ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
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727 detections
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Detects unauthorized access to virtual hard disk (VMDK) files by non-standard processes followed by the creation or modification of sensitive offline credential artifacts such as ntds.dit or SYSTEM hives on the same host within a 2-hour window, indicating potential offline credential theft.
Finds BeyondTrust Remote Support (Bomgar) appliances at version 26.2.3 or earlier that have a public IP address, indicating a potentially internet-facing vulnerable appliance (CVE-2026-102764). Index and field names are placeholders to adapt.
Detects a sequence where an UpdraftCentral management request is made to a WordPress site followed by plugin installation or user creation requests from the same source within a 30-minute window, potentially indicating unauthorized plugin installation or webshell deployment via compromised management endpoints.
Detects host-side telemetry indicating Cairn agent worker artifacts, including specific process command line terms, tsec skill files and environment variables, combined with network connections to OpenRouter from the same host.
Detects a sequence where PowerShell or PWSH executes a web download referencing an .mp4 file using download cmdlets, followed within 1 hour by the execution of NetSupport Manager components (client32.exe or pcictlui.exe) from a user-writable path.
Detects successful Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) sign-ins using the device code flow where the originating device is neither registered nor trusted (managed or compliant), which may indicate suspicious authentication attempts or token abuse.
Detects the execution of NetSupport Manager client binaries (client32.exe or pcictlui.exe) from user-writable directories such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public folders, optionally spawned by script loaders or command interpreters.
Detects persistence mechanisms established via Registry Run/RunOnce keys, Startup folder modifications, or scheduled task creation using specific tool names such as client32 or pcictlui.
Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Detects an inbound QUIC/UDP port 443 burst targeting a Bun process (bun.exe or bun) from external IP addresses, followed by the process going completely silent on the network within a short time window. This pattern correlates with potential exploitation or denial-of-service conditions involving network parsing anomalies.
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