Azure Sentinel
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This query was originally published by PWC Security Research Team.
BPFDoor is custom backdoor malware used by Red Menshen. The BPFDoor allows an adversary to backdoor a system and remotely execute codes without opening any new network ports or firewall rules.
BPFDoor is custom backdoor malware used by Red Menshen. The BPFDoor allows an adversary to backdoor a system and remotely execute codes without opening any new network ports or firewall rules.
This query looks for Entra ID group adds identified by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. It will require an corresponding app connector in Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.
'This query detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task usually used to deploy ransomware at scale.
It monitors whether a scheduled task is modified within the Sysvol folder in GPO.
Ref: https://bogusecurity.com/2019/12/26/persistence-and-execution-at-scale-via-gpo-scheduled-task/'
It monitors whether a scheduled task is modified within the Sysvol folder in GPO.
Ref: https://bogusecurity.com/2019/12/26/persistence-and-execution-at-scale-via-gpo-scheduled-task/'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Exploitation of CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep).
CVE-2019-0708, also known as BlueKeep, is a critical remote code execution vulnerability involving RDP. Soon after its disclosure, the NSA issued a rare advisory about this vulnerability, out of concern that it could be used to quickly spread malware. Attackers have since used this vulnerability to install cryptocurrency miners on targets.
Microsoft has issued updates for this vulnerability, as well as guidance for protecting operating systems that we no longer support. Microsoft Defender ATP also contains behavioral detections for defending against this threat.
The following query locates Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 machines initiating outbound connections to internal or public IP addresses on TCP port 3389. It filters out common RDP programs and scanning tools and shows the number of connections per machine. It can identify machines with relatively intense outbound network activity on the common RDP port (TCP/3389). You can use it to find processes that might be scanning for possible targets or exhibiting worm-like behavior.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708
https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1865726/nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-patch-remote-desktop-services-on-legacy-versions-of/
https://www.wired.com/story/bluekeep-hacking-cryptocurrency-mining/
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4500705/customer-guidance-for-cve-2019-0708
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/11/07/the-new-cve-2019-0708-rdp-exploit-attacks-explained/
CVE-2019-0708, also known as BlueKeep, is a critical remote code execution vulnerability involving RDP. Soon after its disclosure, the NSA issued a rare advisory about this vulnerability, out of concern that it could be used to quickly spread malware. Attackers have since used this vulnerability to install cryptocurrency miners on targets.
Microsoft has issued updates for this vulnerability, as well as guidance for protecting operating systems that we no longer support. Microsoft Defender ATP also contains behavioral detections for defending against this threat.
The following query locates Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 machines initiating outbound connections to internal or public IP addresses on TCP port 3389. It filters out common RDP programs and scanning tools and shows the number of connections per machine. It can identify machines with relatively intense outbound network activity on the common RDP port (TCP/3389). You can use it to find processes that might be scanning for possible targets or exhibiting worm-like behavior.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708
https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1865726/nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-patch-remote-desktop-services-on-legacy-versions-of/
https://www.wired.com/story/bluekeep-hacking-cryptocurrency-mining/
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4500705/customer-guidance-for-cve-2019-0708
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/11/07/the-new-cve-2019-0708-rdp-exploit-attacks-explained/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, MailSniper Exchange attack tool.
MailSniper is a tool that targets Microsoft Exchange Server. The core function is to connect to Exchange Server and search through emails. In support of this, it can perform reconnaissance, collection, exfiltration, and credential theft. MailSniper is used both by red teams running penetration tests, and by malicious actors.
Microsoft Defender Security Center may record the following alerts during and after an attack:
1. Global mail search on Exchange using MailSniper
2. Exchange mailbox or mail folder search using MailSniper
3. Enumeration of Active Directory usernames using MailSniper
4. Enumeration of the Exchange GAL using MailSniper
5. Access to Exchange inboxes using MailSniper
6. Password spraying using MailSniper
7. Enumeration of domains and user accounts using MailSniper
The following query detects activity commonly associated with attacks run with MailSniper.
Reference - https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper
MailSniper is a tool that targets Microsoft Exchange Server. The core function is to connect to Exchange Server and search through emails. In support of this, it can perform reconnaissance, collection, exfiltration, and credential theft. MailSniper is used both by red teams running penetration tests, and by malicious actors.
Microsoft Defender Security Center may record the following alerts during and after an attack:
1. Global mail search on Exchange using MailSniper
2. Exchange mailbox or mail folder search using MailSniper
3. Enumeration of Active Directory usernames using MailSniper
4. Enumeration of the Exchange GAL using MailSniper
5. Access to Exchange inboxes using MailSniper
6. Password spraying using MailSniper
7. Enumeration of domains and user accounts using MailSniper
The following query detects activity commonly associated with attacks run with MailSniper.
Reference - https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper
This query will show rare firewall rule changes using netsh utility by comparing rule names and program names from the previous day
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
'This detection will alert when RunningRAT URI parameters or paths are detect in an HTTP request.
Id the device blocked this communication presence of this alert means the RunningRAT implant is likely still executing on the source host.'
Id the device blocked this communication presence of this alert means the RunningRAT implant is likely still executing on the source host.'
'Identifies a match across various data feeds for domains related to an actor tracked by Microsoft as Star Blizzard.'
'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors.
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
In this query, we hunt for inbound emails having URLs from QR codes and send by non-prevalent senders
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