Aamir Muhammad
@AamirTrusted contributorCompletionist
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52 detections
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This rule detects various activities associated with the Charon ransomware, including DLL sideloading, ransomware deployment, payload reading, ransom note creation, shadow copy deletion, and service creation for persistence. It leverages specific filenames, process behaviors, and registry modifications to identify the threat.
This rule detects a combination of suspicious activities indicative of multi-stage malicious operations. It identifies GUP.exe beaconing to command and control (C2) servers, execution of known malicious hashes (SHA256 and SHA1), connections to C2 IP addresses and domains, suspicious filenames, DLL side-loading attempts, suspicious script/code execution, data exfiltration via curl, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist, systeminfo, netstat), secondary payload writes, and initial malicious execution originating from gup.exe or temporary directories.
This rule detects impossible travel scenarios for Azure logins by calculating the speed required to travel between two consecutive login locations for the same user. It flags logins where the calculated speed exceeds the maximum speed of a commercial passenger aircraft (900 km/h) and the logins originate from different countries. Mobile device logins are excluded to reduce false positives related to VPN usage.
KQL Query from file: threat-hunt-rokrat-malware---injection-and-steganography.kql
This Logic detects the presence of the malicious Chrome extension FreeVPN[.]One by identifying its unique extension ID across installed browsers. The logic further correlates this presence with network communications initiated by the extension to suspicious or untrusted domains. By combining extension enumeration with traffic analysis, the detection ensures high fidelity with minimal false positives. This layered approach strengthens visibility into malicious browser add-ons masquerading as VPN tools.
This rule detects the presence or execution of files identified by specific SHA256 hashes or file names associated with PAM-based backdoors on Linux systems. It monitors device events, file events, process events, and image load events for these indicators. The rule aims to identify the 'Plague' PAM-based backdoor or similar malicious PAM modules.
Threat Hunt: RoKRAT Malware – Injection & Steganography 🛠 High‑Level TTPs Initial Access: Malicious .lnk files within compressed archives. Execution & Persistence: PowerShell/BAT‑driven staged loaders with XOR decryption. Defense Evasion: Process injection into trusted Windows binaries & payload concealment via steganography. Command & Control: Abuse of pCloud, Yandex Disk, and Dropbox APIs with embedded tokens to blend with legitimate traffic.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the writing of both DLL and EXE files to the same path, followed by process masquerading (where the file name differs from the original file name) and subsequent DLL side-loading. It also attempts to identify the source URL if the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) is present, indicating a downloaded file. The detection chain tracks the process that writes the files, the parent process that initiates the file write, the process that performs the DLL side-load, and finally the loaded DLLs themselves, including various module load telemetry classifications.
This rule detects various stages of the Charon ransomware deployment and activity, including the writing of ransomware-related files to disk, malicious DLL side-loading, the deployment trigger, and the creation of ransom notes or service associated with Charon.
This rule detects various activities associated with the Kimsuky JavaScript dropper, including DNS requests to known malicious domains, creation of specific files (Themes.js, L298306.tmp), execution of certutil.exe or script.exe for decoding/encoding, suspicious command-line arguments for system information or task listing, and persistence mechanisms via scheduled tasks or registry modifications related to 'Themes.js' or 'Windows Theme Manager'.
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