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Google SecOps

@GoogleSecOps
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727 detections

Detects modifications to various Windows Registry keys under `CurrentVersion` that are commonly used for autostart extensibility points (ASEPs). This includes `Run`, `RunOnce`, `RunOnceEx`, `RunServices`, `RunServicesOnce`, `ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad`, `Policies\System\Shell`, `Policies\Explorer\Run`, `Group Policy\Scripts`, `Explorer\ShellServiceObjects`, `Explorer\ShellIconOverlayIdentifiers`, `Explorer\ShellExecuteHooks`, `Explorer\SharedTaskScheduler`, `Explorer\Browser Helper Objects`, `Authentication\PLAP Providers`, `Authentication\Credential Providers`, and `Authentication\Credential Provider Filters`. Adversaries often modify these keys to establish persistence on a system by ensuring their malicious code executes automatically during system boot or user logon.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0042
Detects modifications to the 'User Shell Folders' registry key, specifically the 'Startup' value. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence by ensuring a malicious payload is launched automatically when a user logs in.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0042
Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value, which controls RestrictedAdmin mode. Disabling RestrictedAdmin mode can expose credentials to compromise during Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections, making it easier for adversaries to harvest credentials during lateral movement. This rule identifies modifications to this critical security setting.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0040
Detects potential malicious modification of the 'UseLogonCredential' property value within the WDigest registry key to enable clear-text credential storage. This modification can allow attackers to dump credentials from LSASS memory.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0040
Detects modifications to specific Windows Registry keys that disable or modify features of internal Windows tools. These modifications are often used by malware to hinder system functionality or security mechanisms. The rule looks for changes to registry keys related to disabling the command prompt, control panel, run dialog, log off, password changes, workstation locking, registry tools, task manager, display settings, notification center, UAC consent prompt behavior, inactivity timeout, shutdown without logon, push notifications, and write protection for storage devices. The rule specifically looks for these registry keys being set to a DWORD value of '0x00000001' (to disable features) or '0x00000000' (to enable or modify behavior of certain features like UAC consent prompt, inactivity timeout, shutdown without logon, push notifications, and write protection).
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0037
This rule detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run keys that point to executable files located in suspicious folders. Adversaries often use Run keys for persistence, ensuring their malicious code executes automatically when a user logs in. The rule specifically looks for entries in common Run key paths (e.g., CurrentVersion\Run, Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Policies\Explorer\Run) where the associated executable's path is within directories commonly used by malware or temporary files (e.g., PerfLogs, ProgramData, Windows\Temp, AppData\Local\Temp, Recycle.Bin, Users\Default, Users\Public, or user profile subdirectories like Favorites, Music, Documents). A specific exclusion is included for legitimate Windows update processes that might write to temporary folders via RunOnce keys.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0037
Detects direct modification of autostart extensibility points (ASEP) in the Windows Registry using the 'reg.exe' utility. This rule specifically looks for 'reg.exe' being executed with the 'add' command and targeting common autorun registry paths such as 'Run', 'Userinit', 'Shell', 'Windows', 'User Shell Folders', and 'AlternateShell'. Adversaries often modify these registry keys to establish persistence on a system, ensuring their malicious code executes upon system startup or user login.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
2036
Detects modifications to specific registry keys under 'System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager' that are used for autostart extensibility points (ASEPs). These keys include 'SetupExecute', 'S0InitialCommand', 'KnownDLLs', 'Execute', 'BootExecute', and 'AppCertDLLs'. Adversaries often modify these keys to establish persistence or elevate privileges by ensuring their malicious code runs automatically during system boot or user login.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0034
This rule detects the use of the `reg.exe` utility to add or modify registry keys or subkeys in specific suspicious paths. These paths are often abused by adversaries for persistence, defense evasion, or to modify system behavior. The rule specifically looks for modifications to paths related to AppDataLow, Windows Policies, Winlogon, SecurityProviders (WDigest), and Windows Defender.
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0031
This rule detects attempts to establish persistence by modifying Windows Registry Run keys to execute PowerShell commands or scripts. It specifically looks for modifications to common Run key paths (CurrentVersion\Run, Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Policies\Explorer\Run) that contain keywords indicative of PowerShell execution, such as 'powershell', 'pwsh', 'frombase64string', download functions, hidden window styles, no profile, encoded commands, execution policy bypass, and various Invoke- commands (Invoke-Expression, Invoke-Command, Invoke-WebRequest).
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
1 year ago
0031
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