Lacey Cochrane
@NullVectorXUSTrusted contributorCompletionist
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ShadowCoerce NTLM Coercion via FssAgent
Cortex XDR
Detects unauthorized attempts to coerce the File Server VSS Agent (FssAgent) into authenticating to an attacker-controlled host. This is achieved by invoking the IsPathSupported (opnum 8) or IsPathShadowCopied (opnum 9) functions on the FssAgent RPC interface, which can be leveraged to capture NTLM hashes.
Detects anomalous AWS Bedrock activity indicative of LLMjacking by correlating multiple phases of an attack chain (Model Enablement, Reconnaissance, Probing, and Execution) performed by a single identity within a short timeframe. This rule identifies attackers leveraging stolen IAM credentials to discover available AI models, probe for vulnerabilities, and execute unauthorized inference requests at scale.
This rule detects indicators of the PitScaler campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances, exploiting vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772). It identifies the full attack chain including initial DTLS heap corruption exploitation, WHIPSHOT web shell C2 patterns, SLAPSHOT tunneling artifacts, web shell deployment files, httpd.conf PHP configuration tampering for persistence, privilege escalation via setuid /bin/sh modification, and anti-forensic log tampering.
Detects repeated occurrences of 'ValidationException' errors in AWS Bedrock 'InvokeModel' and 'Converse' API calls. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to probe or validate the usability of stolen AWS credentials by sending deliberately malformed requests, aiming to confirm successful authentication without triggering common access-related alerts.
Detects anomalous or potentially malicious LDAP queries on Domain Controllers, utilizing Event ID 1644 to monitor query filters. The rule identifies patterns commonly associated with reconnaissance and enumeration activities, including Kerberoasting (SPN enumeration), AS-REP roasting, delegation abuse, Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) enumeration, BloodHound collection, and bulk user, group, or computer discovery.
Detects anomalous AWS Bedrock model invocation patterns where a single identity accesses models across three or more distinct AWS regions within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of quota evasion, where attackers bypass per-region rate limits to maximize throughput when leveraging compromised credentials for unauthorized LLM use.
Detects unauthorized modification or deletion of AWS Bedrock model invocation logging configurations. Adversaries may use this technique to disable visibility into LLM usage or redirect logs to an attacker-controlled storage location to hide subsequent malicious activity.
Detects the use of the RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx function (opnum 58) on the Spoolss RPC interface. This function can be abused by attackers to coerce the Print Spooler service into authenticating against an attacker-controlled host via SMB, a technique commonly referred to as 'PrinterBug' or 'SpoolSample'. This authentication can subsequently be relayed to other services (such as AD CS or LDAP) to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects unauthorized modifications to AWS Bedrock Agent configurations, specifically identifying high-risk activities such as rewriting system prompts for potential prompt injection or attaching cross-account Lambda functions. The rule monitors for UpdateAgent, CreateAgentActionGroup, UpdateAgentActionGroup, and PrepareAgent events.
This rule monitors for known suspicious RPC interface and function calls indicative of post-exploitation activities. It specifically targets RPC patterns used for lateral movement (e.g., PsExec, wmiexec, dcomexec), authentication coercion (e.g., PetitPotam, PrinterBug), and credential theft (e.g., DCSync, SAMR enumeration) by filtering on specific interface UUIDs and operation numbers.
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