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Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for network connections using any protocols associated with recent RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT, and other malware campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
This activity is often followed by connections to copy-and-paste sites such as pastebin.com, stikked.ch, academia.edu, and archive.org. Many of these connections will occur on non-standard ports.
The following query looks for network connections using any protocols associated with recent RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT, and other malware campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
This activity is often followed by connections to copy-and-paste sites such as pastebin.com, stikked.ch, academia.edu, and archive.org. Many of these connections will occur on non-standard ports.
This query can be used to detect instances of a malicious insider creating a file archive and then emailing that archive to an external "competitor" organization.
This query looks for processes that load an older version of the system.management.automation libraries. While not inherently malicious, downgrading to PowerShell version 2
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Msiexec abuse.
Msiexec.exe is a Windows component that installs files with the .msi extension. These kinds of files are Windows installer packages, and are used by a wide array of legitimate software. However, malicious actors can re-purpose msiexec.exe for living-off-the-land attacks, where they use legitimate system binaries on the compromised device to perform attacks.
The following query detects activity associated with misuse of msiexec.exe, particularly alongside mimikatz, a common credential dumper and privilege escalation tool.
Reference - https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz/
Msiexec.exe is a Windows component that installs files with the .msi extension. These kinds of files are Windows installer packages, and are used by a wide array of legitimate software. However, malicious actors can re-purpose msiexec.exe for living-off-the-land attacks, where they use legitimate system binaries on the compromised device to perform attacks.
The following query detects activity associated with misuse of msiexec.exe, particularly alongside mimikatz, a common credential dumper and privilege escalation tool.
Reference - https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz/
This query identifies crashing processes based on parameters passed
to werfault.exe and attempts to find the associated process launch
from DeviceProcessEvents.
to werfault.exe and attempts to find the associated process launch
from DeviceProcessEvents.
'This hunting query uses Application events from the "MSSQL$MICROSOFT##WID" provider to collect SQL statements run against an AD FS database (e.g Windows Internal Database (WID)).
A threat actor might want to extract the AD FS data configuration settings with a SQL statement or modify it with an UPDATE SQL statement.
In order to use this query you need to create a server audit and database audit specification on your AD FS database.
Reference: https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand/blob/main/3_simulate_detect/credential-access/exportADFSTokenSigningCertificate.md
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
'
A threat actor might want to extract the AD FS data configuration settings with a SQL statement or modify it with an UPDATE SQL statement.
In order to use this query you need to create a server audit and database audit specification on your AD FS database.
Reference: https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand/blob/main/3_simulate_detect/credential-access/exportADFSTokenSigningCertificate.md
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
'
'This query will dynamically identify Exchange servers using common web paths used by the application in the csUriStem. The query
will then collect MDE alerts from the SecurityAlert table using the identified Exchange Server hostnames.'
will then collect MDE alerts from the SecurityAlert table using the identified Exchange Server hostnames.'
'This composite hunting query will highlight any HTTP traffic in CommonSecurityLog web proxies (such as ZScaler) that match known patterns used by red teaming tools potentially stolen from FireEye. Most FireEye red teaming tools are designed to mimic
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
'This hunting query looks for new Service Principals running queries that have not previously been seen running queries.'
MFA Spamming
KQL
'Identifies list of user impacted by MFA Spamming within a given time window,Default Failure count is 10 with default Time Window is 5 minutes'
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