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Lacey Cochrane

@NullVectorX
USTrusted contributorCompletionist
11 followers159 downloads2,514 copies56 likes67,916 views

245 detections

Detects external users accessing internal Slack canvases and suspicious canvas deletion or access level changes. Canvases can contain sensitive runbooks, credentials, and organizational data, making these actions critical to monitor for potential data exfiltration or unauthorized access.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
507
Detects attempts to list, read, create, update, or delete Kubernetes secrets via the Kubernetes API server. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive information or manipulate the environment.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
9014
Detects the creation or deletion of Kubernetes namespaces and nodes via the API server. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence, expand their control, or disrupt the environment within a Kubernetes cluster.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
5010
Detects kubectl exec and port-forward operations via the Kubernetes API server. 'Exec' provides interactive shell access to a running container, while 'Port-forward' tunnels into the pod network, potentially bypassing network policies. This rule also detects 'attach' operations.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
608
Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods with dangerous security settings that could lead to privilege escalation or container escape. This includes configurations such as enabling hostNetwork, allowing privilege escalation within containers, or running containers as the root user (UID 0).
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
407
This rule detects potential credential stuffing or password spraying attacks against Okta by monitoring for a high volume of failed primary authentication attempts from a single source IP address or ASN within a one-hour window. It also incorporates corroborating evidence such as account lockouts, Okta ThreatInsight detections, and blocked requests. The rule surfaces both failed attempts and successful logins that might indicate a compromised account.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
9020
Detects the creation or modification of Kubernetes ClusterRoles, ClusterRoleBindings, and RoleBindings, which can be used for privilege escalation within a Kubernetes cluster. The rule specifically flags activities related to 'cluster-admin' roles as critical and other administrative roles as high severity.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
304
This rule detects potential session hijacking or token replay attacks against Okta by identifying a single Okta session (externalSessionId) being used from multiple distinct origins. It specifically looks for divergence in client country, device hash (dtHash), or operating system within the same session, rather than just multiple IP addresses, to reduce false positives. This behavior is indicative of a stolen post-MFA cookie being replayed by an attacker.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
13018
This rule detects when a user performs a security investigation query within Google Workspace using the Security Investigation Tool. It extracts the user's UPN, the data source being investigated, and the query itself. This can help identify potential insider threat activity, unauthorized investigations, or unusual administrative behavior.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
5012
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events in Okta that could indicate a help-desk social engineering attack or account takeover. Specifically, it looks for a user's password being reset, followed by the enrollment of a new MFA factor or device for that same user, all occurring within a short time frame (1 hour) and potentially from distinct session IDs or device hashes. This pattern suggests an attacker has gained initial access (e.g., via social engineering the help desk) and is immediately attempting to establish persistence by enrolling their own MFA device.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
5 months ago
11014
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