Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious web traffic patterns associated with potential Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) exploitation. It monitors for access to files containing 'cors_exploit_poc', HTTP POST requests containing sensitive 'AMAUTHID' cookies, or the presence of 'withCredentials' headers alongside 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' configurations. These indicators, particularly when combined, suggest unauthorized attempts to bypass browser-based security models to access sensitive session identifiers or data.
This rule detects network connections on port 443 made to common public DNS resolvers (1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4, 9.9.9.9, 149.112.112.112) by processes other than known web browsers. This behavior is atypical for standard endpoint processes and may indicate the use of DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) for command and control or data exfiltration to bypass network filtering.
Detects DNS resolution of known Bluekit PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) operator domains. These domains are associated with phishing lures that leverage LLMs for localized content and voice cloning, and this detection identifies when a host attempts to resolve these specific malicious domains, indicating a likely interaction with a phishing lure.
This rule monitors and alerts on network connections originating from hosts to known command-and-control (C2) or infrastructure domains associated with malicious browser extensions, specifically those identified in the BadBlocker campaign. These extensions often masquerade as legitimate ad-blocking tools to perform lifecycle beaconing or redirect users to promotional/malicious content.
Detects instances of Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PaaS) where the browser utilizes WebRTC RTCPeerConnection to initiate a UDP STUN request on port 3478 while concurrently accessing a suspicious web page. This behavior is used by attackers to discover the visitor's real IP address, effectively bypassing proxies or VPNs to identify security researchers or analysts.
Detects HTTP responses containing JavaScript files with a Content-Length exceeding 1MB. This behavior is associated with the Bluekit PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) platform, which uses large, obfuscated JavaScript bundles for browser fingerprinting and to evade static security signatures.
Detects outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests to api.adblock-for-youtube.com to fetch scriptlet rules. This activity is consistent with the Adblock for YouTube extension (cmedhionkhpnakcndndgjjdbohmhepckk) periodically polling for updates.
Detects network, process, or command-line activity associated with the installation or update of malicious Chrome extensions linked to the BadBlocker campaign. The rule specifically monitors for known extension IDs: cmedhionkhpnakcndndgjdbohmhepckk (Adblock for YouTube), onomjaelhagjjojbkcafidnepbfkpnee (Adblock for Chrome), gekoepiplklhniacchbbgbhilidiojmb (AdBlock Suite), and ogcaehilgakehloljjmajoempaflmdci (Adblock for You).
Detects anomalous, high-frequency bidirectional WebSocket connections (wss/ws) originating from an endpoint that match patterns associated with Bluekit BitM. These connections typically carry DOM serialization events (rrweb-style) and session handshake data, indicative of a victim's keystrokes and mouse movements being relayed to an attacker-controlled browser session.
This rule detects network communication targeting specific external IP addresses associated with known SD-WAN infrastructure and common management endpoints (e.g., /dataservice/). This behavior may indicate an attempt to interact with, enumerate, or compromise SD-WAN controllers or managed edge devices.
Detects attempts to create rogue WordPress administrator accounts using indicators associated with the OptinMonster/TrustPulse supply chain attack. The rule specifically looks for POST requests to WordPress user creation endpoints (REST API, admin form, AJAX) containing campaign-specific identifiers like 'developer_api1', 'customer1usx', or patterns like 'dev_xxxxxx' in the response body or request URL. This covers the known vectors of the attack, aiming to identify the unauthorized creation of administrative users.
This rule detects suspicious update requests to the Ghost CMS Admin API that indicate an attempt at dynamic script injection. It specifically looks for PUT requests to `/ghost/api/admin/posts/` containing markers associated with Base64 decoding (`atob(`) and dynamic DOM manipulation (`appendChild`, `createElement`), or specific strings (`ghost_once_footer_`, `btoa(a.origin)`) known to be used in the Ghost ClickFix attack chain. This activity suggests an attacker is attempting to inject malicious JavaScript into Ghost CMS content, potentially leveraging a vulnerability like CVE-2026-26980.
Detects network activity associated with the 'Adblock for YouTube' Chrome extension (ID: cmedhionkhpnakcndndgjdbohmhepckk) as it retrieves malicious scripts from 'api.adblock-for-youtube.com'. These scripts are designed to access sensitive browser data, including session cookies, localStorage, and sessionStorage, and potentially interact with site-specific login form elements within the user's browser session.
This rule detects activity associated with malicious or intrusive browser extensions, specifically identifying network connections to a known malicious command-and-control (C2) endpoint, execution of specific scriptlet keywords related to MAIN-world injection in browser processes, and the presence of known 'BadBlocker' extension IDs on endpoints.
This rule detects potential exposure of API keys, tokens, or secrets within FTP directory listings. It specifically looks for network events on remote port 21 (FTP) where the 'RemoteUrl' contains keywords like 'api_key', 'apikey', 'token', 'secret', or 'key=' during a network signature inspection.
Detects unusually large FTP responses containing 'LIST' or 'NLST' commands, potentially indicating an attempt to exploit the Squidbleed vulnerability or similar data exfiltration over FTP. The rule specifically looks for network events on port 21 (FTP) where the action type is 'NetworkSignatureInspected' and the RemoteUrl contains either 'LIST' or 'NLST' with a string length greater than 4000 characters.
This rule monitors network logs (DNS, Proxy, or general network traffic) for communication with TON (The Open Network) blockchain-related infrastructure, including known C2 domains associated with TONResolver and specific blockchain API queries. It flags connections made by suspicious processes such as node.exe, powershell, wscript, cscript, or mshta, which are often used by malware to execute scripts or facilitate C2 communication.
This detection monitors for web requests to the specific URI path "/mifs/403.jsp". This path is known to be used by attackers to deploy a dormant Java-based webshell ("sleeper shell") on vulnerable Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) instances as part of an initial access campaign.
This rule monitors network, proxy, and DNS traffic for connections to the domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. It identifies potentially suspicious activity by aggregating requests and distinguishing between general outbound traffic and traffic to specific endpoints, such as search queries that may indicate data exfiltration or reconnaissance.
Detects network communication associated with BeepRAT, specifically identifying direct TCP connections to a known command-and-control IP address on a non-standard port or DNS requests directed at a specific malicious domain.
Detects anomalous network activity originating from Firefox (firefox.exe). The rule flags connections to port 8765 (associated with specific browser-based exfiltration PoCs) and any outbound connection on non-standard ports (excluding common browser ports: 80, 443, 8080, 8443, 8888, 53) directed to public IP addresses.
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