Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,154 detections
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Detects DNS queries to known OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) domains like oastify.com, oast.pro, and oast.fun where the subdomain is unusually long (over 50 characters). Long subdomains may indicate encoded data exfiltration, a technique observed in the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-1731 to bypass egress filtering.
This detection identifies network connections from non-browser processes to known Large Language Model (LLM) API endpoints. While some connections may be legitimate developer or application traffic, unexpected processes connecting to these services could indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, corporate espionage, or misuse of AI services.
Detects HTTP requests to vulnerable Ivanti EPMM endpoints containing URI patterns associated with active exploitation of CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340. The rule looks for specific URI paths and the presence of a 'gPath' parameter, which is indicative of an exploitation attempt.
Detects outgoing network connections using the User-Agent 'ArkanixStealer/1.0', which is hardcoded in the C++ variant of the Arkanix Stealer.
This rule set detects attempts to download an 'install.sh' script from the domains 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai' using various methods. The first rule, 'openclaw_curl_install_script', specifically targets command-line tools like curl, wget, aria2c, and fetch. The 'openclaw_powershell_download' rule focuses on PowerShell commands (Invoke-WebRequest, iwr, Invoke-RestMethod, irm) used for downloading. The 'openclaw_aria2c_fetch_download' rule is redundant with the first rule, as it also targets aria2c and fetch. The 'openclaw_lolbin_download' rule identifies the use of Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil, bitsadmin, and mshta for the same download activity. Finally, the 'openclaw_http_install_sh' rule detects direct HTTP network requests to the 'install.sh' path on these domains. Collectively, these rules aim to identify potential initial access or execution attempts involving a suspicious installation script from specific domains.
Detects a potential attempt to downgrade a password manager client's encryption to a legacy, non-authenticated mode (e.g., AES-CBC). A malicious or compromised server can send a specially crafted response during login or synchronization that forces the client to use weaker cryptography. This can compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the user's vault, enabling further attacks like vault modification or padding oracles.
Detects a sequence of HTTP requests where the User-Agent shifts from 'WordPressAgent' to 'FingerPrint' within a short time window, a behavior associated with OysterLoader C2 registration and payload retrieval.
Detects potential exploitation of Apache bRPC command injection vulnerability (CVE-2025-60021) via the /pprof/heap endpoint.
This rule set detects potential post-exploitation activity and exploitation attempts targeting Ivanti EPMM (formerly MobileIron Core). The first rule, `ivanti_epmm_java_spawns_shell`, identifies suspicious process creation where a Java or Tomcat process (parent process) spawns a shell process (cmd.exe, bash, sh, or powershell.exe). This behavior is indicative of an attacker gaining remote code execution and using the compromised Java/Tomcat process to execute system commands. The second rule, `ivanti_epmm_http_featureusage_exploit`, detects HTTP requests to the `/api/v2/featureusage` endpoint that contain parameters indicative of Expression Language (EL) injection or format string abuse, specifically looking for `format=` along with keywords like `${`, `Runtime`, `exec`, or `getRuntime` in the URL. This suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the Ivanti EPMM application to achieve remote code execution.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 18789, the default gateway port for OpenClaw. Monitoring for unauthorized external access to this port helps identify exposed admin dashboards or exploitation.
Detects network connections to domains and IPs associated with the Notepad++ supply chain attack. These indicators are linked to the distribution of Cobalt Strike and the Chrysalis backdoor.
Detects HTTP requests containing the specific parameter 'k0f53cf964d387' in the query string or POST body. This parameter is the unique trigger used to activate the dormant 'base.Info' in-memory loader on vulnerable Ivanti EPMM instances.
Detects network connections to or from a known malicious Command and Control (C2) IP address (91.92.242.30) associated with malicious OpenClaw/ClawdBot skills.
This detection monitors for web requests to the specific URI path "/mifs/403.jsp". This path is known to be used by attackers to deploy a dormant Java-based webshell ("sleeper shell") on vulnerable Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) instances as part of an initial access campaign.
Detects HTTP POST requests to n8n webhook endpoints containing patterns associated with CVE-2026-25049, a type confusion vulnerability leading to Remote Code Execution. The detection looks for specific JavaScript destructuring or property access patterns used to bypass sanitization.
This rule detects when popular Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools initiate network connections to public IP addresses. This behavior can be indicative of legitimate administrative tasks, but also of malicious activity where adversaries use these tools for remote access and control within a compromised environment. The rule specifically filters out connections to private IP ranges to reduce false positives related to internal network communication.
Detects the DKnife gateway-monitoring framework, a toolset used by China-nexus actors for adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks, based on specific file, network, and persistence artifacts.
Detects HTTP requests where the User-Agent string contains a full URL pointing to 'temp.sh'. This technique was observed in the Notepad++ supply chain attack where attackers passed the URL of exfiltrated data back to their C2 server within the User-Agent header.
Detects network traffic indicative of the Diaoyu Loader downloading second-stage payloads from GitHub. The loader masquerades these payloads as image files within a WordPress-like directory structure.
This query hunts for network activity and other events related to specific domains (freefoodaid.com, wellnessmedcare.org) potentially associated with CVE-2026-21509. It searches DNS queries, network connections, generic web proxy/firewall logs, and URL click events to identify interactions with these domains.
Detects DKnife attempting to discover network information by sending a POST request with a specific password hash to a router management interface. This activity is associated with the DKnife framework, a China-nexus gateway-monitoring tool.
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