Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,154 detections
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Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location
Telegram API Access
Sigma
Detects suspicious requests to Telegram API without the usual Telegram User-Agent
Detects Bitsadmin connections to IP addresses instead of FQDN names
Detects a potentially suspicious empty user agent strings in proxy log.
Could potentially indicate an uncommon request method.
Could potentially indicate an uncommon request method.
Detects Windows PowerShell Web Access
Detects unusual outbound network connections from ATM devices (identified by device names containing 'ATM', 'NCR', 'DIEBOLD', 'WINCOR'). The rule flags connections to public IP addresses, excluding common internal networks and standard web/DNS ports (80, 443, 53). Alerts are triggered if an ATM device shows a high number of connections, unique remote IPs, or significant data transfer, indicating potential compromise or unauthorized activity.
Detects network connections to malicious domains, associated IPs, execution of related malicious file hashes, registry persistence, and postinstall script executions related to UNC1069 NPM/Axios supply chain attacks deploying SILKBELL and WAVESHAPER.V2. Categorized into risk-scored scenarios.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests using a specific, hardcoded Internet Explorer 8 User-Agent string over a specific port. This combination is highly indicative of the cross-platform RAT deployed via the compromised Axios npm packages.
Detects network connections initiated by regsvr32.exe or cmstp.exe to external IP addresses on common web ports. This behavior can indicate the use of these legitimate Windows utilities for malicious purposes, such as downloading and executing malicious scripts or DLLs, often bypassing application whitelisting.
This rule detects attempts to exploit a vulnerability in ShareFile (CVE-2026-2699/CVE-2026-2701) by monitoring for HTTP GET requests to the `/ConfigService/api/StroageZoneConfig` URI path with a `h=` query parameter. This pattern is indicative of an attacker trying to leak API secrets.
Detects the creation of specific webshell files (GW.class, payload.bin, or dpr_<8-hex-digits>.jsp) associated with CVE-2026-4681 weaponization on PTC Windchill and FlexPLM servers, or suspicious web requests containing patterns which could indicate exploitation attempts.
This rule detects exploitation attempts against Oracle WebLogic servers by identifying HTTP requests that target known WebLogic administrative or internal endpoints and simultaneously contain indicators of command execution payloads within the URL. Specifically, it looks for URLs containing '/console/', '/wls-wsat/', '/bea_wls_internal/', or '/_async/' combined with keywords like 'cmd=', 'bash', 'powershell', 'wget', 'curl', 'base64', 'IEX', or 'Runtime.getRuntime'. The rule also requires the source IP to be different from the target IP, indicating an external attacker. This pattern is typical of Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploitation attempts, including those targeting vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-21962.
Detects EtherRAT-related host and network activity using reported artefacts including a known C2 domain (aurineuroth[.]com), a CDN-like beacon URL pattern, the creation of a svchost.log debug file, and various hidden PowerShell commands for system information discovery (AV, domain, MachineGuid, GPU).
This rule detects various stages of DeepLoad malware activity, including initial delivery via PowerShell execution policy bypass with IEX/IRM style ClickFix, network retrieval using mshta.exe, persistence mechanisms like scheduled task creation and WMI, fileless injection through PowerShell Add-Type compilation and suspicious child processes (LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe), credential stealing via filemanager.exe, and USB propagation indicators including specific C2 paths and LNK themed installer names. It also identifies known DeepLoad infrastructure domains.
Detects HTTP GET requests to the vulnerable Citrix NetScaler /wsfed/passive?wctx endpoint, specifically looking for the malformed query string used in CVE-2026-3055 exploitation where 'wctx' is present without an associated value or '=' symbol. This rule combines common network appliance and web server logs to identify potential exploit attempts.
Detects suspicious WebLogic HTTP requests with command execution indicators, specifically targeting known WebLogic endpoints and looking for patterns indicative of Remote Code Execution (RCE) payloads. The rule also correlates this activity with external IP addresses.
Detects exploitation attempts against Oracle WebLogic via suspicious HTTP requests and command execution patterns. The rule identifies WebLogic-specific endpoints combined with RCE payload indicators such as cmd, bash, powershell, wget, curl, or encoded payloads within the URI query.
Detects HTTP POST requests targeting the Langflow public flow build endpoint, which is vulnerable to unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-33017).
Detects web requests to Cloudflare workers.dev subdomains containing specific keywords commonly used in the EvilTokens device code phishing campaign. The rule specifically looks for a pattern like '[lure-type]-[3char-id].[username]-[domain]...workers.dev' to identify malicious URLs.
Identifies web requests to commonly abused PaaS platforms (Cloudflare Workers, Vercel, AWS Amplify) or the Microsoft device login endpoint.
This rule acts as a base to identify specific events for downstream correlation. To properly detect a device code phishing sequence (such as EvilTokens), correlate a PaaS access event followed by a device login event from the same Source IP within a 5-minute window.
This rule acts as a base to identify specific events for downstream correlation. To properly detect a device code phishing sequence (such as EvilTokens), correlate a PaaS access event followed by a device login event from the same Source IP within a 5-minute window.
This rule detects network communication (DNS queries, HTTP requests, or network connections) to the command and control (C2) domain 'checkmarx.zone', which is associated with the TeamPCP threat group. This activity indicates potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
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