Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,154 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
683
379
342
230
173
Contributors
630
378
354
145
119
Categories
841
831
746
393
348
Platforms
1,587
586
494
263
118
Products / Services
10,683
9,759
6,695
4,421
3,750
2,154
MITRE Techniques
655
561
383
337
286
CVEs
32
20
8
7
6
IDS Classtypes
65
32
23
19
14
IDS Protocols
47
38
30
30
12
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
macOS malware used by JINX-0164 against cryptocurrency developers
Open-source derived remote access trojan with plugin architecture
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
This rule identifies potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity by detecting recurring, consistent HTTP(S) requests from internal hosts to unknown or newly seen external destinations, characterized by stable time intervals and low variance in response sizes. The detection logic filters out common User-Agents, indicating non-browser or automated traffic often associated with malware communication.
This rule detects potential DNS hijacking or redirection by comparing the returned IP address from a DNS query against a known list of authoritative IP addresses for specific domains. If an internal DNS resolver returns an IP address that does not match the authoritative record, it flags the event as a potential DNS response mismatch. It includes risk scoring based on the number of distinct affected hosts.
Detects repeated outbound network connections (HTTPS or HTTP) originating from QEMU emulator processes (qemu-system-x86_64 or qemu-system-i386). This activity is indicative of C2 beaconing or post-exploitation traffic originating from a virtualized guest hidden on a host system.
Detects anomalous activity consistent with the IronWorm threat actor using compromised CI credentials to perform npm package publishing. The rule identifies a sequence of two events from the same source IP within a 10-minute window: first, an OIDC identity token exchange request at the npm registry, followed by a package publish operation (PUT request). This behavior is characteristic of malicious actors hijacking CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code into trusted npm packages.
Detects high-frequency requests (over 30 unique paths within a 5-minute window) to sensitive VPN-related URL paths that result in 403 (Forbidden) or 404 (Not Found) status codes from non-internal IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of an adversary performing directory enumeration or vulnerability scanning on public-facing infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency requests (over 30 unique paths within a 5-minute window) to sensitive VPN-related URL paths that result in 403 (Forbidden) or 404 (Not Found) status codes from non-internal IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of an adversary performing directory enumeration or vulnerability scanning on public-facing infrastructure.
This rule monitors for DNS queries, network connections, and HTTP proxy requests originating from node/npm processes or targeting known infrastructure associated with the Trum3it campaign. It covers common malicious domains and specific Vercel subdomains identified as command-and-control (C2) endpoints.
Detects network beaconing activity attributed to the OceanLotus (APT32) threat group, specifically the SPECTRALVIPER C2 mechanism. The rule identifies the 'OneDrive.Sync.Services.exe' process performing HTTP GET requests to known attacker-controlled infrastructure or using specific malicious cookie headers (zd_cs_pm, euconsent-v2) for command-and-control communication.
Detects potential exploitation of unauthenticated ServiceNow Scripted REST Resources by identifying a pattern where external IP addresses first receive 4xx (authentication required) responses when querying /api/ paths, followed by 200 OK responses for the same paths, indicating a successful authentication bypass.
Detects path traversal attempts within HTTP request parameters, specifically identifying encoded traversal sequences, file protocol usage, and attempts to access sensitive system files like /etc/passwd or /proc/self/environ.
Detects high-frequency port scanning activity from external, non-private IP addresses targeting common network services. The rule identifies different scanning profiles, including wide port sweeps and targeted multi-port scans, which are consistent with reconnaissance behaviors observed in botnet activity like the KV/JDY clusters.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the MYRA RAT. The rule identifies TCP connections to the hardcoded C2 IP address 192.168.54.1 on port 4444, where multiple connections are observed from the same host over a 10-minute window, suggesting automated heartbeat/beaconing behavior.
Detects network connections initiated by Windows Nearby Sharing processes (quick_share.exe, nearby_sharing.exe, or NearbyShare.exe) to non-standard ports, potentially indicating unauthorized file transfers or exfiltration over unusual network channels.
Detects communication between a macOS host and the Telegram Bot API using the 'getUpdates' method. This behavior is indicative of the 'Gaslight' malware family using Telegram as a command-and-control (C2) channel via polling, typically characterized by repeated HTTP requests to 'api.telegram.org'.
Detects high-frequency requests to sensitive management or API-related URL paths (/msp/, /api/, /wyse/, /wms/) that are not preceded by successful authentication attempts. This pattern is characteristic of automated exploitation attempts or unauthorized discovery against network management or configuration interfaces from external IP addresses.
Page 69 of 103