Lacey Cochrane
@NullVectorXUSTrusted contributorCompletionist
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Okta Sensitive OAuth Activity Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects sensitive OAuth activities within Okta, specifically focusing on OAuth client secret access, token revocation requests, and implicit flow requests. These activities can indicate potential compromise of OAuth clients, attempts to invalidate legitimate tokens, or the use of less secure OAuth flows that could be exploited.
Detects when users are added to groups or applications within Okta, which could potentially grant them elevated privileges. This rule monitors for events indicating changes in user membership for both groups and applications.
Detects Okta Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) factor enrollment, activation, update, and reset events. These events may indicate an attacker adding their own MFA factor post-compromise to maintain access or removing an existing factor to weaken account security and facilitate unauthorized access.
Kubernetes Service Account Token Theft
Cortex XDR
Detects non-legitimate processes attempting to read Kubernetes service account tokens or related sensitive files (ca.crt, namespace) from the standard service account path within containers. This rule filters out common and legitimate Kubernetes system processes to reduce false positives.
Detects the creation of DaemonSets in a Kubernetes cluster using the `kubectl` command-line tool. DaemonSets are designed to run a copy of a Pod on all (or some) nodes in the cluster, making them a powerful mechanism for persistence and cluster-wide credential harvesting by attackers. This rule specifically looks for `kubectl` commands that include 'daemonset' and either 'create' or 'apply' operations.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate flows that connect to external services commonly used for data exfiltration or command and control, such as webhooks, Gmail, Dropbox, Google Drive, Slack, RSS feeds, custom connectors, or generic HTTP requests/webhooks. This could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data from the Power Platform environment.
Detects the creation of new connectors in Power Automate (formerly Microsoft Flow) that establish connections to external services. This activity is identified by monitoring 'PutConnection' operations within PowerPlatform or MicrosoftFlow audit logs. Such an event could indicate an adversary attempting to integrate malicious services or exfiltrate data.
Detects suspicious modifications to Power Automate flow permissions, including sharing flows or changing role assignments. This could indicate a compromised account attempting to gain unauthorized access or persistence within the Power Platform environment.
Detects suspicious process execution originating from npm postinstall scripts, which can indicate a supply chain compromise. Specifically, this rule looks for npm, node, or npm.cmd processes with 'postinstall' or 'plain-crypto-js' in their command line, spawning suspicious executables like curl, wget, python, bash, sh, cmd, powershell, or wt, or connecting to known malicious domains/IPs or specific file names associated with the 'plain-crypto-js' RAT dropper.
This rule detects activity associated with TruffleHog, an open-source tool used for finding credentials and sensitive data, within cloud audit logs. It specifically looks for the 'trufflehog' string in the user_agent field, indicating that the tool was used to interact with cloud resources.
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