Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous ICMP Echo Request packets (Type 8) directed towards external networks that contain a payload size greater than 128 bytes. Such anomalies are often indicative of ICMP tunneling, which may be leveraged by adversaries for command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration.
This rule detects anomalous DNS query activity that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. It monitors for three specific indicators: excessive query volume to a single domain family within a short timeframe, the use of abnormally long DNS subdomain labels, and the transmission of TXT record queries from endpoints not acting as designated DNS servers.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to a MyBB forum administrative panel targeting the 'user-users' module, specifically attempting to assign a user to the 'Administrator' group (group ID 4). This pattern is indicative of an exploitation attempt or unauthorized administrative account manipulation.
Detects anomalous ICMP Echo Request packets (type 8, code 0) that contain payloads exceeding 64 bytes. ICMP Echo requests with large, non-standard payloads are a classic indicator of ICMP tunneling, which can be used to bypass network firewalls and encapsulate non-ICMP traffic for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple such packets are seen from the same source.
Detects a browser session that contacts an EvilTokens Device Code phishing endpoint (/api/device/status/) and then immediately navigates to onedrive.live.com. This indicates that the attacker's backend successfully returned 'status:completed' and the phishing kit executed a window.location.replace to redirect the victim to OneDrive after token capture.
Detects potential lateral movement activity where PowerShell or the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) host process (wsmprovhost.exe) initiates network connections to multiple distinct destination IP addresses over the WinRM default ports (5985/5986). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary using legitimate remote administration tools to pivot or spread across a network.
Detects DNS queries with exceptionally long request strings (30 characters or more), which is a common indicator of DNS tunneling or command and control (C2) communication. Adversaries often encode data within the subdomain portion of a DNS query to bypass network security controls.
Detects network activity associated with the EKZ Stealer malware, specifically an HTTP POST request used to exfiltrate base64-encoded credentials to a known malicious destination at 83.138.53.110/service/save.php.
This rule detects network connections or process command lines referencing 'easyupload.io' and 'limewire.com', as well as searches for 'eayupload'. These indicators are often associated with unauthorized file transfers or potentially malicious activity involving known file sharing platforms.
This rule monitors for two types of anomalous network behavior: first, it identifies connections to known domains from IP addresses not previously associated with those domains over a seven-day lookback period. Second, it identifies HTTP proxy responses (from Zscaler or Squid) where the content-length significantly deviates from the historical baseline for specific URLs. These patterns are potential indicators of C2 channel shifts or data exfiltration via web protocols.
Detects anomalous network scanning behavior from a Qualys scanner towards Domain Controller ports. The rule monitors CommonSecurityLog and NetworkSessions for high volumes of connection attempts (more than 50 within one hour) targeting critical Active Directory ports (88, 135, 389, 445, 636, 3268, 3269). This activity may indicate a scanner configuration error, a compromised scanner, or an adversary attempting to map the environment while masquerading as a security tool.
This rule detects network communication (connections, DNS queries, or proxy logs) between endpoints and a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses associated with Mistic and Woodgnat/KongTuke threat families. It identifies these activities across network event logs, DNS queries, and security logs.
This rule detects network connections to phishing pages hosted on the workers.dev domain that are attempting to interact with EvilTokens device code API endpoints. These pages are known to implement developer hotkey prevention (F12 blocked, context menu disabled) to hinder in-browser analysis, indicating malicious intent.
This rule detects network requests to the Bing 'search by image' endpoint where an external URL is provided as the query parameter. Adversaries may use this technique to perform reconnaissance, such as searching for images of internal documentation, sensitive infrastructure, or to identify if internal files have been indexed or leaked online.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration through the Bing Image Search 'search-by-image' feature. It identifies web traffic to Bing that contains an 'imgurl' parameter, decodes the URL, and filters out legitimate Microsoft-related domains. It then flags suspicious, potentially encoded file paths or data structures that might indicate the use of this public service to exfiltrate or host staging data.
This rule detects potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) exploitation where Bing's 'search by image' functionality is abused to fetch external, non-Microsoft controlled URLs. The query monitors web proxy logs for specific Bing search parameters ('cbir=sbi' and 'imgurl') and filters out requests to trusted domains, effectively identifying attempts to use the search engine as an intermediary for unauthorized external web requests. The rule further correlates these hits with Microsoft Copilot interaction logs to identify if the activity is associated with authenticated Copilot user sessions.
This rule detects potential Bluekit PhaaS C2 infrastructure by identifying fast-flux DNS behavior. It monitors DNS queries for domains associated with Bluekit phishing campaigns and flags instances where a single hostname resolves to a high number of distinct IP addresses (3 or more) within a one-hour window, which is indicative of domain rotation for evasion.
Detects anomalous outbound network connections initiated by media server processes (Jellyfin, FFmpeg, or Nextcloud) immediately following an inbound video file upload (AVI) to the media server's API, indicative of post-exploitation activity related to the PixelSmash (CVE-2026-8461) heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability.
Detects network connection attempts or DNS queries to a set of specific domains ('holabrief.com', 'loopedin.io') that are known to be associated with suspicious activity or potential command and control infrastructure.
Detects potential phishing activity involving a two-hop open-redirect chain. The rule monitors for an initial navigation to known SaaS platforms (HolaBrief or LoopedIn), followed within one minute by an outbound request to an external destination where the SaaS domain is present in the HTTP referrer header, indicating a redirect-based phishing mechanism.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
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