Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic associated with Djinn Stealer malware beaconing to a hardcoded C2 IP address (96.126.130.126) on port 58942. The detection specifically monitors for HTTP POST requests containing the malicious User-Agent 'telemetry-client/1.0' and 'application/octet-stream' content-type, which are characteristic of this stealer's exfiltration activity.
Detects network connections using the GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) protocol destined for non-internal (outside of RFC 1918) IP addresses. GRE is frequently used for tunneling traffic and, when used to communicate with external hosts, may indicate unauthorized tunneling or data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) network traffic originating from or destined to non-private (non-RFC1918) IP addresses. GRE is often used for tunneling protocols and can be abused to bypass network security controls or establish hidden command and control communication channels.
Detects browser processes invoking internal extension schemes and subsequently generating high volumes of network requests to e-commerce or advertising-related domains/URLs, indicating potentially malicious browser extension behavior such as affiliate tag substitution or ad-injection.
Detects HTTP requests that include an 'Upgrade' header (specifically for websocket or h2c) in conjunction with a 'Content-Length' header. This combination can be used to perform HTTP Request Smuggling or protocol-specific request queue poisoning attacks, particularly against load balancers or proxy servers like nghttpx.
Detects deployment of phishing landing pages on attacker infrastructure
This rule monitors Cisco SD-WAN environment logs for indicators of unauthorized or suspicious control plane activity, including rogue peering attempts, unexpected NETCONF interactions, certificate mismatches, and unauthorized vBond/vSmart connections. It filters out known local management subnets and utilizes a threat intelligence lookup to identify potentially malicious infrastructure attempting to interface with the SD-WAN fabric.
This rule detects administrative changes to Cisco SD-WAN environments, including policy pushes, template attachments, device onboarding, and tunnel modifications. It uses a risk-scoring mechanism based on the type of change and whether the activity occurs outside of standard business hours (06:00 to 22:00). High-risk events (score >= 65) trigger an alert, highlighting potential unauthorized infrastructure modifications or malicious device insertion.
Detects a module changing protocol, destination class, or cloud service after repeated failed connections on its primary channel. This behavior is indicative of malware like Kazuar attempting to establish C2 communication through alternative means when its initial attempts fail.
Detects manipulation of financial transaction data for financial theft
Detects anomalous SSH lateral movement originating from the Cisco SD-WAN Manager (vManage) to other control plane components (vSmart/vBond). This rule correlates network connections on port 22 with successful SSH logins using privileged or service-related accounts, which is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity or pivoting within an SD-WAN control plane environment.
Detects HTTP/1.1 Upgrade requests directed at an nghttpx proxy that contain a non-zero Content-Length header. This combination is the core primitive for the nghttp2-nghttpx-upgrade-queue-poison-poc attack, where the proxy incorrectly forwards request body bytes to the next backend connection user.
This rule detects attempts to exploit MyBB administrative controls. It monitors for two primary patterns: unauthorized privilege escalation where a limited ACP account creates a new Administrator (usergroup=4) user by bypassing access controls, and unauthorized access by limited ACP accounts to restricted administrative modules such as template and plugin management.
Detects potential HTTP Request Smuggling attempts targeting the nghttpx reverse proxy by monitoring for HTTP/1.1 'Upgrade: h2c' requests that include a 'Content-Length' header, or traffic containing known PoC-specific payloads, poisoned paths, or specific nghttp2 version strings that indicate exploitation activity.
This rule detects anomalous DNS query activity that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. It monitors for three specific indicators: excessive query volume to a single domain family within a short timeframe, the use of abnormally long DNS subdomain labels, and the transmission of TXT record queries from endpoints not acting as designated DNS servers.
This rule monitors for network connections that occur over non-standard ports (STUN, MQTT) or to specific suspicious IP addresses and domains, while excluding known legitimate user-facing applications. The detection aims to identify potentially malicious command and control (C2) communication or unauthorized network activity performed by non-standard processes.
Detects potential HTTP Request Smuggling attempts targeting nghttpx proxies. The rule monitors for malicious request patterns involving HTTP/1.1 Upgrade headers combined with a body (Content-Length) designed to poison the request queue, as well as specific path patterns (e.g., /upgrade, /poisoned) or server-agent identification of the nghttp2/nghttpx service.
Detects outbound network connections over port 8883 (MQTT/IoT) indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan. The rule identifies suspicious, unsigned, or non-whitelisted processes attempting to initiate multiple connections to external endpoints, masquerading as legitimate IoT telemetry traffic using MQTT client configurations.
This rule detects network connections from internal hosts to identified C2 or phishing infrastructure associated with the threat actor group UNC1151 (also known as Ghostwriter). It monitors both host-based network events (via DeviceNetworkEvents) and centralized network security logs (via CommonSecurityLog) for traffic targeting a curated list of known malicious IP addresses.
This rule detects network connections from internal hosts to identified C2 or phishing infrastructure associated with the threat actor group UNC1151 (also known as Ghostwriter). It monitors both host-based network events (via DeviceNetworkEvents) and centralized network security logs (via CommonSecurityLog) for traffic targeting a curated list of known malicious IP addresses.
Detects a browser session requesting a device code and repeatedly polling the token endpoint while the victim completes authentication elsewhere. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a device code phishing technique, often associated with the Tycoon threat actor.
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