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This rule detects potentially suspicious file deletion activity originating from PowerShell processes (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe). It monitors for commands targeting temporary directories and specific file extensions (such as .vbs, .lnk, .js, or .ps1) combined with recursive deletion arguments. Additionally, it highlights scenarios where these PowerShell commands are executed by potentially unusual parent processes such as script engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe) or other command-line utilities.
This rule detects references to specific social media handles and identifiers associated with the MEK/NCRI (National Council of Resistance of Iran) influence campaign within email URLs, device process command lines, and miscellaneous device events. It is designed to identify potential engagement with or dissemination of influence-related content on endpoints and in email communication.
Detects instances where Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) has blocked outbound network connections initiated by critical Microsoft Defender components (e.g., MsSense.exe, MsMpEng.exe). Such blocks may indicate security software interference, misconfiguration, or attempts to disrupt endpoint security monitoring.
This rule detects potentially malicious usage of the Windows RegSvcs.exe binary, often used as a proxy for executing code. It monitors for two specific patterns: RegSvcs.exe being executed from user-writable directories (e.g., C:\Users\, C:\ProgramData\), or RegSvcs.exe spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, WScript, mshta), which is indicative of a living-off-the-land (LotL) attack technique to bypass application control or execute payloads.
Detects instances of the Windows utility RegSvcs.exe being executed from suspicious, user-writable directories (such as Temp or Public folders) or instances where RegSvcs.exe is used to spawn common command-line or scripting tools, which is a common indicator of living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) abuse.
Detects the execution of known Windows accessibility binaries (e.g., sethc.exe, utilman.exe) where the internal metadata or original filename indicates that the process is actually cmd.exe. This is a common technique used by adversaries to gain unauthenticated command-line access with SYSTEM privileges via accessibility features, typically during the login screen process.
This rule monitors DeviceFileEvents for the presence of specific browser extension files on disk known to be associated with malicious campaigns. It utilizes a predefined mapping of extension IDs to names to identify and flag files matching the known malicious browser extensions.
Detects the use of command-line tools like curl, wget, PowerShell, or Python to perform DNS over HTTPS (DoH) queries, identified by specific command-line arguments and connections to known public DoH resolvers. This behavior can be indicative of attempts to bypass local DNS monitoring or security controls.
Detects PowerShell processes initiating network connections to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers over port 443. This behavior is often associated with efforts to bypass standard organizational DNS logging and security controls by tunnelng DNS queries through encrypted HTTPS traffic.
This rule detects activity associated with known indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to European political targeting campaigns. It monitors network, email, and authentication logs for connections to specific malicious domains (including .onion addresses) and IP addresses. The rule spans multiple data sources, including device network events, Entra ID sign-in logs, cloud application events, and email communications.
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