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In the campaign where Bazarloader is delivered via emails containing pw protected zip attachments, regsvr32.exe is used to launch a malicious payload that is disguised as a JPG file.
'This query identifies modifications to COM registry keys to point to executable files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
ZLoader was delivered in a campaign in late summer 2021. This campaign was tweeted by @MsftSecIntel on twitter.
Use this query to find email stealing activities ran by Qakbot that will use "ping.exe -t 127.0.0.1" to obfuscate subsequent actions.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_equationgroup_c2.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Dragon Fly
KQL
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_dragonfly.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query searches Threat and Vulnerability Management (TVM) data for Orion software known to be affected by the Nobelium campaign.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query searches Threat and Vulnerability Management (TVM) data for Orion software known to be affected by the Nobelium campaign.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Sample query that search for .settingcontent-ms that has been downloaded from the web.
Through Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Outlook.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
Through Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Outlook.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query retrieves an inventory of SolarWinds Orion software use in your organization, organized by product name and ordered by how many devices the software is installed on.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query retrieves an inventory of SolarWinds Orion software use in your organization, organized by product name and ordered by how many devices the software is installed on.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
This query looks for a Word document attachment, from which a link was clicked, and after which there was a browser download.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
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