHP application vulnerability (CVE-2026-109619).
This analytic detects suspicious PHP web application requests using Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Intrusion Events.
The matching network signature identifies a serialized input pattern associated with attempts to exploit PHP request handling.
Investigate the source, targeted application, and related web server activity to determine whether the request was part of PHP2Shell exploitation.
The matching network signature identifies a serialized input pattern associated with attempts to exploit PHP request handling.
Investigate the source, targeted application, and related web server activity to determine whether the request was part of PHP2Shell exploitation.
Detects endpoint network connections and correlates multi-stage communications associated with the ClickFix browser cache smuggling campaign, including initial payload retrieval and secondary stage/C2 communication across devices.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Detects multiple distinct source IPs sending forged 'pitboss PPE' authentication failure messages to NetScaler authentication endpoints within a short timeframe, associated with a fetch-based FreeBSD payload download (kw2-freebsd-x64-s11).
Detects potential vulnerability scanning, enumeration, or bulk data extraction against Request Tracker (RT) web paths by monitoring high request volumes, distinct URI counts, or large response byte sizes within CommonSecurityLog data.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects potential SQL injection (SQLi) attempts targeting web applications by identifying multiple requests matching specific SQLi regex patterns combined with encoding or internal reference markers within web access logs.
The following analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
It leverages Palo Alto traffic logs mapped to the Network_Traffic data model in Splunk. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects potential abuse of WordPress application passwords by correlating an authorization mint request (authorize-application.php) from an administrator's browser with a subsequent REST API page creation request to the same destination server from a different source IP address within a short time window.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Finds BeyondTrust Remote Support (Bomgar) appliances at version 26.2.3 or earlier that have a public IP address, indicating a potentially internet-facing vulnerable appliance (CVE-2026-102764). Index and field names are placeholders to adapt.
Detects connections held open far longer than normal. Interactive command and
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
Detects HTTP requests to the PeopleSoft PSEMHUB servlet using alternate
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
Detects suspicious DNS queries to external service interaction domains often used for out-of-band interactions after successful RCE
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects potential data exfiltration to popular public paste-sites and code-sharing services (such as Pastebin, Paste.ee, Hastebin, Ghostbin, ControlC, Dpaste, Rentry.co, Privatebin) using HTTP POST or PUT requests based on upload frequency and volume thresholds.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
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