ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
0 followers820 downloads3,277 copies25 likes12,025 views
727 detections
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Detects the presence of Tailscale binaries (tailscale.exe, tailscaled.exe) on a device within 24 hours of other campaign-specific toolkit components such as kitanai.exe, nandemo.exe, ufw.exe, or upd-ms.bat, indicating potential unauthorized remote access setup.
Detects PowerShell processes combining local loopback listener terms (such as HttpListener or TcpListener) and authentication or web request cmdlets referencing 127.0.0.1 or localhost, correlated with local network loopback connections.
Detects sandbox or training hosts performing DNS resolution followed shortly by outbound connections to public IP addresses on ports 80 or 443, which may indicate a firewall misconfiguration or unauthorized egress from isolated environments.
Detects potential tampering of Apache HTTP Server configuration files (httpd.conf) involving PHP engine or script handlers, followed closely by an Apache service reload (HUP signal) on the same device within a 10-minute window.
Detects command-line execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA) spawned via Windows Explorer containing download primitives and URLs, followed by immediate external network connections.
Detects instances where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave) is observed on a device shortly before an explorer.exe-initiated PowerShell, PWSH, or CMD process executes a command containing download strings or script execution patterns (such as DownloadString, Invoke-WebRequest, IEX, or encoded commands) referencing URLs.
Detects the execution of fsquirt.exe spawned by INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe where fsquirt.exe subsequently loads an unsigned or untrusted DLL, indicative of a potential TechHub DLL side-loading technique.
Detects the execution of OpenConnect VPN clients on non-sanctioned devices followed within a 4-hour window by high-volume internal network connections across multiple ports indicative of network service discovery or pivoting activity.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools within a 30-minute window following Microsoft Teams network activity on the same device, which can be an indicator of unauthorized remote access or interactive command and control setup via remote support applications.
Detects malicious behaviors involving the Chisel tunneling tool, including reverse SOCKS proxy connections with TLS verification skipped, cron-based persistence referencing watchdog scripts in hidden /var/tmp directories, and associated tool staging activities.
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