ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
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727 detections
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Detects Kerberoasting activity on endpoints via the execution of Impacket's GetUserSPNs with request flags or hashcat executing Kerberos TGS cracking modes (13100/19700).
Detects the pulling and execution of known backdoored ARTEX Docker Hub images followed by a shell execution within a container runtime on the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects behavior where a process initiates an outbound public network connection and shortly afterwards deletes its own executable file from user-writable directories, a technique commonly associated with malware cleanup such as info-stealers.
Detects outbound network connections to known C2 domains and IP addresses associated with the Lazarus TraderTraitor campaign (ROOFDECK/FLATROOF).
Detects the execution of the AdFind utility launched from a command interpreter batch file script (cmd.exe wrapping a .bat or .cmd script) performing multiple Active Directory reconnaissance queries, such as enumeration of persons, computers, organizational units, groups, trusts, or subnets.
Correlates a type 9 'seclogo' logon event with a cmd.exe named-pipe echo command (not spawned by services.exe) on the same device within a 30-minute window, which can indicate lateral movement or credential manipulation techniques.
Detects the Remote Desktop client (mstsc.exe) attempting to open the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) with PROCESS_VM_READ access rights (0x1010), which is indicative of credential dumping or process injection.
Detects potential malicious software installation via two branches: Branch A identifies MSI files downloaded from suspicious URLs or with meeting/update lures (e.g., Zoom, Google Meet) followed by msiexec installation within one hour. Branch B detects msiexec command lines referencing RMM tools (ScreenConnect, LogMeIn, GoToResolve) combined with paths like Downloads, Temp, or AppData.
Detects successful interactive sign-ins followed by non-interactive session replays using the same SessionId from a different IP address and country within 60 minutes, which is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack and subsequent session hijacking.
Detects a sequence where a Python process connects to GitHub to retrieve files associated with Armorsteal/got.py, followed by the execution of a 'chromelevator' binary from the C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\getthem directory within a 30-minute window.
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